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Vol. 49 • April 1997 • No. 3

CONTENTS

The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade — *Michael A. Bailey, Judith Goldstein,* and *Barry R. Weingast* 309

The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina — *Edward L. Gibson* 339

Game Theory and the Spiral Model — *Andrew Kydd* 371

Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic — *Sheri Berman* 401

RESEARCH NOTE

Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research — *David Collier* and *Steven Levitsky* 430

The Contributors ii

Abstracts iii

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ABSTRACTS

The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy

POLITICS, COALITIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

By MICHAEL A. BAILEY, JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, and BARRY R. WEINGAST

The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) changed the structure of the making of U.S. trade policy and made possible a dramatic reduction in tariffs. The authors demonstrate that the key institutional innovation in the RTAA was its mandate to lower tariffs through reciprocal agreements with foreign nations. The expansion of exports under the RTAA enhanced political support for increasingly lower U.S. tariffs. Evidence that export interests were positively associated with congressional votes for free trade supports this view.

The Populist Road to Market Reform

POLICY AND ELECTORAL COALITIONS IN MEXICO AND ARGENTINA

By EDWARD L. GIBSON

Governing parties face two fundamental tasks: they must pursue policies effectively, and they must win elections. Their national coalitions, therefore, generally include two types of constituencies—those that are important for policy-making and those that make it possible to win elections. In effect, governing parties must bring together a policy coalition and an electoral coalition. This distinction sheds light on how the transitional costs of major economic policy shifts can be made sustainable in electoral terms. It also provides a starting point for analysis of how two of Latin America's most important labor-based parties, the Peronist party in Argentina and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, maintained electoral dominance while pursuing free-market reforms that adversely affected key social constituencies. Peronism and the PRI are conceived of as having encompassed historically two distinctive and regionally based subcoalitions: a metropolitan coalition that gave support to the parties' development strategies and a peripheral coalition that carried the burden of generating electoral majorities. This framework permits a reconceptualization of the historic coalitional dynamics of Peronism and the PRI and sheds light on the current process of coalitional change and economic reform.

Game Theory and the Spiral Model

By ANDREW KYDD

When one state engages in a military buildup, other states sometimes take this as a sign that it is more aggressive or expansionist than they previously thought. Some argue that such increases in mutual suspicion can drive arms races and even lead to war. Psychological bias is often invoked to explain this pattern of growing suspicions leading to hostility. This article presents an incomplete information model of an arms race and investigates when escalations should rationally generate increased fears and when, in order to reduce such fears, security seekers can refrain from building. It shows that escalations rationally provoke fear even in the absence of bias and that weak states and states facing high costs of arms racing and war will be especially likely to refrain from building as a way of signaling benign intentions.

Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic

By SHERI BERMAN

Practically everywhere one looks these days the concept of "civil society" is in vogue. Neo-Tocquevillean scholars argue that civil society plays a role in driving political, social, and even economic outcomes. This new conventional wisdom, however, is flawed. It is simply not true that democratic government is always strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society. This essay shows how a robust civil society helped scuttle the twentieth century's most critical democratic experiment, Weimar Germany. An important implication of this analysis is that under certain circumstances associationism and the prospects for democratic stability can actu-

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ally be inversely related. To know when civil society activity will take on oppositional or even antidemocratic tendencies, one needs to ground one's analyses in concrete examinations of political reality. Political scientists should remember that Tocqueville considered Americans' political associations to be as important as their nonpolitical ones, and they should therefore examine more closely the connections between the two under various conditions.

Democracy with Adjectives

Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research

By DAVID COLLIER and STEVEN LEVITSKY

The recent trend toward democratization in countries across the globe has challenged scholars to pursue two potentially contradictory goals. On the one hand, they seek to increase analytic differentiation in order to capture the diverse forms of democracy that have emerged. On the other hand, they are concerned with conceptual validity. Specifically, they seek to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied to cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not appropriate. This article argues that the pursuit of these two goals has led to a proliferation of conceptual innovations, including numerous subtypes of democracy—that is to say, democracy "with adjectives." The article explores the strengths and weaknesses of alternative strategies of conceptual innovation that have emerged: descending and climbing Sartori's ladder of generality, generating "diminished" subtypes of democracy, "precising" the definition of democracy by adding defining attributes, and shifting the overarching concept with which democracy is associated. The goal of the analysis is to make more comprehensible the complex structure of these strategies, as well as to explore trade-offs among the strategies. Even when scholars proceed intuitively, rather than self-consciously, they tend to operate within this structure. Yet it is far more desirable for them to do so self-consciously, with a full awareness of these trade-offs.

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THE INSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN TRADE POLICY

Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade

By MICHAEL A. BAILEY, JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, and BARRY R. WEINGAST

WHILE economists are unanimous in their agreement that free trade yields significant welfare gains, no consensus exists on the political conditions that will support such a policy. According to conventional views, even if politicians recognize that society gains from trade, they are constrained because of an organizational bias in society: those who lose from increased trade have a greater incentive to organize than those who benefit from the policy. The outcome is an overrepresentation of protectionist interests and constant pressure on governments to close markets. Although logically consistent, the conventional view suffers from the empirical problem that democracies have and continue to support free-trade policies. We argue that political institutions, by structuring conflict over trade policy, provide an explanation for the divergence between analyses that predict economic closure and the empirical reality of relatively free trade.

The importance of institutional rules is no more apparent than in the case of the creation and sustenance of a liberal trade policy in the United States. For most of the nineteenth century, protectionist interests successfully pressured Congress to maintain high barriers to trade. Although the interest of manufacturers in cheap raw materials periodically led Congress to enact a "free list" for such products, the interests of consumers and exporters were largely ignored. This situation changed dramatically with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) in 1934, which changed the way trade policy was determined and set the stage for American leadership in efforts to expand international trade.

Trade liberalization in the United States was neither inevitable nor irrevocable; the structure of American politics in the middle of the twentieth century made trade policy still vulnerable to protectionist impulses that were difficult to contain. Hence, any explanation of American trade policy must account not only for the passage of the

World Politics 49 (April 1997), 309–38

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RTAA but also for how and why Congress sustained the trade liberalization program in the ensuing decades.

This essay offers an explanation for the timing, form, and efficacy of this institutional innovation. The argument has two parts. First, we ask what explains the choice of the rules and procedures that characterized the 1934 foundational legislation. Two rule changes distinguished the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act from its predecessors: (1) it mandated reciprocal, not unilateral, tariff reductions, and (2) it authorized trade agreements on the basis of a simple majority vote instead of the supermajority mandated in the Constitution. We argue that these changes in trade rules reflected efforts by the Democratic Party to build support for free trade within the party and to insulate trade policy from a future Republican Congress.

Second, the essay demonstrates how these two institutional changes shifted American policy to a more liberal equilibrium. The real significance of the RTAA was not just that it was passed; had it been overturned a few years later, after all, it would be nothing but a footnote to American trade history. Rather, the RTAA had an impact because it created a dynamic of political support for free trade. In contrast to perspectives in which Congress is seen to have abdicated control of trade policy, we focus on how presidential agreements affected congressional preferences. The president's "bundling" of international and domestic tariffs made low tariffs politically durable. The ensuing increases in world trade made members of Congress more willing to trade off the political risk of reducing U.S. tariffs for the political benefits of gaining access to foreign markets. This change in preference enabled presidents to ask for and receive ever broader authority to negotiate tariff reductions.

We divide this essay into three sections. Section I begins with the empirical observation of the breakdown of partisan divisions on trade and the emergence of a free-trade coalition, a puzzling occurrence given the previous decades of trade closure and continued congressional involvement in trade policy. Section II explains the origins of the RTAA and shows how political factors changed the institutional environment of trade policy. We offer a model in which members of Congress, the president, and a generic foreign government interact on trade policy. Section III examines the dynamic effects of the RTAA and shows how its institutional structure changed the political environment of trade policy. Not only did the RTAA dramatically increase the political durability of low tariffs, but, as we show through an empirical examination of congressional voting in 1953 and 1962, the rise in exports that it brought about also led to changes in congressional preferences on trade.

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I. Bipartisan Support for Trade Policy

One of the anomalies in the history of U.S. politics involves the relatively rapid change in the political salience of trade policy. Where trade policy was a defining issue of partisan politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it all but disappeared from the political arena by the 1950s. Indicative of the charged political climate of early tariff policy-making were policy shifts that followed changes in control of government. As shown in Table 1, trade policy through 1934 shows tremendous predictability. In general, when Democrats took office, they lowered tariffs; when Republicans held office, they did the opposite. This ability to predict policy based on party control disappears in midcentury. After World War II the parties look increasingly similar in their voting behavior. (See Figures 1 and 2.) What explains this change in congressional preferences?

There is an impressive body of literature suggesting that change occurred because Congress abdicated its control over trade policy when the RTAA transferred authority for setting tariffs to the president. By one account, the work associated with tariff legislation had become so onerous that members of Congress chose to remove themselves from the process.[1] While revision of tariff schedules had never been a simple matter, the process had degenerated into a frenzy of special-interest

Table 1
Partisan Patterns of Major Tariff Legislation
(1846–1934)

Year	*Control of Congress and Presidency*	*Legislation*	*General Effect*
1846	Democrat	Walker	reduced tariffs
1861	Republican	Morrill	increased tariffs
1890	Republican	McKinley	increased tariffs
1894	Democrat	Wilson-Gorman	reduced tariffs
1897	Republican	Dingley	increased tariffs
1909	Republican	Payne-Aldrich	reduced tariffs
1913	Democrat	Underwood	reduced tariffs
1922	Republican	Fordney-McCumber	increased tariffs
1930	Republican	Smoot-Hawley	increased tariffs
1934	Democrat	RTAA	reduced tariffs

[1] Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy*, 2d ed. (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), 14; Douglas Nelson, "Domestic Political Preconditions of U.S. Trade Policy: Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamics," *Journal of Public Policy* 9 (January–April 1986).

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

FIGURE 1
VOTING IN SENATE ON PASSAGE OF MAJOR TRADE LEGISLATION BY PARTY
(1913–62)

SOURCES: The votes included in the figures are as follows: 1913 Underwood Tariff, 1922 Fordney-McCumber Tariff, 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 1934 RTAA, 1937 RTAA Renewal, 1940 RTAA Renewal, 1943 RTAA Renewal, 1945 RTAA Renewal (HR3240), 1951 RTAA Renewal in Senate (HR1612) (House vote was voice vote), 1953 RTAA Renewal (HR5495), 1954 RTAA Renewal (HR9474), 1955 RTAA Renewal (HR1), 1958 RTAA Renewal (HR12591), 1962 Trade Expansion Act (HR 11970). Votes in favor of the Underwood Tariff, the RTAA , all RTAA renewals, and the Trade Expansion Act are coded as votes for liberalization. Votes against the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff bills are coded as votes for liberalization. The 1948 vote on RTAA renewal (HR6556) has been omitted, as it was particularly idiosyncratic. Most Democrats opposed renewal because of the inclusion of protectionist "peril point" provisions. Obviously, their votes were not votes against liberalization.

lobbying and deal making with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill of 1930. Schattschneider wrote of the "truly Sisyphean labor" to which the legislation condemned Congress—eleven thousand pages of testimony and briefs collected over forty-three days and five nights of hearings.[2] Many therefore viewed the congressional move to delegate authority to change tariffs as a means of avoiding months of tedious hearings and negotiations.

Several factors make it difficult to accept that the fundamental motivation for the RTAA was a desire to reduce workload. First, the easiest way to reduce workload is to do nothing. Clearly this was not the choice of Congress.[3] Second, there were many other ways to streamline

[2] E. E Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressure and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics as Shown in the 1929–1930 Revision of the Tariff* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1935), 29, 36.

[3] Karen Schnietz, "To Delegate or Not to Delegate: Congressional Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Foreign Trade, 1916–1934" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1994), 125.

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

FIGURE 2
VOTING IN HOUSE ON PASSAGE OF MAJOR TRADE LEGISLATION BY PARTY
(1913–62)

SOURCES: See sources for Figure 1.

the process than by delegating to the president: existing organizations could have been used differently, new committees and commissions could have been created, and rules and formulas could have been established. There is no specific reason to choose delegation to the president over these other possibilities.

An alternative explanation, the "lesson thesis," suggests that the disastrous results of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff led members of Congress to the realization that they were politically incapable of passing a rational tariff policy. Destler, for example, states that members of Congress chose to delegate in order to "protect themselves from the direct one-sided pressure from producer interests that had led them to make bad law."[4]

This perspective, too, is problematic. First, one should be wary of models of congressional behavior in which members of Congress act against one-sided political pressure in the interest of good public policy for no political reason. If such behavior were the norm, one would expect Congress to "protect" itself from the American Association of

[4] I. M. Destler, *American Trade Politics*, 2d ed. (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994), 14. See also Robert Baldwin, *The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985); and Robert Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

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Retired People, the National Rifle Association, farmers, oil producers, and almost all other interests as well. Needless to say, this is not generally the case; even on trade, Congress has continued to represent producer interests on more than a few occasions.[5]

Second, problems with the process in 1930 do not prove that Congress was incapable of getting the process back under control. A new set of congressional leaders with different priorities could have organized procedures differently so as to achieve a better outcome than that of 1930. Congress had gone through such reorganizations in 1894, 1909, and 1913; and it did it again in 1934, when the Senate defeated many amendments seeking exemptions for particular industries, precisely the type of amendments that had spun the process out of control in 1930.[6]

Third, Schnietz provides strong empirical evidence against the lesson thesis. If congressional learning did in fact occur between 1930 and 1934, one would expect to see a substantial number of members who voted for the Smoot-Hawley Tariff coming around to support the RTAA.[7] To the contrary, however, voting on *both* the Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the RTAA was almost wholly partisan: Republicans favored the former and opposed the latter, whereas Democrats opposed the former and favored the latter. Of 225 representatives and senators who voted on both bills, only nine voted in a manner consistent with the lesson thesis. The remaining 96 percent voted either along party lines or in a manner inconsistent with the lesson thesis. The difference between 1930 and 1934 is therefore not that protariff members of Congress learned from their mistake, but rather that there were too few Republicans in 1934 to oppose the Democrats' initiative.[8]

As well as disagreeing on why Congress would grant new tariff-setting powers to the president, analyses differ over the actual effect of the RTAA on American policy. One view, consistent with the deflection and lesson theses, holds that the RTAA allowed Congress to wash its

[5] See, for example, Destler (fn. 4), 71.

[6] Stephan Haggard, "The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934," in G. John Ikenberry, David Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *The State and American Foreign Economic Policy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), 113.

[7] Schnietz (fn. 3), 129.

[8] Ibid., 128–32. For a third thesis, see Thomas Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984). He argues that the New Deal coalition was not one of workers, poor, and minorities, but one of capital-intensive industries, investment banks, and internationally oriented commercial banks. Haggard offers a persuasive critique. First, Ferguson writes that this new coalition congealed "by 1938"; it was not clear that it was a powerful force in 1934 when the New Deal was clearly hostile to capital, pushing policies such as the NIRA. Second, Ferguson studies the preferences of one block to explain outcomes, ignoring other actors; see Haggard (fn. 6), 98.

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hands of tariffs, leaving the president free to pursue rational liberalization of U.S. trade policy unburdoned by members of Congress or the special interests they represented.

This view is overstated. While congressional activity on tariffs declined dramatically after the RTAA, it still remained substantial; Congress continued to play a central role at every step along the path to trade liberalization. Congress extended the RTAA ten times between 1934 and 1962, debating and often modifying the legislation.[9] In 1937, for example, an amendment to limit reductions on agricultural duties to whatever level would be necessary to equalize production costs initially passed the Senate and was only defeated on a revote.[10] In 1948, 1951, and 1955, Congress added peril-point provisions that tied duties to the minimum rates necessary to protect domestic producers against imports. In 1953 Republicans in Congress agreed to a one-year renewal only when the president promised not to enter into any new trade negotiations.[11] While Congress never overturned the RTAA, members were clearly always ready to make significant changes if they thought them necessary.

Another view of the effects of the RTAA focuses on new presidential agenda-setting power on trade matters. Thus, Haggard argues that the RTAA allowed executive officials to mold "the agenda and policy process to their own ideological, bureaucratic and above all, international interests."[12] With this power, the executive could ensure that trade policy was as liberal as politically possible, given congressional preferences on trade. This argument, however, is not sufficient to explain the long pattern of trade liberalization. Agenda-setting power allows the agenda setter to choose its most preferred policy from among those policies acceptable to the institutionally defined electorate. Once a new status quo policy is established, however, agenda-setting power is useful only in keeping bills off the floor. As long as preferences remain constant, no further policy changes are possible; the agenda setter and the floor median find no policies preferable to this new status quo. Hence, if a progression of policy change is observed, agenda-setting power is not a sufficient cause; something else must have enabled the successive changes.

[9] For a more complete review of congressional policy, see Judith Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Pastor (fn. 4); John Evans, *The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Ernest Preeg, *Traders and Diplomats* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973).

[10] Yung-Chao Chu, "A History of the Hull Trade Program, 1934–1939" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1957), 311.

[11] Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (fn. 1), 33; Pastor (fn. 4), 101.

[12] Haggard (fn. 6), 91.

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What does explain the passage of the RTAA in 1934 if not that Congress abdicated control or sought to deflect political pressure? Our answer is simple: the Democratic leadership wanted lower tariffs that would pass an increasingly skeptical Congress and would be able to outlive Democratic control of Congress. The institutions they designed met this goal. In that the Democrats chose to lower tariffs through reciprocal "bundled" agreements with other nations, some delegation to the president to negotiate these agreements was necessary. The significant change, however, was not delegation to the president per se. Rather, the RTAA marks a turning point in American trade history because first, it moved Congress away from legislating unilateral tariffs, and second, it granted these bilateral agreements the status of treaties without a two-thirds supermajority.

II. The Political Origins of the RTAA

With its passage of RTAA in 1934, Congress ushered in a new era of trade policy. The legislation amended the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act to allow the president to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with foreign governments. In exchange for increased access to foreign markets, the president was authorized to reduce U.S. duties by up to 50 percent.[13] No specific duties were established or changed by the act and no congressional approval of agreements was required.[14]

That such legislation was passed in 1934 is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that there was no groundswell of support for tariff reductions. Although highly critical of Hoover's tariff policy during the 1932 campaign, Roosevelt was no staunch free trader. While he associated himself with the Wilsonian international wing of the Democratic Party, at times he sounded very much like a protectionist. In the 1932 presidential campaign he announced that his trade doctrine was "not widely different from that preached by Republican statesmen and politicians" and that he favored "continuous protection for American agriculture as well as American industry."[15]

[13] Reciprocity in trade legislation had a long history before the RTAA. The first explicitly reciprocal treaty was with the German Zollverein in 1844. (It was rejected by the Senate.) Many of the previous measures on trade contained provisions for reciprocal agreements, but none was nearly as broad as the RTAA. See Goldstein (fn. 9), 93; and Sharyn O'Halloran, *Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).

[14] Consistent with section 317 of the 1922 Fordney-McCumber Act, concessions granted any one country would be generalized to all others receiving most-favored-nation status.

[15] Haggard (fn. 6), 106–7.

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In addition, many in the Roosevelt administration, including leading members of Roosevelt's brain trust, such as Rexford Tugwell, Raymond Moley, and Adolf Berle, placed a low priority on trade liberalization. They considered America's problems to be domestic in nature, requiring domestic solutions. Many members of the administration were thus willing to impose higher duties in the interests of insulating the domestic economy from the world economy. Such sentiment manifested itself in provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agriculture Assistance Act (AAA), which allowed the government to limit imports if they were deemed to be interfering with the operation of the programs.[16]

Rank-and-file Democrats also were not united in favor of lower tariffs. The increase in blue-collar and immigrant labor in the party proved a counterweight to southern preferences for lower tariffs.[17] Led by Al Smith, 1928 presidential nominee and 1932 contender for the nomination, a major wing of the party supported high tariffs. Indicatively, during the debate on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, most Democrats tempered their opposition to high tariffs.[18]

The Great Depression did little to enhance the appeal of lower tariffs for these Democrats. During this period, efforts to cut tariffs unilaterally were dismissed as politically foolhardy. In 1931 Democratic representative and future speaker Henry Rainey of Illinois argued that such a unilateral reduction of tariffs would trigger "a flood of imports."[19] During the 1932 presidential campaign, Roosevelt's advisers roundly criticized Hull's proposal of unilateral reductions, and when Roosevelt was given a draft of a speech calling for a flat 10 percent reduction in tariffs, Democratic senators Pittman (Nevada) and Walsh (Montana) warned him that support for such a measure would be politically dangerous.[20] Even after the election, reciprocal cuts were so politically risky that Roosevelt delayed introducing the RTAA to Congress for a

[16] See Cordell Hull, *Memoirs* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 353; Goldstein (fn. 9), 154–58; and Haggard (fn. 6), 97. The clash between free traders such as Secretary of State Hull and protectionists led Moley to comment that "nothing which we have been dealing with has been subject to such wide differences of opinion"; Goldstein (fn. 9), 142. By 1935 Moley was an outspoken critic of the administration's trade policy. See Arthur Schatz, "Cordell Hull and the Struggle for the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program, 1932–1940" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1965), 240.

[17] While Southern Democrats favored lower tariffs, they were not necessarily free traders. In general they shared the belief with Republicans that tariffs were necessary to protect wages, but disagreed with Republicans on the extent and level of tariffs. See Goldstein (fn. 9), 92.

[18] Frank Fetter, "Congressional Tariff Policy," *American Economic Review* 23 (September 1933), 416.

[19] Henry Tasca, *The Reciprocal Trade Policy of the United States* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938), 14.

[20] Goldstein (fn. 9), 142; Schatz (fn. 16), 51.

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year, out of fear that controversy over trade would derail high-priority items like NIRA.[21]

Thus, the Democratic Party faced two constraints in fashioning a trade policy. First, its old platform of unilateral tariff reductions had questionable support, both within and outside the party. Roosevelt's promise of tariff reform would need to be fulfilled some other way. Second, Democrats wanted to provide some durability for their preferred policies. As shown in Table 1, Democratic tariffs had lasted only as long as the Democrats' tenure in power. Although we now consider 1932 as a watershed election in American history, it was not perceived as such at the time. In 1934 the electoral future looked highly uncertain to Democrats. The Republicans after all had dominated national elections for the previous seventy years, and were it not for the depression, they would probably still have been in office. Given this uncertainty, Democrats were looking for a way to make their tariff policy last beyond their tenure. House members were facing midterm elections in November and the president was in the second year of what could be a single four-year term. Party members had not forgotten their last effort at tariff reform, in 1913, when Woodrow Wilson fought long and hard for the Tariff Act, only to see it scuttled when the Republicans regained office.

The institutional form of the legislation introduced in 1934 should be understood as serving dual purposes. The key innovation—coupling liberalization of U.S. tariffs with reductions in foreign tariffs—accomplished two tasks. First, the form of tariff reduction served to broaden the range of tariff cuts acceptable to a majority in Congress. As shown below, it is easier to build majority support for reductions (and harder to form a coalition to negate an agreement) when tariffs are coupled with changes in access to foreign markets. Second, it provided durability for the reform efforts. Granting the president the right to negotiate "bundled" tariff treaties increased the costs to Republicans of increasing tariffs. Under the RTAA, even small adjustments could unravel many agreements and harm U.S. export interests. We take up each of these points in turn.

Building a Coalition in Favor of Free Trade

We begin with a spatial model to show how the RTAA enabled the Democrats to ensure domestic political support for lower tariffs. The preferences of political actors in a two-dimensional policy space are shown in Figure 3. The horizontal axis represents the level of domestic tariffs,

[21] Tasca (fn. 19), 24.

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

FIGURE 3
ACTOR PREFERENCES AND PREDICTED TARIFF UNDER PRE-RTAA SYSTEM

ranging from low to high. The vertical axis represents the level of foreign tariffs. Political actors have ideal policies, that is, tariff rates they prefer over all others. They prefer policies closer to their ideal policy to those farther away. To simplify matters, we consider the rest of the world to be one nation that sets the foreign tariff levels. For simplicity, we also assume Congress is unicameral.

The historical record is clear about the location of actors in this space. First, all American political actors prefer foreign tariffs to be as low as possible.[22] Therefore their ideal points line the horizontal axis in Figure 3. Second, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the parties had distinct preferences, with Republicans the party of high tariffs and Democrats the party of low tariffs. (See Table 1.) The median in Congress (the "floor median") is located between the Democratic median and the Republican median. During periods of Republican majority, the median was among the Republicans with the lowest ideal rates; during Democratic majorities, it was among the Democrats with the highest ideal rates.

While presidents shared the partisan inclinations on trade, their national constituencies and their more direct concern with international

[22] Of course, the relative weight members assign foreign tariffs vis-à-vis imports will vary. Our assumption, however, is that all members put at least some weight on foreign tariffs and prefer lower foreign tariffs for any given level of U.S. tariffs.

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diplomacy made them less protectionist than the median member of their parties.[23] The foreign government is assumed to be a unitary actor with an ideal point along the vertical axis, preferring U.S. tariffs to be as low as possible.

We also need an assumption about who controls the agenda in Congress. The literature on Congress propounds various views on the question—that committee, party, or the median controls the agenda.[24] Because committee and party leaders took a leading role in the passage of the RTAA, we assume here that the agenda setter is some party leader who is distinct from the floor median. For convenience, we refer to this actor as the Democratic or Republican median.[25]

To analyze congressional choice on the RTAA, we compare outcomes with and without the RTAA. We assume that the Democrats control the presidency and Congress, as they did in 1934. First, consider the situation without the RTAA. Under the existing tariff system, the Democratic median proposes unilateral changes in U.S. tariffs that are passed or rejected by the floor median. Because the tariff changes are unilateral, the Democratic median is constrained to making proposals along a horizontal line extending in both directions from the status quo Q_0. In other words, the Democratic median treats the foreign tariff level as fixed and makes a proposal affecting only U.S. tariff levels.[26]

The Democratic median will propose a policy that makes it better off than the current status quo and is preferred by the median to the current status quo. In this situation, the status quo is the protectionist level of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. The Democratic median would maximize its utility by proposing Q_1, the policy closest to the Democratic median among those preferred by the floor median to the status quo. Figure 3 illustrates the Democratic median's choice.

Such an outcome is suboptimal for many actors. There is a range of policies that would make the Democratic median, the floor median, and the foreign government better off than Q_1. In Figure 4 we have

[23] For an argument relating constituency size to concern of the representative with particularistic policies, see Barry Weingast, Kenneth Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," *Journal of Political Economy* 89 (June 1981).

[24] See Barry Weingast and William Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress," *Journal of Political Economy* 96 (June 1988); Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); and Keith Krehbiel, *Information and Legislative Organization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

[25] See, for example, Hull (fn. 16), 357; Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (fn. 1). The argument of the paper holds even if we were to assume the floor median could set the agenda.

[26] The level of foreign tariffs at the start of the game is assumed to be the level of tariffs the foreign government sets if there is no agreement with the U.S. As long as Congress sets tariffs unilaterally, the foreign country is assumed to choose this level of tariffs.

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

FIGURE 4
GAINS FROM RECIPROCITY

drawn the preferred sets of the floor median and the foreign government to Q–; all points in the interior of the indifference curves are preferred to Q–. The shaded region at the intersection of the two preferred sets is an area of potential mutual gain; both of those actors and the Democratic median would be better off at any other outcome in the region than at Q–. When decision making is unilateral, however, Congress cannot move outcomes into this region.

Next consider outcomes under the RTAA. First, the president proposes an agreement to the foreign government subject to the minimum tariff provisions enacted by Congress. The foreign government then accepts or rejects the proposal. Even if there is no agreement, Congress still has the option of passing tariff legislation. The criterion for the foreign government is whether the proposal would leave it better off than if there were no proposal. From above we know that if there is no agreement, Congress will pass a unilateral tariff bill and the outcome will be Q–. The foreign government will therefore accept the proposal if the proposal makes it better off than Q–.

In making the proposal, the president seeks to bring the policy as close as possible to his ideal point. If the president proposes an agreement that is rejected by the foreign government, Congress would then set tariffs as if there were no agreement and choose Q–. Since the president is to the left of the Democratic median and the median, he would

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seek larger reductions, if possible. In particular, he would choose the point closest to his ideal point among policies above the congressional minimum tariff level and preferred to Q– by the foreign government. Agreement A* in Figure 5 is such a point: of the points above the minimum tariff level and preferred by the foreign government to Q–, it is the point closest to the president's ideal policy.

It is essential, then, that the Democratic median choose an appropriate minimum tariff level. If the minimum tariff level is too low—that is, if the president is able to choose a policy that makes the median worse off than the status quo—the floor median will not support the RTAA. Therefore, the Democratic median will set the minimum tariff level such that policy chosen by the president is as close as possible to its ideal point given that the policy is still preferred by the floor median to the status quo. As in Figure 5, such a minimum tariff level will go through the point of tangency between an indifference curve of the Democratic median and the indifference curve of the foreign government through Q–. The floor median will prefer the outcome chosen by the president, A*, to Q–.

The result is that under the RTAA, the Democratic median maintains a minimum tariff level of T*, the floor median supports the RTAA, and the president proposes an agreement at A* that is accepted by the foreign government. The implication is that the RTAA makes perfect sense given the preferences of American political actors and an assumption of strategic behavior. No extra assumptions about congressional laziness or congressional antipathy toward special interests are necessary. Moreover, it is not a story of congressional abdication.

This framework can also be used to explain why other means of trade liberalization were not chosen. First, we can see why congressional Democrats were not satisfied with letting the president use existing treaty-making powers. The Constitution requires that a treaty must be approved by a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Hence, the president would be constrained to please the member at the sixty-seventh percentile of protectionists in order to achieve mutual reduction in tariffs. In fact, the inability to garner a two-thirds majority in the Senate had repeatedly nullified trade treaties negotiated in the nineteenth century. Under the RTAA, by contrast, the process was structured to require only a simple majority to pass tariff reductions—a clever institutional innovation that allowed the Democrats to sidestep the constraints of the existing institutional structure.

A second possible alternative to the RTAA was that Congress could have tried to devise a strategy to induce foreign reductions in tariffs.

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

FIGURE 5
PREDICTED TARIFF UNDER THE RTAA

However, the sequential nature of tariff making could undermine such efforts. Consider first the commitment problems in trying to effect mutual lowering of tariffs. Suppose the status quo is Q and Democrats take over Congress and are considering tariff reductions. We know Congress can pass Q–. Suppose, however, that the Democrats propose some reduction beyond Q– and argue that this large cut in U.S. tariffs will be accompanied by a cut in foreign tariffs. It would be difficult for such a strategy to work. First, the foreign country will be sorely tempted not to lower tariffs, because it favors low U.S. tariffs and high foreign tariffs over low U.S. tariffs and low foreign tariffs. To avoid this outcome, the Democrats would have to commit to raising tariffs if foreign tariffs were not lowered. But here, the temptation would be on the Democrats. Would they be willing to raise tariffs even though they prefer low tariffs? How credible would their threat be? Both the foreign country and the median in Congress would have good reason to doubt that the Democrats would carry out their threat.

These commitment problems would be exacerbated by problems associated with political uncertainty. Even if the Democrats were to lower tariffs beyond Q– and the foreign country responded in kind, the Democrats could lose an election and the incoming Republicans could raise tariffs back to Q. The foreign country would be forced to retreat

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from its reduction of tariffs. This possibility could make the foreign government reluctant to lower tariffs in the first place.

The RTAA and Political Durability

The second need for congressional Democrats was to provide some political durability for the tariff cuts. To demonstrate the increase in durability of trade liberalization under the RTAA, we first model the extreme volatility of trade policy under the pre-RTAA institutional structure. Under that regime, changes in trade policy followed the classic American legislative process. Parties originated legislation in Congress. If Congress passed a tariff bill, it went to the president. If the president signed the legislation, it became law; if he vetoed it, it went back to Congress where a two-thirds majority was required to override the veto.

Given this framework, we can determine equilibrium outcomes for different states of the world. Because tariffs were set unilaterally by each country, choices can be represented in one dimension. Consider a period in which there is a Republican majority in Congress, a Republican president, and a status quo tariff rate of Q_1 as in Figure 3. As long as the Republicans maintain their majority, Q_1 is stable. While the median prefers all points between Q_1 and Q_-, defined to be a point equidistant from the median as Q_1 but on the left side of the median, the congressional Republicans prefer none of these points.

Now suppose that after an election, the Democrats become the majority party. The status quo, Q_1 is no longer an equilibrium, as there are points that both the Democratic agenda setters and the median prefer to such a policy. In order for the Democrats to get as close to the Democratic median as possible, given that the bill must be approved by the median, they will introduce and pass the policy Q_-. The Democratic president will prefer Q_- to Q_1 and will not veto the legislation. Once at this point, policy remains stable as long as the Democrats remain in power. As soon as the Republicans recapture Congress and the presidency, however, the status quo inherited from the Democrats is no longer an equilibrium. By similar reasoning as above, the Republicans would pass Q_-.[27]

[27] The situation is more complicated if there is divided government. These results are deemphasized, since major tariff legislation occurred under unified rule. The equilibria are easily established, however. If the status quo is Q_- and an election puts a Republican president and Democratic Congress in power, the Democrats will propose nothing and the status quo will remain Q_-. However, if the status quo is Q_- and a Democratic president and Republican Congress win, the Republicans will propose an increase in rates. Because an increase to Q_+ would be vetoed by the Democratic president, the Republicans will only propose an increase to the maximum point in the preferred set over Q_- held by the veto player to the left of the median. The veto player to the left of the median is the member the Republicans will need in order to pass a two-thirds override of a presidential veto. Similar reasoning estab-

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According to this logic, tariff shifts should occur when a new party obtains control of government. In fact, this is what occurred. In 1860, 1897, and 1920 the Republicans gained unified control of government after periods of unified Democratic control. Every time, they raised tariffs. In 1845, 1892, 1912, and 1930 the Democrats gained unified control of government after periods of unified Republican control. Every time, they lowered tariffs.

The dynamics of trade policy under the RTAA provide a stark contrast. To demonstrate the implications of the RTAA for the durability of low tariffs, we analyze two situations, one in which preferences are constant and one in which preferences change. First, we assume that the ideal point of the floor median remains constant, even as parties change. This is plausible if, say, moderate Democrats are replaced by moderate Republicans. We have already seen that the status quo after the passage of the RTAA is A^*.

What happens after an election? If Democrats retain the presidency and Congress, there is no change: the minimum tariff level prevents the president from negotiating further tariff reductions, and congressional agenda setters desire no change.[28] If the Republicans win control of both the presidency and Congress, change will be possible only if the median prefers the unilateral tariff of the foreign country to A^*.[29] However, since the RTAA moved the median to an outcome preferred over Q (and Q–), this will not be the case and no change will be possible.

Of course, members of Congress are likely to change their preferences after an election. We therefore consider the kind of changes in preferences that would be necessary to allow Congress to overturn the RTAA and resume unilateral tariff making. The president's preferences

lishes the remaining possibilities. On divided government and tariff policy, see Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence," *International Organization* 48 (Autumn 1994).

[28] We concentrate on the implications of unified government, as most tariff changes occurred under unified government. The effects of divided government can be determined in this framework, however. There is also no change if the Democrats retain control of Congress but a Republican wins the presidency. The foreign government would not negotiate a U.S. tariff increase, as the president might wish, because it prefers the status quo to such an agreement. Congressional agenda setters would also desire no change. If Republicans win Congress and Democrats retain the presidency, there is also no change, as the president can veto any efforts by Republicans to increase tariffs and not be overturned. A sufficient condition for this is that D is equal to, or to the right of, the thirty-third percentile member. In 1934 this was an accurate depiction of the situation. Democrats controlled about two-thirds of the seats in Congress. The median Democrat was therefore roughly at the thirty-third percentile. Given that T^* was chosen by Democrats when they could have chosen a higher level, we know that they will not prefer a tariff increase to T^*. They would therefore not support any effort to overturn a presidential veto of legislation raising tariffs.

[29] Here it is assumed that the foreign country raises tariffs back to their unilateral tariff level if the U.S. nullifies the RTAA agreements and raises tariffs.

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play a key role. If a protectionist president were elected, the floor median would have to shift to the right to the extent that he or she prefers some point along the foreign unilateral tariff line to the RTAA outcome, A*. In Figure 6 the floor median would have to shift to a point equidistant from A* and the foreign unilateral tariff line. To determine this point, we find an ideal point, C', at which the indifference curve through A* touches the foreign unilateral tariff line. If the change were any smaller, no protectionist legislation would be possible, as the floor median would not be satisfied with any possible unilateral tariff legislation.

On the other hand, if a Democratic or internationalist Republican president were elected, protectionist legislation would have to overcome a presidential veto. Hence legislative success would depend, not on the floor median, but on the veto pivot. The veto pivot in this case is the member at the sixty-sixth percentile (ranked from least to most liberal); if this member and all more protectionist members prefer a bill to the status quo, then Congress can pass the legislation over the veto of the president. In this case, then, preferences in Congress would have to change such that the veto pivot—one of the more liberal members of Congress—would shift to C' on the right of the current median (as in Figure 6). In other words, if the president is a free trader, Congress would almost certainly not be able to raise tariffs, even if the Republicans were to take power.[30]

Could we expect the president to be liberal on trade? Two factors indicate yes. First, being elected from a national constituency makes a president less susceptible to narrow demands for protection and more interested in policies that benefit the whole country.[31] Second, the president's international role often inclines him to use trade liberalization as a tool in achieving geopolitical goals.

III. Long-Term Effects of the RTAA

The importance of the RTAA was more than simply creating the mechanism for short-term tariff reform. More important, it set up a self-

[30] Schnietz (fn. 3) has made a similar claim, that the RTAA increased the durability of liberal trade policies. She uses a one-dimensional model to argue that holding the median constant, the RTAA mitigates protectionist potential. That is, when Republicans take over after Democrats, a relatively liberal Republican president will raise tariffs to co-opt the extremist Republican Congress. We make a much stronger claim. Holding the median constant, the RTAA *eliminates* protectionist potential under general conditions. In addition, in our model the RTAA's low tariffs are robust to a whole class of preference changes. Also, note that, in Schnietz's argument, the RTAA will lead to more protection than if there were no RTAA when a Republican president and Democratic Congress win; a Republican president in this situation would be able to use his authority to preempt more extreme Democratic cuts in tariffs.

[31] Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (fn. 23).

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

FIGURE 6
STABILITY OF TARIFFS UNDER THE RTAA

reinforcing dynamic that led to increasingly lower tariffs. In this section, we discuss the effects of RTAA-induced increases in trade on congressional and foreign preferences. We argue that congressional support for the expansion of presidential authority to negotiate cuts in American and foreign tariffs was forthcoming because the RTAA increased the importance of exports to constituents in congressional districts, which, in turn, changed the trade policy preferences of key congressional representatives. This section illustrates how RTAA structures influenced support for free trade. First, we show that trade did expand under the RTAA. Second, we model how expanding trade affects political preferences. Third, we present empirical evidence that increasing exports were a significant factor in transforming trade from a partisan to a bipartisan issue.

Tariffs declined precipitously and trade expanded dramatically during the tenure of the RTAA. In 1934 American duties averaged over 46 percent; by 1962 they had fallen to 12 percent. World trade increased from 97 trillion dollars at the war's end to 270 trillion at the time of the 1962 Trade Act. U.S. exports grew from $2.1 billion in 1934 to $3.3 billion in 1937 and from $9.8 billion in 1945 to over $20 billion in 1962.[32]

[32] E. S. Woytinsky and W. S. Woytinsky, *World Commerce and Governments: Trends and Outlooks* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), 48; Pastor (fn. 4), 332.

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While much of this increase in world trade can be attributed to the emergence of the world economy out of depression and war, two factors point to the substantial role of the RTAA. First, the RTAA allowed the president to take the lead in fighting for increased international openness. After the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, a retaliatory spiral of beggar-thy-neighbor polices had left the world with monumentally high tariffs. Given protectionist pressures inherent in democracies, we have good reason to believe that without the RTAA, tariffs would have moved downward at a far slower pace. Second, there is evidence that U.S. trade with treaty nations increased more rapidly than with nontreaty nations. For example, in the first three years of the program, exports to twenty-two nations with which agreements existed increased by 61 percent as compared with a 38 percent increase to other nations.[33]

There are two ways such changes in trade flows could change political preferences. First, the ideal points could shift. Since we assume that all members of Congress prefer zero foreign tariffs, the only room for movement would be along the horizontal axis. For any given level of foreign tariffs, that is, a member's ideal level of U.S. tariffs could shift. Such a shift could mean members of Congress would prefer unilateral reductions in U.S. tariffs.

A second possible change is that the relative weight members put on the two dimensions may change. Consider a generic situation in which a political actor has preferences over a two-dimensional policy space, with a level of X on the horizontal axis and a level of Y on the vertical axis. If the actor places equal weight on each dimension, the actor's indifference curves will be circular; the actor is willing to trade off loss of units of X in equal proportion to gain in units of Y. Suppose the actor comes to place greater weight on the X dimension such that she is willing to exchange a small gain in X for a larger loss in Y. The indifference curves would then become vertical ellipses; small changes in X would require large changes in Y in order to make her indifferent. By contrast, if the actor comes to place a greater weight on dimension Y, her indifference curves will be horizontal ellipses; small changes in Y would require large changes in X to make the actor indifferent.

We emphasize this latter process; that is, changing weights on issue dimensions allowed the president to expand the coalition in favor of free trade. Increasing trade flows increased the size and profits of export interests but had a lesser effect on import-competing interest (as some

[33] Tasca (fn. 19).

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industries facing import competition disappeared). A similar effect occurred abroad, as exports to the U.S. activated foreign export interests. The net effect was that the importance placed on foreign access increased relative to the importance of protecting domestic industry. Indifference curves of actors in each nation changed, with American curves being transformed from circles to flat horizontal ellipses and foreign indifference curves becoming vertical ellipses.

Consider Figure 7 in which A* (from Figure 5) is the status quo. The only way that Congress will lower the minimum tariff level is if doing so makes congressional agenda setters (the Democratic median) better off. If the preferences of the Democratic leaders—both in terms of the location and relative weights—remain the same, no such policy will exist. If, however, increasing trade has led the foreign government and members of Congress to place relatively more weight on export interests, the indifference curves will shift. The indifference curves of U.S. actors will flatten and those of the foreign government will broaden, as indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 7. This means that the set of policies preferred over the status quo by the agenda setters will no longer be empty and a new equilibrium at a point such as A** will be possible.

The implication for the dynamics of trade liberalization is now apparent: increasing trade leads members of Congress and foreign actors to place more weight on access to foreign markets, indifference curves then shift, and greater liberalization is possible.

Changing Congressional Preferences

We can now return to our original query: what explains the depoliticization of American trade policy after World War II? We noted that trade was a highly partisan issue in the pre-RTAA period. Historically, Democrats voted for tariff reductions; Republicans voted for tariff increases. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that voting in Congress on trade measures before the RTAA generally followed party lines.

As the RTAA program progressed, the partisan composition of trade voting began to change in important ways. In 1943 some Republicans voted for the program for the first time, and by the mid-1950s many Republicans supported the program. Of course, Republicans were still more protectionist than Democrats and many voted for protectionist amendments to the RTAA renewal legislation. Nevertheless, their support for the general principles of the RTAA was no longer in doubt. In our empirical analysis, we concentrate on the period from 1953 to 1962, a time that saw the beginnings of substantial changes in partisan voting patterns on trade.

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

FIGURE 7
HOW TARIFFS SHIFT IN RESPONSE TO CHANGES IN PREFERENCES

The logic we offer above suggested that changes in votes will be a function of export interests in congressional districts. With passage of increasing numbers of trade agreements, highly competitive American products were pouring into foreign markets. This increased flow of trade led to growth in the size, number, and profitability of export industries. Import competition was more than offset by increased opportunities in the export sector, so at least until the mid-1960s the overall effect was that producers and their representatives placed increased importance on foreign access relative to the importance of protecting domestic industry.

To explore the relationship between exports and congressional preferences, we estimated probit models on congressional voting on major trade bills in 1953 and 1962. First, data were compiled on the industrial composition of each district. Data for whole-county districts were found primarily in the *Congressional District Data Book*.[34] Data for urban districts were available in Labor Department publications.[35] Details are discussed in the appendix.

[34] United States Bureau of the Census, *Congressional District Data Book: Districts of the 87th Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961).

[35] United States Department of Labor, *Employment and Earnings: State and Local Areas*, 1939–1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

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Trade and production data were gathered for each industry. After 1958 trade data were available for twenty-two industrial categories in the *U.S. Commodity Exports and Imports as Related Output*.[36] Because trade data from before 1958 were not available in the same format,[37] we constructed a correspondence between the types of data (see the discussion in the appendix). Production data for manufacturing, mining, and agriculture were collected from various issues of the *Census of Manufactures,* the *Census of Agriculture,* and *Historical Statistics of the United States*.[38]

Based on these data, we constructed trade variables for each district. First, we calculated a weighted average of exports as a proportion of shipments for each district. For example, suppose district A were 50 percent agriculture and 50 percent chemicals. If national exports as a percentage of shipments were 10 percent in agriculture and 20 percent in chemicals, district A's weighted average export share of production would be 0.5 * 0.1 + 0.5 * 0.2 = 0.15. Second, in a similar manner, we calculated a weighted average of import penetration change as a proportion of shipments for each district. The idea is that the greater the pressure on domestic producers from imports, the larger the increase in import penetration.

In the estimations, we controlled for party and ideology, recognizing that these factors have traditionally been important determinants of a representative's trade preferences. For party, we have standard dummy variables. For ideology, we use Poole and Rosenthal's estimates for the social and economic preferences of representatives.[39]

We analyzed votes that occurred in 1953 and 1962, years that spanned the important development of bipartisan support for free trade. For 1953 we considered three votes: the Curtis Motion to recommit an RTAA alternative trade bill; the Smith Motion to recommit the RTAA; and the renewal of the RTAA. Of the three, the most controversial, and thus the most divisive, was the Curtis Motion. The motion

[36] United States Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Commodity Exports and Imports as Related to Output* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, various editions).

[37] Max Lechter, *U.S. Exports and Imports Classified by End-Use Commodity Categories, 1923-1968* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Business Economics, 1970).

[38] United States Bureau of the Census, *The Census of Agriculture* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, various editions); United States Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Manufactures* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, various editions); United States Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).

[39] For an explanation of the ideology scores, see Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, "Patterns of Congressional Voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (February 1991). For a formal theory of low-dimensional ideological consistency, see Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger, *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

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recommitted a protectionist trade bill that had been introduced as a substitute for the renewal of the trade agreements program. (The vote on final passage of the renewal was very lopsided [363-34] and is therefore not amenable to probit analysis. To compensate for the skewed vote, we used ordered probit analysis, combining the vote on passage and the Smith Motion.)[40] For 1962 we analyzed the Mason Motion, a protectionist effort to substitute a one-year extension of the RTAA for the Trade Expansion Act and the vote on the final passage of the bill.

The results in Table 2 are consistent with our expectations. The coefficients on export share of production are all significant at a 10 percent (one-tailed) level and are significant at a 5 percent level for four out of five estimates. The coefficients on the control variables also accord with our expectations. Increases in import penetration were consistently associated with opposition to trade liberalization. Surprisingly, party affiliation was often not significant, although multicollinearity between party and ideology prevents us from drawing any conclusions about the independent effect of party. Poole and Rosenthal's X, associated with liberalism-conservatism, was generally significant, as was their Y, generally associated with civil rights.

Because the estimated coefficients from probit analysis are not directly interpretable, we provide estimates of the effect of change in exports on the probability of liberal trade voting for different groups within Congress. Table 3 does this for the 1953 vote on the Curtis Motion and Table 4 does this for the 1962 vote on final passage. The first column is the predicted probability of voting for trade liberalization by an "average" representative, computed as someone with average levels of all independent variables for the whole subgroup. The second column is the predicted probability of voting for trade liberalization when exports are increased by one standard deviation and all other variables are held constant at their average levels. The third column repeats the exercise for an increase of two standard deviations in exports.

From Tables 3 and 4 we see that exports explain why—for the first time in a century—members of the Republican Party abandoned their party's traditional stance on trade. Table 3 shows for 1953 that a two standard deviation increase in export share of production increased the probability of a free trade vote from 65 percent to 84 percent for an "average" representative. The effect is stronger for Republicans, moving

[40] On ordered probit analysis, see Keith Krehbiel and Doug Rivers, "The Analysis of Committee Power," *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (November 1988).

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TABLE 2
PROBIT ANALYSIS OF HOUSE VOTING
(1953 AND 1962)[a]

	1953			1962	
Legislation	*HR5894*	*HR5495*	*HR5495*	*HR11970*	*HR11970*
Vote	*Curtis Motion*	*Smith Motion*	*Smith Motion & Passage*	*Mason Motion*	*Passage*
Constant	−1.47	−1.40	0.85	0.34	−0.06
	(3.16)	(1.86)	(1.87)	(0.74)	(0.16)
Exports	12.48	10.60	8.27	4.25	4.78
	(3.71)	(1.93)	(2.51)	(1.53)	(1.98)
Import penetration	−197.52	−216.98	−191.10	−126.62	−76.87
change	(7.41)	(4.84)	(6.49)	(2.76)	(1.97)
Democrat	0.7	0.68	1.24	−0.01	0.59
	(1.52)	(1.02)	(2.76)	(0.02)	(1.22)
P&R's X	−0.72	−4.82	−1.96	−5.3	−2.37
	(1.17)	(4.54)	(3.18)	(6.33)	(3.53)
P&R's Y	−0.95	3.25	1.27	0.05	−1.01
	(1.85)	(3.75)	(2.44)	(0.07)	(1.56)
Threshhold	—	—	2.39	—	—
	—	—	(15.69)	—	—
Number of observations	408	423	400	429	428
Percentage correctly predicted	74	95	87	86	82
Votes Free Trade	244	196	183	256	300
Moderate	—	—	183	—	—
Protectionist	164	227	34	173	128

[a] t-statistics are in parentheses.

them from a 49 percent probability of voting for free trade at average levels of exports to a 75 percent probability of a free-trade vote when export shares increased by two standard deviations. The effect of exports was less important for Democrats, but most Democrats were already committed to free trade.

Table 4 reveals a similar story for the 1962 vote. An increase in two standard deviations of export shares of production raised the probability of a free-trade vote by 12 percent for all members. For Republicans, those least likely to vote for free trade in 1962, the effect was an increase of 21 points. Democrats in 1962 were still highly likely to vote for free trade, but an increase of two standard deviations in export

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TABLE 3
ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES OF LIBERAL TRADE VOTING IN 1953 BY GROUP AND CHANGE IN EXPORTS

	Probability of Voting for Trade Liberalization		
	Exports	*Average Exports Plus 1 Standard Deviations*	*Average Exports Plus 2 Standard Deviations*
All	0.65	0.75	0.84
Republicans	0.49	0.63	0.75
Democrats	0.78	0.85	0.90

share of production increased their likelihood to vote for free trade by 6 percent.[41]

The general conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that exports affect congressional voting on trade. Higher levels of exports led to increased support for free trade. Although analysts have often suggested that exports should play such a role, the effect has been difficult to demonstrate. It is hard to get export data on the district level, and often the effects are overwhelmed by the more traditional variables of party, region, and ideology. By extrapolating export shares of production from district-level industrial data and using probit simulations, we have shown that an export effect was felt by congressional representatives. Members of Congress do vote based on constituent interests, and their views on American trade policy shifted as exports grew.

CONCLUSION

Through detailed analysis of both the logic and empirical effects of liberalization,this paper provides a new interpretation of the transformation of U.S. trade policy in the middle of the century. By examining both the causes and economic ramifications of the RTAA, we are

[41] American trade politics has historically shown strong regional variation. We also ran estimations that included regional dummy variables in our equations. The result was consistent with the previous analysis; but there were interesting differences across regions. Among the Republicans in 1953, an increase of two standard deviations in exports led to a 13 percent increase in the chance that representatives from the Northeast will vote for trade liberalization, an 18 percent increase for those from the Midwest, and a huge, 51 percent hike for those from the West. For Democrats in 1953, the comparable numbers were 2 percent Northeast; 10 percent Midwest; 31 percent West; 8 percent South; 5 percent Border (no South or Border results are reported for Republicans given the scarcity in the number of representatives). In 1962 the increase in probability of a free-trade vote with a two-standard deviation rise in exports was for Republicans: 8 percent Northeast; 25 percent Midwest; and 18 percent West. For Democrats in 1962, the vote effects were 2 percent Northeast; 2 percent Midwest; 5 percent West; 11 percent South, and 6 percent Border.

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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES OF LIBERAL TRADE VOTING IN 1962 BY GROUP AND CHANGE IN EXPORTS

	Probability of Voting for Trade Liberalization		
	Average Exports	*Average Exports Plus 1 Standard Deviations*	*Average Exports Plus 2 Standard Deviations*
All	0.78	0.85	0.90
Republicans	0.47	0.58	0.68
Democrats	0.90	0.94	0.96

able to explain how political factors shaped the institutional environment and, in turn, how the institutional factors shaped the political environment.

Two sets of puzzles have driven the analysis. The first set revolves around the initial legislation. Why would Congress ever agree to forfeit so much power to the president? And, more curiously, why would Congress choose to do so at a time when the commitment to free trade was not particularly strong? The second puzzle revolves around the expansion of the RTAA, especially after the Second World War. What was the mechanism that allowed trade liberalization to move continuously forward throughout the twenty-eight-year life span of the RTAA? Liberalization goes counter to a conventional logic that assumes that pro-protection interests should have been overrepresented in the policy process because of the distributional inequalities that obtained from a liberal trade policy.

The existing literature provides incomplete answers to both puzzles. Many analyses of the original delegation emphasize congressional efforts to reduce its workload or to avoid serving special interests. In contrast, we argue that a model positing only policy-oriented, strategic political actors can explain the initial delegation. The RTAA allowed congressional Democrats to satisfy reluctant free traders and to durably reduce tariffs by coupling U.S. tariff cuts with foreign cuts. Further, it created a mechanism for lowering tariffs without having to meet the demanding constitutional requirement for two-thirds support that had undermined previous treaty efforts.

Many analyses of the effects of the RTAA are also suspect. Some claim that the RTAA removed trade policy from the constraints of a protectionist Congress; others argue that delegating authority and its accompanying agenda-setting power to the president was the key to trade liberalization in the period. But neither of these views can explain the

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clear and continued congressional involvement in tariff policy, even under the RTAA.

We agree with the consensus that congressional delegation to the president was an important element of the trade liberalization program. Nevertheless, the president's involvement in lowering trade barriers should not be exaggerated. Once Congress eschewed unilateral tariff reductions, presidential involvement was inevitable—it is the president's constitutional prerogative to negotiate treaties with foreign nations. But presidents had negotiated trade treaties throughout American history. Few, however, made it past a congressional veto. The RTAA should be remembered not because it delegated power to the president but because it mandated reciprocal tariff cuts under an innovative voting rule that bypassed the need for ex post approval by a supermajority in Congress.

The radical change in underlying preferences that allowed the liberalization of American trade policy cannot be explained either by the insulation of trade policy making or by presidential agenda control. Rather, trade liberalization endured because the RTAA changed the strategic environment of policy setting and later, the optimal policy choices of elected officials. First, the RTAA increased support for trade liberalization by "bundling" domestic and foreign reductions into one package. This not only garnered a larger base of support than did unilateral tariff reductions, but it also made it more difficult to change policy, even with an alteration in political control of government. By tying domestic reductions to foreign reductions, a greater pool of representatives found themselves in the proliberalization coalition. The existence of treaty obligations and the direct loss of foreign markets in response to a tariff hike made tariff reform far more durable than in any previous period of U.S. history. The RTAA was not simply a bill to lower tariffs; it was as well, an attempt to institutionalize a low tariff policy.

Second, and as important, tariff reform under the RTAA began an endogenous process of tariff reduction. Tariff reductions were matched with export growth. Increased export dependence in districts led to a more fundamental and enduring change in the political preferences of key actors in Congress. Although not the only factor, the RTAA was instrumental in increasing world trade, which spurred political interest in increasing access to foreign markets. This made increasing numbers of politicians willing to trade off support from import-competing interests that stood in the way of trade liberalization in exchange for support from export groups.

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Empirical analysis of voting on trade bills supports our argument. Before the RTAA, voting on trade was almost wholly partisan, with Democrats in favor of and Republicans opposed to reductions in U.S. tariffs. After World War II partisan voting broke down, as more Democrats voted for protection and many more Republicans voted for trade liberalization.

Overall, the shift in American policy exceeded everyone's expectations. Trade increased dramatically, and the U.S. sustained a policy of relatively open borders. Our analysis strongly suggests that part of this shift should be attributed to an increase in the importance of exports at the district level.

In summary, the early history of liberalization in the U.S. provides a picture of how domestic politics, institutional choice, and the international economy are interlinked. Domestic politics led to an institutional innovation, the RTAA. The institutional innovation led both directly and indirectly to increased world trade. And, in turn, increased world trade led members of Congress and foreign actors to put more weight on increasing access to international markets. These preference changes expanded the coalition supporting free trade and allowed trade liberalization to continue to move forward.

Appendix: Data Sources and Methods

District-Level Data

Variables for districts comprised of complete counties were constructed from the *Congressional District Data Book.*

—employment in standard industrial classification (SIC) codes = (number of establishments with 20 or more employees in district/total number of such establishments)*total number of employees employed by manufacturers, based on 1958 data.

—employment in agriculture: total number of farm operators, 1959.

—employment in mining: average number of employees, 1958.

Variables for districts comprised of partial counties (almost exclusively urban districts) were constructed based on metropolitan statistical area (MSA) data in *The Census of Manufacturers* and *Historical Statistics of the U.S.* District MSAs determined from *Congressional District Atlas of the United States.*

Trade Data

Trade data from 1960–62 were available by SIC code in *U.S. Commodity Exports and Imports as Related to Output.* Trade data for 1951–53 were

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available by Office of Business Economics (OBE) code in Lechter (1970). OBE data and SIC data in which each SIC and OBE category was placed in one of ten categories below.

Category	*SIC Codes*	*OBE Export Codes*	*OBE Import Codes*
Food	01, 02, 20, 21	0, 10, 4112	0, 1223-4, 1227, 1601
Industrial supplies	Mining, 29, 33	11, 401, 12 (minus 124-7)	10, 14, 15, 1603-5
Wood	24, 26	124	11, 1300-1, 4100
Chemicals & rubber	28, 30	125, 4113-4, 1270, 1273-5	1225-6, 1228, 1230-1, 1610, 4011-2
Textiles	22, 23	126, 4100	120-1, 400, 410A
Finished manufactures	25, 34-6, 38-9	2 (minus 22), 400	20 (minus 2013-4), 41 (minus 4100, 4101, 410A)
Transportation	37	22, 3, 5	2013-4, 21, 3
Printing	27	4111	4013
Leather	31	4110, 1271	4010, 1220-2
Clay	32	1273, 1276	1302, 1310, 4101
Unclassified			1232, 1611

SHIPMENT DATA

Data for years in which there was no such census were extrapolated from the data for 1954, 1958, and 1963. Shipment data for mining were available in Historical Statistics (Table M1-12). Production data for agriculture were available in various issues of the *Census of Agriculture.*

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THE POPULIST ROAD TO MARKET REFORM
Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina

By EDWARD L. GIBSON*

INTRODUCTION

DURING his tenure of office between 1988 and 1994, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari proclaimed a new guiding ideology for his presidency and his country's ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Liberalismo Social (Social Liberalism) would replace the statist and corporatist Nacionalismo Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalism) as the vision advanced by the party in a new age of free-market development. During much the same period, five thousand miles away, Argentina's President Carlos Saúl Menem committed his government to the pursuit of a new development model, the Economía Popular de Mercado (Popular Market Economy), a policy shift that reversed the Peronist party's historic commitment to state-led economic development. These leaders headed the two most important populist movements in Latin America, movements that had strong ties to labor and embodied their countries' pursuit of state-led economic development. The policy shifts thus had tremendous coalitional and institutional consequences. They implied a restructuring of the social coalitions that had historically supported the Peronist party and the PRI, and the alteration of many of the representational arrangements that linked key social actors to the state. Although these reforms reversed historic policy commitments and

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adversely affected the parties' key social constituencies, both parties handily won their respective presidential elections held in 1994 in Mexico and in 1995 in Argentina.

How did leaders of the PRI and the Peronist party carry out such shifts and remain electorally viable? What coalitional characteristics, which shaped the dynamics of these transitional periods, did these movements share? This essay offers a rethinking of the internal coalitional dynamics of these broad-based national parties. The literature on populist coalition building has tended to stress the importance of these parties' strategic links to labor and developmental cross-class alliances. This essay, however, conceives of these parties as unions of two distinctive regional subcoalitions and suggests a historical division of labor between the subcoalitions in the realms of policy-making and electoral politics. Peronism and the PRI are thus understood as encompassing a "metropolitan" coalition and a "peripheral" coalition. The metropolitan coalition functioned primarily as a policy coalition that gave support to the parties' development strategies. The peripheral coalition functioned largely as an electoral coalition, which carries the burden of generating electoral majorities. This perspective, which stresses the interaction between the electoral and policy-making dimensions of coalition building, sheds light on important complexities in the historical evolution of these parties and on the current process of coalitional realignment and economic reform.

Metropolitan and Peripheral Coalitions in the Evolution of Populism

The literature on the origins and dynamics of populist parties in Latin America is vast, and the PRI and Peronism have taken up the lion's share of attention. Debates on the historical meaning, coalitional dynamics, and ideologies of these parties have dominated Latin American scholarship, but consensus exists on a number of points: populist parties incorporated labor and popular sectors into political life, just as mass politics transformed national politics in the early and mid-twentieth century. Building on this incorporation, they linked labor to nascent cross-class support coalitions for state-guided capitalist development.[1] Regardless of the many differences that separated individual cases, the

[1] In Latin American studies the "populism" concept has been subject to continuous stretching over the years to include types of movements, policy-making patterns, ideologies, coalitions, styles, or 'ways of doing politics.' Some conceptualizations have included all these features. The concept of "populism" in this essay is more restrictive, denoting parties that incorporated labor during the historical and developmental period mentioned above. These characteristics link Peronism and the PRI conceptually to

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strategic link to labor and the developmentalist policy orientation were two features indissolubly linked to populist parties generally and to Peronism and the PRI in particular.[2]

Peronism and the PRI have thus been largely analyzed as labor-based movements whose political and electoral clout resided in the most urbanized and modern regions of the country.[3] These were, after all, the movements that put an end to oligarchic rule and organized new social forces for the reorganization of their countries' political economies. But the picture is not complete until we look more carefully at other aspects of the populist coalitions, aspects which have not received much attention relative to the much analyzed relationship of these parties to labor. Labor and the developmental coalition to which it was linked were important, but often electorally insufficient components of the PRI and Peronist coalitions. If we look at these movements as national parties, as mobilizers of electoral victories throughout the national territory, we see that there was more to populism. The other less illuminated, perhaps even seedier, side of populism is its rural, nonmetropolitan side. In the metropolis, populism was a revolutionary force, incorporating labor into its fold and promoting a new class of domestically oriented entrepreneurs as carriers of new state-led strategies of economic development. It was the metropolis that gave populism its modern face—that gave it the social and economic clout to build a new economic order. It was the periphery, however, that linked populism to the traditional order, gave it coherence as a national electoral force, and extended its reach throughout the national territory.

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such movements as, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru, Acción Democrática in Venezuela, and Varguismo in Brazil. For a less restrictive definition of populism, see Kenneth M. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case," *World Politics* 48 (October 1995).

[2] See, for example, such works as Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Michael L. Conniff, ed., *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982); Ruth Berins Collier, *The Contradictory Alliance: State-Labor Relations and Regime Change in Mexico* (Berkeley: Institute of International and Area Studies, University of California, 1992); Kevin Middlebrook, *The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, *Estudios sobre los orígenes del peronismo* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores, 1971); Joel Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State, and the Rise of Perón, 1930–1945* (Berkeley: Institute of International and Area Studies, University of California, 1990); Juan Carlos Torre, ed., *La formación del sindicalismo peronista* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Legasa, 1988); and Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute for International and Area Studies, University of California, 1971).

[3] The role of the PRI in mobilizing peasants, as a pillar of its corporatist structure, has been widely addressed, but analysis has rarely gone beyond its controlled and subservient status within the coalition. The functions of the regional subcoalition, which organized peasant and rural sectors, in the maintenance and internal power struggles of the PRI have been understudied aspects of the party's politics.

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As electoral movements, the PRI and Peronism were national coalitions that harbored two very disparate and regionally based subcoalitions. These were dualistic movements, encompassing at once the most modern sectors of society and the most traditional, the most urbanized and the most rural, the most dynamic and the most stagnant, the most radical and the most conservative. The secret of their success was due largely to their ability to make effective the dualistic nature of their societies in the coalitional realm by bringing together the most antagonistic sectors of society and giving them distinct tasks in the creation and reproduction of populist power.

The metropolitan coalition was located largely in urban areas and economically important regions of the country.[4] Its most important constituencies were labor and business groups, geared toward the domestic economy and dependent on state subsidies and protection. These social groups were vital for the implementation of developmentalist economic policies. They generated support for state policies and ensured, through corporatist bargaining, mobilization, and legitimation, the viability of the development model and the governability tasks of the political system.

The peripheral coalition was located primarily in rural areas and relatively underdeveloped regions. Its primary constituencies were peasants, rural labor, and town dwellers, but it also included local elites who controlled local populations and could deliver their votes and support to the national party. These constituencies remained, by and large, marginalized from the design and implementation of the development strategies pursued from the center, but in the organization and maintenance of populist power, they were not merely a residual coalition. As the Peronists and the PRI became consolidated as national parties, they came to play a vital role in maintaining their parties' electoral strength. Populist parties came to rely increasingly on the peripheral coalitions to deliver national electoral majorities. Tradition and modernity coexisted in Peronism and the PRI because of the indispensability of the peripheral coalition for the maintenance of populist power.

The Origins of the Populist Coalitions

The Formation of the Peronist Party

The mobilization of labor in Argentina's metropolitan regions was decisive in the rapid rise to power of army colonel Juan Perón after the

[4] The term "metropolitan" is thus employed here to mean more than "urban," although the relationships described in the following pages tend to accentuate levels of urbanization. The term here denotes the most dynamic and economically dominant areas of the country.

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1943 military coup that overthrew a conservative civilian regime. Appointed secretary of labor shortly after the coup, Perón galvanized the moribund agency and made it an aggressive champion of workers' rights. He also used his position in office to tie labor organizations more closely to the state, to purge them of communist and opposition influences, and to build networks of supporters in the labor movement. Perón thus used the power of the state to tap a constituency that, in spite of its organizational clout and importance in the country's urban occupational structure, had been largely unclaimed by the national political establishment.

In 1946 Perón ran for president as the candidate of the Partido Laborista, an independent labor party founded by union leaders in 1945. The party was modeled on European social democratic parties and was seen by its founders as an autonomous vehicle for labor representation in the electoral arena.[5] The Partido Laborista's links to organized labor gave Perón a powerful organizational base for running his presidential campaign and for mobilizing the urban vote.

In regions with a negligible proletarian population, however, Perón's 1946 electoral victory was driven by other factors. The Partido Laborista's labor networks gave his campaign some organization in the capitals of less backward provinces in the interior, but provided it with little access to voters in towns and rural areas or to urban voters not controlled by the fledgling regional labor organizations. These areas tended to be firmly controlled by existing caudillo-dominated electoral machines. A national presidential victory required more than powerful organization in metropolitan regions. It also required the formation of an electoral coalition in the peripheral regions of the country.

To this end, Perón reached out to the enforcers of the periphery's status quo. Throughout the interior provinces, he recruited local conservative leaders into his alliance, from the top leaders of provincial governments to local party hacks who controlled electoral machines in rural areas and small towns.[6] The defection of conservative caudillos facilitated the massive transfer of votes from conservative electoral networks throughout the country to the 1946 Peronist ticket.[7]

[5] Murmis and Portantiero (fn. 2).

[6] The Junta Renovadora, a conservative faction of the Radical Party dominated by leaders from the "interior" provinces, supported Perón's candidacy. So did the Partido Independiente, a small group of provincial conservative-party leaders. These two electoral groupings and additional coalition building with local caudillos helped, build support in areas beyond the Partido Laborista's geographical reach. See Darío Cantón, *Elecciones y partidos políticos en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores, 1973); and Sandra J. Aidar, "Electoral Reform in Argentina and the Revival of the Peronist Party" (Master's thesis, MIT, February 1994).

[7] Systematic case studies of the Peronist party's formation in the interior provinces are unfortunately almost nonexistent. However, a glimpse of processes taking place throughout the country is provided

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In this way, Perón forged the key pillars of his national electoral coalition. In metropolitan regions he mobilized the unincorporated working class as the primary constituency of his new political movement. Outside those areas he co-opted existing provincial electoral machines, which delivered large numbers of votes from among the rural poor and town dwellers to the Partido Laborista's electoral campaign. After the 1946 election President Perón transformed this circumstantial electoral alliance into a new national political party, the Partido Justicialista.

The creation of the Partido Justicialista established Peronism's electoral presence throughout the country. It also created a new internal balance of power between the movement's national coalition members. The social and political forces that had brought Perón to power underwent major reorganization in the period following his election. The union movement experienced a dramatic expansion of its membership, and its organizations were strengthened and linked closely to the state. In the metropolitan regions, labor organizations, with their expanding mass mobilizational capabilities, became the primary organizers of the Peronist electoral machine. After the 1946 elections the union movement's dominance over party leaders was almost complete in the metropolitan areas' electoral organization.[8]

Political caudillos remained important, however, for mobilizing votes outside the working class, and they were most important in less developed regions with few industrial workers and union members. In the 1940s the industrial working class was largely located in the greater Buenos Aires urban area, and to a lesser extent in such budding industrial cities as Rosario and Córdoba. Throughout the rest of the country, however, traditional social structures dominated, and the paternalistic political control of caudillos held sway. The conservative political machines that had controlled political life for decades, and which had

by two studies of the 1946 election in the provinces of Córdoba and Buenos Aires, both of which experienced endorsements of Perón by prominent conservative leaders. Luís González Esteves and Ignacio Llorente report a significant transfer of conservative organizational resources and votes to the Peronist ticket. The exceptions were large urban areas, where the working-class constituencies of Peronism were congregated. See Luis Gonzáles Esteves, "Las elecciones de 1946 en la provincia de Córdoba," and Ignacio Llorente, "Alianzas políticas en el surgimiento del peronismo: El caso de la provincia de Buenos Aires," in Manuel Mora y Araujo and Ignacio Llorente, eds., *El voto peronista: Ensayos de sociología electoral argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1980). A more recent work, both historical and partisan, provides details of local-elite networks that supported the rise of Peronism in the nortwestern province of La Rioja, President Menem's home province. See Hugo Orlando Quevedo, *El Partido Peronista en La Rioja*, 3 vols. (Córdoba: Marcos Lerner Editora, 1991).

[8] Manuel Mora y Araujo, "Introducción: La sociología electoral y la comprensión del peronismo," in Mora y Araujo and Llorente (fn. 7), 49.

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helped put Perón in power in 1946, were dominant facts of local political life. Incorporating them into the national party was vital to making Peronism a truly national electoral force.

Thus, the period following Perón's assumption of the presidency was marked by the reorganization of the peripheral electoral coalition that had helped him win. Temporary deals with autonomous conservative machines were followed by the outright absorption of these leaders and organizations into the national Peronist party. Former conservative caudillos became Peronist caudillos, or their organizations and followers were absorbed by the national party and given new leaders from among their ranks. Control of the state also gave Perón the ability to engage in the autonomous mobilization of rural and nonmetropolitan constituencies. This mobilization, however, was far less threatening to local power relations than the mobilization then taking place in the country's metropolitan regions. Measures passed during Perón's first term, such as the Estatuto del Peón, extended benefits and legal rights to rural laborers, but did not threaten existing land-tenure patterns or disrupt local-elite control over economic life.[9] They were, however, effective in mobilizing support among the lower social strata for a national Peronist party whose local political and social structures closely resembled those that had dominated life in the pre-Peronist political order.

With the founding of the Partido Justicialista, the autonomous electoral creation of the Argentine labor movement, the Partido Laborista, was dissolved. In its place, Perón created a national party supported by two distinctive and regionally specific pillars. The urban labor organizations, which had declared in the founding documents of the Partido Laborista that no "members of the oligarchy" would be permitted in its ranks,[10] were incorporated alongside the conservative-dominated party machines of the interior regions of the country. By doing this, Perón institutionalized not only the Peronist party's presence throughout the nation, but also a new internal balance of power in the party. As a national party, Peronism would not be exclusively dependent on its powerful and highly mobilized constituencies in the labor movement. Their clout in the area of mobilization would be countered by the electoral weight of the caudillo-dominated and socially heterogeneous constituencies in the peripheral coalition. Perón was thus able to fuse disparate coalitions under one national party structure, and each coalition provided a counterweight to the other. The two pillars were rooted

[9] Robert J. Alexander, *The Perón Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 141–53.
[10] Cited in Murmis and Portantiero (fn. 2), 96.

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in very different social contexts and organized by different types of machines: corporatist and mobilizational in the metropolis, clientelistic and conservative in the periphery. The Peronist party's seeming invulnerability at the polls in subsequent decades as well as the continuous (and often polarizing) tensions between the party's metropolitan labor organizations and its provincial party organizations were both results of Peronism's successful fusion of these two national subcoalitions.

Electoral studies of the Peronist vote, written during the 1970s, provide a sense of the continuities involved in the relations between metropolitan and peripheral coalitions after Perón's rise to power. The most consistent finding is the negative relationship between the Peronist vote and indicators of economic development and modernization as the Peronist coalition became established.[11] In the 1946 election the Peronist vote was positively associated with such variables as industrialization, urbanization, and size of the working-class population, and ambiguously associated with indicators of economic backwardness. These results reflected Perón's reliance in 1946 on labor mobilization and the weakness in the organization of the independent Peronist electorate in the interior. However, by 1954 these relationships had changed. Peronism was most positively associated with indicators of social and economic backwardness, and most negatively associated with indicators of economic development and modernization.[12] Studies of the 1973 presidential elections suggest that these tendencies persisted after decades of repression and electoral proscription of the Peronist movement by authoritarian governments. In the 1973 presidential elections, Peronism's performance in rural and underdeveloped regions far outstripped its performance in urban regions, a performance which gave the Peronist party its slim national electoral majority in March 1973.[13]

[11] As Mora y Araujo and Smith note, summarizing the literature on the subject, "the conclusion has been categorical: the higher the level of development, the lower the Peronist vote." Manuel Mora y Araujo and Peter Smith, "Peronism and Economic Development: The 1973 Elections," in Frederick C. Turner, ed., *Juan Perón and the Reshaping of Argentina* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 177. Electoral studies of Peronism that have noted this trend include Ignacio Llorente, "La composición social del movimiento peronista hacia 1954," in Mora y Araujo and Llorente (fn. 7); Peter Smith, "The Social Bases of Peronism," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 52 (1972); Lars Shoultz, *The Populist Challenge: Argentine Electoral Behavior in the Postwar Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Manuel Mora y Araujo, "La estructura social del peronismo: Un análisis interprovincial," *Desarrollo Económico* 14 (1975); Darío Cantón and Jorge R. Jorrat, "Occupation and Vote in Urban Argentina: The March 1973 Presidential Election," *Latin American Research Review* 13, no. 1 (1978); and Douglas Masden and Peter G. Snow, *The Charismatic Bond: Political Behavior in Time of Crisis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

[12] This pattern is detailed in Llorente (fn. 11).

[13] In the March 1973 election, the Peronist party consistently received over 60 percent of the vote in rural districts, while failing to get a majority in most urban districts. As Mora y Araujo noted, "It is very clear that if only those districts with urban populations higher than 40 percent had been counted,

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TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE PERONIST VOTE[a]

	1946	*1954*	*March 1973*	*Sept. 1973*
Per capita product	.07	−.39	−.75	−.80
Illiteracy	−.08	.63	—	—
Literacy	—	—	−.59	−.59
Urbanization	.20	−.48	−.64	−.55
EAP in primary sector[b]	−.24	.28	.28	.12
EAP in secondary sector[b]	.32	−.18	.03	−.04
EAP in tertiary sector[b]	.09	−.34	−.11	−.36
Urban working class	.30	−.14	−.39	−.40

SOURCES: Calculations for 1946 and 1954 from Ignacio Llorente, "La composición social del movimiento peronista hacia 1954"; calculations for 1973 from Manuel Mora y Araujo, "Las bases estructurales del Peronismo"; in Mora y Araujo and Llorente, eds., *El voto peronista: Ensayos de sociología electoral argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1980).

[a]N=479 electoral counties. Significance levels of coefficients not listed.

[b]EAP=Economically active population.

The coefficients listed in Table 1[14] measure correlations between the Peronist vote and selected socioeconomic indicators from the Argentine census, giving an indication of the nonmetropolitan bias to the Peronist vote which emerged after 1946.[15]

the Peronist party would not have attained the 50 percent vote total which gave it its victory in the March elections." Manuel Mora y Araujo, "Las bases estructurales del Peronismo," in Mora y Araujo and Llorente (fn. 7), 423.

[14] Working from a similar database, Manuel Mora y Araujo and Peter Smith provide further support for this argument in a multiple regression analysis of the 1973 elections, in which indicators of social deprivation and underdevelopment have the strongest positive impact on the Peronist vote, while indicators of urbanization register a strong negative impact. See Mora y Araujo and Smith (fn. 11), 177–81.

[15] The correlations presented in Table 1 and elsewhere in this essay are ecological correlations; that is, they measure the association between aggregate economic indicators and aggregate electoral results for given geographic units (in this case, Argentine electoral counties, which today number 520). The unit of analysis is not the individual voter, but the geographic unit. The negative associations between such variables as "urban working class" and Peronist party vote should not, therefore, be interpreted as indications of the preferences of working-class individuals, but of Peronist electoral performance in geographic areas where workers live. These tend to be areas of high urbanization and economic development, which also include other social sectors whose electoral preferences may differ dramatically from those of working-class voters. In fact, studies based on survey data or urban-area data sets consistently find strong working-class support for the Peronist party. See, for example, Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971); Masden and Snow (fn. 11); Schoultz (fn. 11); Peter Ranis, *Argentine Workers: Peronism and Contemporary Class Consciousness* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992); Smith (fn. 11); and Gino Germani, "El surgimiento del peronismo: El rol de los obreros y de los migrantes internos," *Desarrollo Económico* 13 (October–December, 1973).

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The Origins of the PRI in Mexico

The formation of what is today named the Partido Revolucionario Institucional went through several stages. The first stage was the creation by Plutarco Elías Calles of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929. The creation of the PNR was first and foremost an effort to impose central authority on a fractious nation in the aftermath of the armed conflicts and intraelite struggles that had rocked the nation since the outbreak of the 1910 revolution. The PNR's founders sought to bring together under one institutional umbrella the disparate regional power holders that had emerged from these conflicts. They also sought to establish procedures of negotiation and political succession that would institutionalize intraelite conflicts and provide electoral hegemony to elites in control of national and regional governments.[16] The PNR was thus an effort to organize the existing Mexican political strata, whose composition was as regionally varied as the reach of the Mexican revolution itself. They included progressive and conservative governors, local revolutionary caciques, landlords, and military caudillos.[17] In an effort to establish institutional control throughout the territory, the PNR incorporated the array of old and new, revolutionary and prerevolutionary power holders who were left standing after decades of armed conflict.[18]

[16] A detailed treatment of the formation of the PNR is provided by Luís Javier Garrido, *El partido de la Revolución institucionalizada: La formación del nuevo Estado en México, 1928–1945* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, 1986). For this period see also, Jean Meyer, *Estado y sociedad con Calles,* vol. 11 of *Historia de la Revolución Mexicana* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1977); and Lorenzo Meyer, Rafael Segovia, and Alejandra Lajous, *Los inicios de la institucionalización,* vol. 12 of *Historia de la Revolucion Mexicana* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978); and Samuel León, "Del partido de partidos al partido de sectores," in Carmen Corona, ed., *El partido en el poder: Seis ensayos* (Mexico: Partido Revolucionario Institucional-Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Económicos y Sociales [IEPES], 1990).

[17] The terms "caudillos" and "caciques" seem to have slightly different meanings in Argentina and Mexico. In Argentina, "caudillo" denotes a political boss. The Argentine caudillo can be a local boss or a national leader. In Mexico, "cacique" explicitly denotes a local political boss, while "caudillo" generally denotes a civilian or military political leader whose authority is national in scope. In both Mexico and Argentina, caciques and caudillos can draw their political authority from socioeconomic power relations, political institutions, or both. I am indebted to Blanca Heredia, of the Centro de Investigaciones y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), and Fernando Escalante, of the Colegio de México, for these distinctions. For typological and analytical discussions of this issue, see Fernando Díaz Díaz, *Caudillos y Caciques: Santa Anna y Juan Alvarez* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1971), and Gilbert Joseph, "Caciquismo and the Revolution: Carrillo Puerto in Yucatán," in D. A. Brading, ed., *Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

[18] As Alan Knight notes, "Through the 1920's and 1930's Mexican elites remained variegated and fractious, especially if the vital provincial, as against national, perspective is adopted. In parts of the south the plantocracy still ruled, albeit under pressure; the northern bourgeoisie prospered (at least until the later 1920's); and the new revolutionary elite—generals, above all, acquired property to match their power. But there were also elites, some of popular extraction, who depended on continued popular support for their advancement." Knight, "Mexico's Elite Settlement: Conjuncture and Consequences," in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 128.

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Responding to worker and peasant masses mobilized by the revolution was also a concern of PNR founders, but it was subordinated to the imperative of territorial consolidation. The PNR's creation was thus a deal between the center and the regions, involving the incorporation of regional elites into the national party in exchange for local autonomy. The party was organized territorially, with little or no efforts made toward the sectoral incorporation of the masses.[19]

The presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas from 1934 to 1940 temporarily shifted the party's internal balance of power in favor of sectoral incorporation of workers and peasants. In an effort to consolidate new power bases against the continuing influence of Callistas and their networks of regional power bosses, Cárdenas carried out the most sweeping labor and land-reform initiatives ever seen in the country's history.[20] During this period the first manifestations of what would become the metropolitan and peripheral coalitions emerged in the party's national coalitional structure. The national labor movement was mobilized as an official constituency of the party, an act that made it a pivotal part of the party's emerging metropolitan coalition. In the countryside, massive land-reform initiatives were accompanied by the sectoral organization of peasants and rural workers and their formal incorporation into the party structure. Cárdenas then spearheaded the reform of the party itself, renaming it the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM) and converting its territorial organization to the functional organization of national peasant, labor, and middle sector groups.[21] With the functional reorganization of the party, Cárdenas thus empowered new social groups whose loyalty and political clout strengthened the national party leadership. By adding a new line of cleavage to the previously dominant regional cleavage within the party, he also diluted or neutralized those elite groups whose power had resided in the party's territorial structures. The tension between territorially based elites and functionally

[19] In fact, the territorial deal underlying the PNR was a mechanism for dealing with the threat of class conflict. In exchange for their support, the PNR offered regional elites protection against continued revolutionary change. See Garrido (fn. 16), 127–28.

[20] On the internal struggles that drove the Cárdenas reforms, see Wayne Cornelius, "Nation-building, Participation, and Distribution: The Politics of Social Reform under Cárdenas," in G. A. Almond, S. C. Flanagan, and R. J. Mundt, eds., *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies in Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973). See also Nora Hamilton, *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[21] The military was organized into a "sector" as well, but this sector was dissolved shortly thereafter. The reorganization of the PRM and party-constituency relations is analyzed in Middlebrook (fn. 2), and in Ruth Berins Collier (fn. 2). Detail on the dynamics of the Cárdenas presidency is provided by Luis González in *Los artífices del cardenismo*, vol. 14 of *Historia de la Revolución Mexicana* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979), and *Los días del presidente Cárdenas*, vol. 15 of *Historia de la Revolución Mexicana* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1981).

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organized sectors of the party would persist within the party to the present day.

The Cárdenas-led land reforms and peasant mobilizations had another effect on what would become the party's peripheral coalition. In regions affected by land reform, they placed party-controlled electoral machinery throughout the countryside. A result was the controlled mobilization of rural masses in support of national leaders and a large captive rural electorate that would become instrumental to the party's electoral success. Once the reformist euphoria of the Cardenista period subsided in the countryside, a new system of rural electorate control remained in place. Caciques loyal to the PRM (later renamed PRI) came to replace those of pre-Cardenista days. Thereafter the PRI's peripheral coalition throughout the country would consist of a blend of revolutionary and prerevolutionary systems of rural electoral mobilization and control. In areas swept by the winds of the revolutionary periods, PRI caciques, dispensing land titles and party patronage, ensured the overwhelming support of rural voters for the ruling party. In areas that escaped the effects of the revolution, more traditional forms of cacique-led political and social control prevailed. The guardians of the old order were given free rein to perpetuate local power arrangements in exchange for reliably delivering massive PRI victories at election time.[22]

A glance at the PRI's electoral performance over the last several decades reveals the party's reliance on the peripheral coalition. (See Table 2.) Prior to the 1970s the PRI enjoyed hegemonic status, and while its electoral margins were consistently larger in rural and less developed areas, it won overwhelmingly throughout the country.[23] The peripheral coalition was thus less important as a mobilizer of electoral majorities than as a guarantor of order and political support for the PRI-dominated regime throughout the country. Its importance as an electoral coalition, however, grew dramatically from the 1970s onward, as

[22] In both cases, of course, the mobilization and control of rural electorates were complemented, when needed, with electoral fraud. For an analysis of rural power dynamics in the postrevolutionary period, see Werner Tobler, "Peasants and the Shaping of the Revolutionary State, 1910–1940," in Friedrich Katz, ed., *Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Illustrative local case studies include Guillemo de la Peña "Populism, Regional Power, and Political Mediation: Southern Jalisco, 1900–1980," in Eric Van Young, ed., *Mexico's Regions: Comparative History and Development* (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1992); Romana Falcón, "Charisma, Tradition, and Caciquismo: Revolution in San Luis Potosí," in Katz (fn. 17); as well as essays in Brading (fn. 17).

[23] According to one study, between 1964 and 1976 the PRI averaged over 70 percent of the vote in highly urbanized areas, while its averages in rural areas exceeded 90 percent of the vote. Leopoldo Gomez, "Elections, Legitimacy, and Political Change in Mexico, 1977–1988" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1991), 242.

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TABLE 2
ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR THE PRI BY LEVEL OF URBANIZATION

Level of Urbanization	*1979*	*1982*	*1985*	*1988*	*1991*
>95 % urban	54%	50%	44%	30%	48%
50–74% urban	71%	68%	61%	50%	61%
<25 % urban	84%	82%	78%	64%	71%

SOURCE: Joseph L. Klesner, "Realignment or Dealignment? Consequences of Economic Crisis and Restructuring for the Mexican Party System," in Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, eds., *The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico* (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1994), 165.

national elections became more competitive and the party faced growing electoral challenges in metropolitan areas.

The PRI's electoral support has been strongly correlated with indicators of ruralness, primary production, and illiteracy, and negatively correlated with indicators of urbanization, education, and occupations characteristic of the metropolitan economy. (See Table 3.) In spite of the party's historic role as an incorporator of working classes and a transformer of the metropolitan political economy, rural Mexico, in the words of one observer, "has been the PRI's bastion for six decades."[24] Furthermore, these trends increased as decades of stabilizing development changed the country's demographic and social structures. Ironically, the PRI's metropolitan constituencies, which were vital supporters and beneficiaries of the party's economic development policies, played an ever decreasing role in the generation of electoral majorities for the PRI.[25]

Populist leaders in Argentina and Mexico thus solved the problems of governance by bringing two distinctive subcoalitions together under one movement. In their founding periods, they succeeded in exploiting the two dominant lines of cleavage in national politics, class and region, and made both lines of cleavage the organizing principles of their national coalitional structures. Pact making between classes permitted Peronism and the PRI to seize the initiative in the transformation of the national political economy. Pact making between regions permitted

[24] Joseph L. Klesner, "Realignment or Dealignment? Consequences of Economic Crisis and Restructuring for the Mexican Party System," in Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, eds., *The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico* (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California,1994), 164.

[25] A multiple regression analysis carried out by Joseph Klesner from the same database in the above-cited study confirms the tendencies shown in Tables 2 and 3, particularly with regard to the impact of industrialization, urbanization, and education on the PRI vote. See Klessner (fn. 24), 170.

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TABLE 3
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR THE PRI AND SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES[a]

	1967	*1970*	*1982*	*1988*	*1991*
% in localities >2,500	−.68	−.73	−.76	−.71	−.65
% with no schooling	.62	.61	.62	.49	.48
% with post-primary ed.	−.68	−.76	−.74	−.58	−.62
% EAP in primary sector[b]	.74	.80	.74	.60	.62
% EAP in secondary sector[b]	−.63	−.73	−.79	−.64	−.69
% EAP in tertiary sector[b]	−.72	−.75	−.44	−.32	−.35
Urban working class	NA	NA	−.80	−.66	−.66
Rural popular classes	NA	NA	.82	.67	.71

SOURCE: Joseph L. Klesner, "Realignment or Dealignment?" Consequences of Economic Crisis and Restructuring for the Mexican Party System," in Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, eds., *The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico* (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1994), 163.

[a]Range of N=159-290 federal districts. All correlations significant at the .001 level.

[b]EAP=Economically active population.

them to constitute themselves as national governing parties.[26] The contrasting social and political contexts in both subcoalitions also created very different local electoral situations. The populist parties' links to traditional and clientelistic power structures in the periphery made them electoral bastions, and the populist coalitions drew support from all social strata. In the more diverse metropolitan regions, the populist coalitions mobilized relatively fewer votes, had more organizational links to working and popular classes, and would become more vulnerable electorally to the effects of social change and organized political opposition.

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CAUSES OF THE CURRENT TRANSFORMATIONS OF PERONISM AND THE PRI

Pressures from global and domestic socioeconomic change converged and prompted major policy and coalitional shifts by the PRI and the Peronist party in the 1980s. Just as the crisis of the global economy in the 1930s led to the adoption of developmentalist economic policies and to the ascendance of populist coalitions, the global reorganization

[26] Although exploring the issue further is beyond the scope of this essay, it might be suggested that this successful institutional fusion of metropolitan and peripheral coalitions is one factor that distinguishes Peronism and the PRI from Varguismo in Brazil and might account for the greater endurance and cohesion of the former two cases.

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of production and capital and the debt crisis of the 1980s signaled the beginning of the end for developmentalism and its support coalitions in Mexico and Argentina. The free-market policy reorientation was led in both countries by their historic populist parties. It also fell to these parties to restructure the populist coalitions that had undergirded decades of developmentalist policies.

But while international economic change drove the turn toward free-market development, the coalitional changes pushed by the PRI and Peronism also had a domestic electoral logic of their own. Even before the global economy put pressure on domestic policymakers, the populist electoral coalitions had been running out of steam. Much of this was due to secular changes in their countries' demographic and occupational structures. Rural to urban migration since the 1950s and 1960s had eroded the peripheral coalitions' electoral weight. The shrinking of the rural electorate was accompanied by changes in the demographic and occupational structures of the countries' metropolitan regions, notably the expansion of social sectors not linked to populist parties or state-controlled corporatist structures that had mobilized votes for the populist metropolitan coalitions.[27] In cities the expansion of populations employed in service activities, informal sectors, and white-collar occupations meant the expansion of a middle stratum of voters that had been most resistant to electoral mobilization by the populist parties' urban "pillars" in the labor movement and corporatist organizations. In effect, decades of social change and economic crisis had produced, in both countries, decline or stagnation in the electoral bastions of Peronism and the PRI, and significant growth in the social categories most negatively associated with populist party vote.[28]

[27] For studies on Mexico's changing social and occupational structure, see Emma Liliana Navarrete and Marta G. Vera Bolaños, eds., *Población y Sociedad* (Toluca, Mexico: El Colegio Mexiquense, 1994); Brigida García, *Desarrollo económico y absorción de fuerza de trabajo en México, 1950–1980* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1988); and Gloria Vázquez Rangel and Jesús Ramírez López, *Marginación y pobreza en México* (Mexico City: Editorial Ariel, 1995). For Argentina, see Susana Torrado, *Estructura social de la Argentina, 1945–1983* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1992); José Nun, "Cambios en la estructura social de la Argentina," in José Nun and Juan Carlos Portantiero, eds., *Ensayos sobre la transición democrática en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Puntosur, 1987); Hector Palomino, *Cambios ocupacionales y sociales en la Argentina, 1947–1985* (Buenos Aires: CISEA, 1987); and Alberto Minujín, et al., eds. *Cuesta abajo: Los nuevos pobres: Efectos de la crisis en la sociedad argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1992).

[28] Studies on Mexico analyzing the effect of social and demographic change on party vote include Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad* (Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 1992); Joseph Klesner, "Modernization, Economic Crisis, and Electoral Alignment in Mexico," *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 9 (Summer 1993); and Gómez (fn. 23). I deal with the impact of social and demographic change on Argentine electoral politics during the 1980s and 1990s in Edward L. Gibson, *Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

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These secular trends made themselves felt in the populist parties' electoral performance, producing a declining trend in electoral support for the PRI and an electoral stagnation for the Peronist party. In Mexico the PRI lost its electoral majorities in urban areas in the 1980s, and while it maintained its majorities in rural areas, these too were on the decline (see Table 2). Meanwhile, party opposition grew by leaps and bounds, supported largely by middle and upper strata in the metropolitan regions.[29] The 1988 presidential elections put the PRI's electoral crisis into bold relief. It was able to claim the slimmest of victory margins only after major electoral irregularities and denunciations of fraud by the opposition. It was quite clear by this time that the PRI was on the verge of losing not only its hegemonic status but also its ability to generate bare electoral majorities.

In Argentina the presidential elections of 1983 resulted in Peronism's first electoral defeat. This event signaled the end of the iron law of Argentine elections, which assumed Peronist victories in freely held elections. A variety of circumstantial factors contributed to this defeat, but the secular trends discussed above played an important part. The peripheral coalition's contribution to the total national vote of the party declined noticeably from the 1973 election and has remained at this new level ever since.[30] This was compounded by the party's poor performance in the metropolitan regions, which demonstrated a clear aversion by affluent voters to the electoral campaign mobilized by the party's labor supporters.[31] The 1989 Peronist electoral victory, which took place amid a profound hyperinflationary crisis, appeared to signal a revival of the classic Peronist coalition. This, however, was to be the last flexing of its populist muscle. Thereafter it would be dramatically restructured.

[29] See Klesner (fn. 24); Molinar Horcasitas (fn. 28); and Yemile Mizrahi, "A New Conservative Opposition in Mexico: The Politics of Entrepreneurs in Chihuahua (1983–1992)" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1994).

[30] One measure of this tendency is the proportion of votes received by Peronism from the country's less developed provinces, calculated here as all provinces and districts excluding Buenos Aires province, the Federal District, Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Mendoza. After 1973 this proportion declined. Since 1946 the poorest provinces provided the following proportion of Peronism's total votes: 1946, 23 percent; 1951, 30 percent; 1973, 37 percent; 1983, 27 percent; 1989, 28 percent; 1995, 27 percent. Percentages for 1946–73 were taken from Mora y Araujo (fn. 13). Percentages for 1983–95 were calculated from official election results.

[31] In one key urban district, the city of Buenos Aires, the 1983 election results constituted a sharp acceleration of a declining trend of support for the Peronist party. The following election totals for the party detail this trend: 1946 presidential elections, 53 percent; 1954 congressional elections, 54 percent; 1973 presidential elections, 37 percent; 1983 presidential elections, 27 percent. Luis Gonzáles Esteves and Ignacio Llorente, "Elecciones y preferencial políticas en Capital Federal y Gran Buenos Aires: El 30 de Octubre de 1983," in Natalio Botana et al., eds., *La Argentina Electoral* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1985).

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The combined effects of international economic pressure and domestic social change placed strains on the policy-making and electoral capabilities of Peronism and the PRI. It is thus useful to understand the current restructuring of the populist coalitions in light of both these dimensions. Global economic pressures produced a clear policy-making logic to the recrafting of populist coalitions: to identify the beneficiaries of neoliberal reform and mobilize them in support of a new economic model. But this recrafting also had an electoral logic: to adapt the populist coalitions to long-term social changes and render them electorally viable in new contexts of social heterogeneity and urbanization of politics. The need to establish new social bases of support for free-market development converged with the need to build new electoral coalitions for populist parties in decline.

The main target of transformation became the metropolitan coalition. The historic pillars of the metropolitan coalition were obviously no longer suited to supporting the development model being adopted by the governing party leaders. Neither were they delivering the goods electorally. Thus, new constituencies and organizations had to be developed in metropolitan regions that would perform both these tasks. The division of labor between policy-making and generating electoral majorities could not continue to be regionally determined. In essence, the metropolitan coalition had to be made both relevant in the policy realm and viable in the electoral realm.

Recasting the Metropolitan Coalition

Business and Labor in the Remaking of Populist Policy Coalitions

Populist leaders had used the power of the state to forge new social coalitions at the start of the developmentalist age in the 1930s and 1940s. They would do so again at the start of the neoliberal age in the 1980s and 1990s. The recasting of the populist policy coalition in metropolitan regions involved the use of state power to reward winners and neutralize losers, to forge alliances with new constituencies, and to rearrange relations with old constituencies. It also involved the opening of new channels of access to policymakers for the coalition's new social protagonists and the dismantling of the institutional structures that had linked old constituencies to the decision-making process. At a general level, it can be asserted that these changes shifted the balance of power within the policy coalition away from labor and toward business.

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However, if this were the only dimension, then it would merely be a continuation of the decades-long pattern whereby business interests in the pursuit of developmentalist policies have prevailed over those of labor. The objectives pursued in the 1980s and 1990s were more nuanced and institutionally discontinuous. They were more nuanced because they involved the selection of winners within both business and labor—the more concentrated and internationally competitive sectors of business and those parts of the labor movement that were linked to those sectors and were able to gain economic and political benefits from the decentralization of the labor movement and the flexibilization of industry-labor relations.[32] They were institutionally discontinuous because they involved the dismantling of legal, regulatory, and financial frameworks that for decades had undergirded the labor movement's institutional power.

In both Mexico and Argentina the plan toward business involved the building of a new strategic relationship with the most diversified, concentrated, and internationally competitive sectors of business. Ties to domestically oriented industrialists and nondiversified, single-sector firms—the traditional business supporters of populist coalitions—were weakened. Corporatist organizations that had traditionally linked them to state decision makers were marginalized in favor of new institutional channels or direct state-firm links for the beneficiaries of economic reform.

From the beginning of their administrations, Presidents Salinas and Menem actively courted leaders of major business firms for the new economic models being pursued.[33] The presidents affirmed publicly the importance of large-scale modern entrepreneurs, with their links to foreign capital and technology. Political cooperation in the formulation and implementation of economic policy between populist-controlled governments and big business reached new heights. In Mexico, access to state policymakers by leaders of large business and financial concerns

[32] On the "modernization" of sectors of the Mexican labor movement and its role in President Salinas's coalition-building strategies, see Ilán Bizberg, "Restructuracion productiva y transformacion del modelo de relaciones industriales: 1988–1994," *Foro Internacional,* no. 143–144 (January–June, 1996). The different strategies of adaptation by sectors of the Argentine labor movement to President Menem's reform policies are analyzed by María Victoria Murillo in "Organizational Autonomy and the Marketization of Corporatism," in Douglas Chalmers et al., eds., *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation and Representation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[33] During his presidential campaign, Peronist candidate Carlos Menem was somewhat discrete about his overtures toward business. His discretion, however, was not shared by candidate Salinas during his own presidential campaign. Salinas openly courted big business during the campaign, reportedly meeting with the largest entrepreneurs in every state he visited. See Carlos Elizondo, "Privatizing the PRI? Shifts in the Business–PRI Relationship" (Manuscript, CIDE, Mexico City, March 1994).

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was greatly enhanced during the Salinas period. Collaboration between business and state elites in the design of economic policy "became unprecedentedly tight, fluid, and public."[34] During his first year in office Argentine President Carlos Menem went so far as to give control of the Ministry of Economy to executives of the Bunge y Born corporation. This move went beyond the Peronist corporatist tradition, whereby key ministries and secretariats were occasionally assigned to representatives of the sectors they oversaw. Bunge y Born was the country's only multinational corporation and Peronism's most truculent adversary in the business community. The appointment of Bunge y Born executives to the high command of the Ministry of the Economy, along with the appointment of conservative leaders to other policy-making positions, signaled an important coalitional shift by the Peronist government toward historically non-Peronist business constituencies. It also marked a shift in the institutional forms of linkage between the state and business, displacing traditional links in favor of direct interaction between state policymakers and large business firms.[35]

Beyond these political links to the business community, populist governments also provided powerful material incentives for their newfound constituencies. The liberalization of financial systems and the opening of the domestic market created major economic opportunities for competitive firms and financial groups. The widescale privatization of state-owned enterprises favored domestic entrepreneurs with access to large amounts of capital and accelerated the process of economic concentration.[36] Privileged economic actors tapped for political support by populist governments thus saw their economic leverage expand during this period.[37]

[34] Blanca Heredia, "State-Business Relations in Contemporary Mexico," in Monica Serrano and Victor Bulmer-Thomas, eds., *Rebuilding the State: Mexico after Salinas* (London: The Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1996).

[35] As Carlos Acuña notes, "Immediately upon taking office, the new minister of economy reached agreements with 350 leading firms to stabilize prices in exchange for maintaining stable public-sector prices and tariffs, as well as interest and exchange rates. These agreements bypassed entrepreneurial representatives." Acuña, "Politics and Economics in the Argentina of the Nineties (Or, Why the Future No Longer Is What It Used to Be)," in William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra, eds., *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America* (Miami: University of Miami, North-South Center, 1994), 39.

[36] In Mexico it is estimated that the privatization of parastatal enterprises fostered the creation of at least fifty big economic *grupos*. See Yemile Mizrahi, "Recasting Business-Government Relations in Mexico: The Emergence of Panista Entrepreneurs," Working Paper, no. 29 (CIDE, División de Estudios Políticos, 1995). For a journalistic analysis of the consolidation of economic conglomerates in Argentina during the Menem period, see Luis Majul, *Los dueños de la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1992).

[37] For a discussion of the uses of market reform for constituency formation and political coalition building, see Hector Schamis, "Re-forming the State: The Politics of Privatization in Chile and Great Britain" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1994).

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The co-optation and strengthening of big business was accompanied by the division of labor and the weakening of its institutional and economic power. In the economic realm, the governments' reforms sought to reduce labor costs and neutralize labor obstacles to marketization. The measures signaled an end to decades-long populist commitments to maintain employment and wage levels and to use state power to bolster labor's bargaining position in the labor market and political arena.[38] In both countries, decrees and legislation were passed restricting the right to strike, decentralizing collective bargaining, limiting wage hikes, and flexibilizing hiring and firing practices in the private sector. The selling-off of state-owned enterprises, which eliminated tens of thousands of jobs in each country, also marked an end to populist commitment to full employment and job security. The reforms also sought to curtail the labor movement's organizational and financial power in measures ranging from the imprisonment of prominent union leaders in Mexico to the restriction of labor control over vast pension plans and social security programs in Argentina.[39]

Not all sectors of labor were clear losers in this reform process. While the labor movement as a whole suffered from the weakening of its political organization and from its membership's declining economic clout, some sectors benefited from the reforms and were able to adapt to a new context of flexibilized labor markets and decentralized state-labor relations. The restructuring of the populist metropolitan policy coalition involved the selection of winners and losers within both the business community and the labor movement, not the wholesale strengthening or weakening of either group. In part, the success of the reform process involved the division of the labor movement and the co-optation of certain sectors to prevent unified labor opposition to economic reform. Populist governments made concerted efforts to co-opt key union leaders and sectors and make them partners in the economic

[38] Weak as this commitment might have seemed in Mexico, especially after the conservative turn of government policy after the Cárdenas period, government policies did nevertheless ensure that real wages for labor rose steadily for labor from the 1950s to the late 1970s. See Esthela Gutierrez Garza, "De la relacion salarial monopolista a la flexibilidad del trabajo, Mexico 1960–1986," in Esthela Gutierrez Garza, ed., *La crisis del estado del bienestar,* vol. 2 of *Testimonios de la crisis* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, 1988), 146–54. In the 1980s, however, this objective changed. Average wages in manufactuing plummeted 38 percent between 1982 and 1985 and continued their downward trend after that. The urban minimum wage fell nearly 46 percent during President De la Madrid's sexenio. Ruth Berins Collier (fn. 2), 105.

[39] For a discussion of the institutional changes in state labor relations made by the Salinas administration in Mexico, see Enrique de la Garza Toledo, "The Restructuring of State-Labor Relations in Mexico," in Cook, Middlebrook, and Molinar Horcasitas (fn. 25). James McGuire analyzes Menem's labor reforms in Argentina in *Peronism without Perón: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming, 1997), chap. 8.

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reform process. These unions tended to be in the more competitive industrial and export-oriented sectors of the economy. In these sectors a new unionism emerged, which emphasized firm-level industry-labor collaboration, worker ownership of stock in privatized firms, and the decentralization of employer-worker negotiations. Their leaders were often rewarded with government positions or were visible interlocutors with state officials in the reform process.[40] The economic and institutional arrangements in the new policy coalition gave clear preference to the larger and internationally competitive sectors of business. However, those labor sectors that could take advantage of economic opportunities offered by policy reforms as well as political opportunities provided by cooperation with the executive, were integrated into the new populist policy coalition.

Technocrats and Peripheral Coalition Politicians in the Recasting of the Metropolitan Coalition

With the restructuring of the business and labor components of their metropolitan policy coalitions, Peronism and the PRI established new bases of support for market reform. But in the process they reversed the social pact with key metropolitan constituencies, which had been a bedrock of populist governance. In the interim, this reversal could be accomplished by relying on sectors outside the metropolitan coalition. In both Mexico and Argentina, peripheral coalition politicians and nonparty technocrats played key roles during the reform period. A much publicized displacement of traditional PRI politicians by technocrats within the Mexican state in the 1980s was crucial for reformers to change economic policy and recast the metropolitan policy coalition. To an extent, this pattern was repeated by Menem in Argentina. Throughout his administration, the key economic policy-making institutions were assigned to non-Peronists. The Ministry of the Economy was first assigned to Bunge y Born executives, then briefly to Erman Gonzalez, a close collaborator of Menem during his years as governor of the remote La Rioja province, and finally to Domingo Cavallo, a non-Peronist technocrat with well established neoliberal credentials. The Central Bank was also assigned to non-Peronist conservative technocrats.

Menem's background as governor of a poor province in the interior of the country also permitted him to rely on leaders, supporters, and

[40] In Mexico this also led to the formation of a new union grouping of the "modern" sectors of the labor movement, the *Federación de Sindicatos de Empresas de Bienes y Servicios* (Fesebes) that took a prominent role supporting government-led reforms. See Bizberg (fn. 32).

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party structures from the peripheral coalition as he brought the day of reckoning to the party's traditional supporters in the metropolis. Menem's presidential victory signaled a shift in Peronism's internal balance of power between metropolitan and peripheral coalitions. Key ministries in the areas of labor relations, management of public enterprise, and institutional reform were assigned to leaders from the peripheral coalition—leaders with few ties and few debts to the party's urban labor constituencies.

The peripheral coalition in Mexico was also vital to Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas as they went about restructuring the metropolitan coalition. Their most important contribution was electoral. As the PRI continued to take a beating in metropolitan regions, the peripheral coalition continued to deliver consistent, albeit decreasing electoral majorities throughout the country. These majorities were enough to counter the losses suffered by the party in urban areas and to deliver the presidency to the ruling party. The peripheral coalition also ensured continued PRI dominance over local politics in many parts of the country. Tensions between technocratic elites in the executive branch and the PRI's traditional políticos running the peripheral coalition were very real in Mexico, as they were in Argentina. However, a marriage of convenience was sustained by the interest of both groups in holding on to their quota of state power. It provided an unlikely alliance between internationalized technocrats and parochial politicians that saw the reform process through.

Making the Metropolitan Coalition Electorally Viable

The neoliberal reformers in Mexico and Argentina were state elites seeking governability for their economic reform programs, but they were also party leaders concerned with the long-term viability of their parties in the postreform period. The clock was ticking on the peripheral coalition's ability to deliver national majorities. New constituencies in the countries' most developed regions had to be built if Peronism and the PRI were to remain competitive in the postdevelopmentalist era. An updating of the metropolitan coalitions was thus pursued by leaders of these parties in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In essence, this meant replacing the mobilizational power of labor with the financial power of business as the foundation of the metropolitan coalition's electoral organization. The populist parties also needed to organize a new mass base among contested urban constituencies. These included middle and upper-middle sectors that lay outside the corporatist system and the

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increasingly fragmented lower classes that lay beyond the reach of traditional populist party organization.

Party leaders sought to make effective in the electoral realm the coalitional changes wrought in previous years in the policy realm. Business, now a vital member of the policy coalition, was thus organized as a core constituency in the metropolitan electoral coalition. Both PRI and Peronist leaders aggressively courted business support for the parties' electoral campaigns. In Mexico this process advanced the furthest, for it involved not only the mobilization of financial support but also the opening of formal links between the party and business. Business had historically been excluded from representation in the party's corporatist organization and, at least formally, from the party's campaign activities. In spite of business's privileged access to state institutions, one major legacy of the revolutionary period was the norm of the illegitimacy of business participation in ruling-party politics. This changed quickly during the Salinas period. Party finance committees, which included prominent entrepreneurs as members, were established. As part of his dealings with business beneficiaries of his government's economic policies, President Salinas actively sought their financial support for the ruling party's campaign operations.[41] At the regional level, business also began to play a more prominent role in the financing of local PRI campaigns, as increasingly competitive local contests compelled local leaders to become more autonomous in the financing and organizing of electoral campaigns.[42]

PRI campaign leaders also tapped the business's power to mobilize. Seeking to renovate the party's image in key urban regions, the PRI often imposed new candidates on local party officials. Many of these candidates were well-known local business leaders. According to one report, 17 percent of PRI candidates in the 1991 midterm elections came from the business community.[43] In the 1994 presidential campaign, committees of local entrepreneurs organized by the PRI, known as Células Empresariales, were established throughout the country. The Células mobilized support for the PRI presidential candidate in the

[41] The most notorious incident was the president's "request" at a gala dinner for business leaders for $25 million in campaign contributions from the participants for the PRI. See Lorenzo Meyer, "El PRI se abre a la inversion privada: Auténtica elite de poder," *Excelsior,* March 4, 1993. See also Tim Golden, "Mexican Leader Asks Executives to Give Party $25 Million Each," *New York Times,* March 9, 1993, p. 1.

[42] Salvador Mikel, national PRI deputy for the state of Veracruz, interview by author, Mexico City, February 4, 1995.

[43] Fernando Ortega Pizarro, "Los empresarios, poderoza fuerza en el PRI, aunque no sean sector," *Proceso* 800, March 2, 1992, p. 21.

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business community, identified entrepreneurs for recruitment into the PRI, and generated funds for local campaigns.[44] The Células tapped local business of all sizes, but made special appeals to small- and medium-sized sectors that had been actively courted by the PRI's party rivals, the conservative Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and the center-left Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). As such, they gave the party an organizational device for luring these constituencies away from the opposition, as well as a wedge into the urban middle classes where the party's organized presence was weak.

The now open relationship with business was accompanied by the restructuring of the party's relationship to its mass base. The operative term for party reformers during this period was "desectoralization," which meant a move away from reliance on the party's sectoral organizations, particularly its labor sector, in the mobilization of the urban vote. It also meant a stress on the party's territorial organization, neighborhood-level organizations, and media campaigns.[45] Under President Salinas, the circumvention of sectoral organizations and traditional party leaders was given further impetus by the creation of a new national antipoverty program with strong electoral dimensions, the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL). There has been much debate about PRONASOL's political and electoral impact, but it formed a key part of the PRI's strategy for recapturing the urban vote in key electoral districts.[46] PRONASOL provided a combination of pork barrel, lead-

[44] The Células Empresariales were established by collaborators in Luis Donaldo Colosio's campaign. After his assassination, they formed part of Ernesto Zedillo's campaign. Details on the strategy behind the organization of the Células Empresariales are provided by Antonio Arguelles, one of the chief PRI organizers of the Células, in "Las células empresariales en la campaña de Ernesto Zedillo," in Antonio Arguelles and Manuel Villa, eds., *México: El voto por la democracia* (Mexico City: Grupo Editorial Miguel Angel Porrua, 1994). The political organizers of the Células maintain that these were organized strictly for mobilizing political support and establishing communication between local entrepreneurs and the party's presidential candidate, not to mobilize financial support; Luis Antonio Arguelles and Marco Antonio Bernal, interviews with the author, Mexico City, February 4 and 5, 1995. However, Roberto Campa, a top party leader in Mexico City, affirmed that these were also important devices for raising funds from the local business community; Roberto Campa, interview with author, Mexico City, June 8, 1995. Journalist Andrés Oppenheimer also describes the importance of the células for PRI fundraising in *Bordering on Chaos: Guerrillas, Stockbrokers, Politicians, and Mexico's Road to Prosperity* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996).

[45] This new emphasis away from sectoral organization was asserted officially by party leaders at the landmark XIVth National Assembly of the PRI in September 1990. For an analysis of the results of the XIVth assembly, see John Bailey, Denise Dresser, and Leopoldo Gómez, "XIV Asamblea del PRI: Balance Preliminar," *La Jornada*, September 26, 1990.

[46] Campa (fn. 44). An edited volume devoted entirely to this subject is *Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy*, ed. W. Cornelius, A. Craig, and J. Fox (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1992). In their article in this volume, "Electoral Determinants and Consequences of National Solidarity," Juan Molinar Horcasitas and Jeffrey Weldon show a strong electoral bias to PRONASOL expenditures and a marked impact on electoral outcomes in key electoral districts. For a recent study questioning the electoral impact of

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ership recruitment, and vote-getting resources in contested urban districts that, in some cases, stemmed the party's slide and, in others, permitted it to recapture majorities back from opposition parties.[47]

After 1988 the PRI managed to recover many of the losses suffered that year. Its metropolitan coalition in particular seemed to have been reinvigorated in subsequent elections. While the peripheral coalition continued to deliver solid majorities in 1991, the PRI's average vote total in urban areas increased significantly over 1988 (see Table 2). In the 1994 presidential elections, the party retained its hold on the metropolitan vote. In the urbanized central region of the country, the PRI's presidential campaign mobilized close to 50 percent of the vote—up from around 37 percent in 1988.[48] Similar results were registered in the advanced northern regions, where the PAN was strongest.[49] The 1994 election results also indicated that the PRI's appeals to privileged voters seemed to be bearing fruit. Exit polls showed the PRI running evenly with the PAN among well-educated and affluent voters, while at the same time winning overwhelmingly at the bottom of the social ladder.[50] While retaining a mass base that overwhelmed its opponents, the PRI in 1994 also mobilized substantial electoral support from affluent sectors of Mexican society.

In Argentina the building of business support for the Peronist party was reflected in close collaborative relationships between key entrepreneurs and top party officials and by the organization of party campaign-finance committees sponsored by prominent members of the business community. The main strategy for building new support among urban upper and upper-middle sectors was evidenced in the party's alliance with local conservative parties. By the late 1980s these parties commanded over 20 percent of the vote in the pivotal city of

PRONASOL, see Kathleen Bruhn, "Social Spending and Political Support: The 'Lessons' of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico," *Comparative Politics* 28 (January 1996).

[47] As Paul Haber notes, PRONASOL was instrumental in eroding organizational and electoral gains by the PRD in Durango and other electoral districts. Haber, "Political Change in Durango: The Role of National Solidarity," in Cornelius, Craig, and Fox (fn. 46).

[48] Federico Estevez, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de Mexico. Electoral data from research in progress.

[49] Joseph Klesner, "The 1994 Mexican Elections: Manifestation of a Divided Society?" *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 11 (Winter 1995). In this study Klesner also shows that, even with the PRI's urban advances, the peripheral and rural electoral bias displayed statistically in Tables 2 and 3 was maintained in 1994.

[50] Exit polls conducted by Mitofsky International, Inc. indicated that the PRI received 45 percent of the "wealthy" vote and 49 percent of the "high income" vote, compared to 44 percent and 33 percent respectively for the conservative PAN. However, at the bottom of the social ladder the PRI obtained 54 percent of the "below poverty level" vote as opposed to 25 percent for the PAN. Similarly, the exit polls indicated that the PRI captured 41 percent of voters with university education, compared to 36 percent for the PAN. For poll results, see *New York Times,* August 24, 1994, p. A4.

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Buenos Aires and held the balance in several districts throughout the country. The parties ran joint candidates with the Peronist party in local elections or declared their support for Peronist candidates in national elections. In several cases conservative party leaders were absorbed outright into Peronist party ranks.[51]

During this period, the power of party leaders within the Peronist movement increased over leaders in corporatist organizations, marking a shift within the Peronist movement's historic internal division of power.[52] In metropolitan areas, new leaders from urban party organizations began to play a major role in organizing Peronist urban campaigns and running the Peronist party apparatus.[53] In a sense, this shift mirrored the PRI's shift from sectoral to territorial organization in the running of urban campaigns. It gave rise to new party leaders and organized channels for mobilizing electoral support, and displaced labor and functional organizations in the party's metropolitan electoral organization. After President Menem seized control of the Peronist party by becoming its chair in 1991, loyal políticos within the urban party organization provided him with an important base of support in his struggles with opponents in the Peronist movement.

The 1995 presidential elections gave the Peronist party a major electoral victory. President Menem won the election with nearly 50 percent of the vote. The Peronist party in 1995 won big throughout the country, but its highest vote totals were in the least developed provinces, and its most contested showings were in the major metropolitan areas.[54] Nevertheless, during the six-year presidency of Carlos Menem, the Peronist metropolitan coalition experienced considerable change, particularly the addition of upper and upper-middle class voters to its electoral ranks. Part of this shift is captured in the results of multiple regression analyses presented in Tables 4 and 5 for Buenos Aires, a

[51] See Gibson (fn. 28).

[52] Peronist party leaders usually played second fiddle to labor leaders and corporatist organization figures in the Peronist movement. See Ricardo Sidicaro, "¿Es posible la democracia en Argentina?" in Alain Rouquié, ed., *Argentina Hoy* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores, 1985); and McGuire (fn. 39).

[53] One of these leaders, was Eduardo Duhalde, governor of the province of Buenos Aires. Formerly the mayor of the greater Buenos Aires municipality of Lomas de Zamora, he became Menem's vice-presidential running mate in 1989 and later won election as governor of Buenos Aires. In the 1995 presidential election, the Duhalde party machine in Buenos Aires was credited with orchestrating President Menem's electoral victories in the greater Buenos Aires region, bucking a general trend of urban electoral losses.

[54] The Peronist party's presidential percentage vote total in the twenty poorest provinces was 54 percent in 1995. In the four most economically advanced provinces it was 47 percent. In the country's four largest cities, the city of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Rosario, and Mendoza, the party's average vote percentage was 38 percent.

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TABLE 4
PERONIST ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE AND SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES: PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, 1995 (MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS)[a]

	Regression Coefficient	*Beta Coefficient*	*t-value*
Intercept	29.73		
Managers	.36	.17	1.2
Higher education	−.05	−.06	−0.8
Unemployed	−.66	−.27	−2.2[b]
Retirees on pension	−.74	−.44	−4.2[c]
Poverty	.31	.35	2.3[b]
Self-employed	.39	.27	2.1[b]
Employee/worker	.30	.35	1.8

[a] N=122 electoral countries. R-squared coeffieicnt is .440. Dependent variable: Peronist party vote percentage, 1995. Independent variables from the 1990 census measured in percentages: managers = population employed as managers or owners of firms; higher education = population with postsecondary education; unemployed = population unemployed; retirees on pension = population collecting retirement pensions; poverty = population with unsatisfied basic material needs; self-employed = business operator or professional with no employees; employee/worker = salaried white- or blue-collar worker.

[b] Significant at the .05 level.

[c] Significant at the .001 level.

major metropolitan province. Table 4 measures the impact of selected sociodemographic variables on the Peronist party's electoral performance in 1995, while Table 5 measures the impact of the same variables on the party's growth between 1989 and 1995.

The results suggest two things about the Peronist party's shifting metropolitan coalition. Keeping with tradition, historically Peronist populations in the lower and lower-middle social strata had the strongest positive impact on the party's electoral performance in 1995, as evidenced particularly by the "poverty" and "self-employed" variables in Table 4. However, the party's growth between 1989 and 1995 (Table 5) was most positively affected by the high-social-status variables of "university education" and "managers."[55] The party's changing metropolitan social profile appeared to be moving in an increasingly discontinuous direction between 1989 and 1995. Its support was strongest at the bot-

[55] The negative coefficients registered for "retirees on pension" and "unemployment" in both tables reflect predictable costs to the governing party of fiscal adjustment in the metropolis. Unemployment, in particular, was a major issue during the electoral campaign, edging toward historically high levels of 20 percent in the first half of 1995.

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TABLE 5
PERONIST PARTY GROWTH BETWEEN 1989 AND 1995 AND SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES: PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
(MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS)[a]

	Regression Coefficient	*Beta Coefficient*	*t-value*
Intercept	−5.23		
Managers	.79	.31	2.0[b]
Higher education	.22	.24	2.3[b]
Unemployed	−1.45	−.49	−3.5[c]
Retirees on pension	−1.12	−.53	−4.5[c]
Poverty	.03	.03	0.2
Self-employed	.30	.17	1.2
Employee/worker	.20	.18	0.8

[a]N=122 electoral counties. R-squared coefficient is .282. Dependent variable: Peronist party vote percentage change between 1989 and 1995.
[b]Significant at the .05 level.
[c]Significant at the .001 level.

tom and the top of the social ladder, and weakest in between, suggesting a possible displacement of the old working-class-based electoral coalition by one with distinctively popular-conservative markings.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to cast a new perspective on the coalitional dynamics of Peronism in Argentina and the PRI in Mexico. The analysis starts off with the suggestion that coalition building is strongly shaped by the interplay between policy-making and electoral politics, and that constituencies within a governing party's coalition can be distinguished according to their importance in the pursuit of either of those tasks. For analytical purposes, it is thus useful to conceive of governing parties as relying upon a policy coalition and an electoral coalition.

The division of policy and electoral tasks between the social constituencies of Peronism and the PRI was strongly shaped by regional factors. This insight leads to one of the main arguments of this essay: the emphasis on class dynamics of populist coalition building that has dominated scholarship on these two movements should be complemented by attention to the regional dynamics of the Peronist and PRI coalitions. Peronism and the PRI were more than class coalitions with strong ties to labor. They were also regional alliances encompassing two

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subcoalitions with markedly different social characteristics and different tasks in the reproduction of populist power. A metropolitan coalition incorporated new social actors into the political process. It gave impetus to the reorganization of the national political economy and to state-led models of development. A peripheral coalition extended the parties' territorial reach throughout the more economically backward regions and became vital to generating national electoral majorities. Modernity and tradition thus coexisted as part of the regional bargain that gave populism its national reach, created an internal balance of power, and led to a political division of labor vital to the political viability of populist movements.

The regional division of policy and electoral tasks was determined by the markedly different social characteristics of the metropolitan and peripheral regions, as well as by the social and demographic importance of the latter regions. This pattern appears to have been reproduced in other experiences of reformist or populist-party coalition building in contexts of underdevelopment. It also sheds light on the factors limiting the reformist potential of populist and center-left parties in developing countries or contexts of marked regional economic imbalances. Such parties must reconcile their drive for social change with their need for political order and support throughout the national territory. Disparities in socioeconomic development between regions render it almost inevitable for national parties, regardless of their transformative policy orientations, to enter into a pact with the forces of tradition that can guarantee order and political support in the territories they control. If these territories lie outside the reach of the original transformative agenda of the reformist parties, so much the better. If not, the pact itself will set clear geographic limits to that agenda. The Democratic Party coalition in the United States in the 1930s, which linked labor and progressive northern constituencies to a southern segregationist plantocracy, gave the Democratic Party a national electoral reach while placing the American South off-limits to the progressive agenda of New Deal policies.[56] Similarly, the Congress Party of India, and the center-left SLFP-led coalition in Sri Lanka, were unions of policy and electoral coalitions that were regionally differentiated and unevenly affected by the reformist economic policies pursued by the central government.

[56] For an analysis of the regional bargain involved in the New Deal, as well as of other effects of regionalism on U.S. national politics, see Robert F. Bensel, *Sectionalism in American Political Development: 1880-1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).

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The more recent experiences of free-market reform, however, suggest that the relationship between coalitions does not render the party's social and policy orientations immutable. Quite the contrary, the coexistence of two functionally distinctive coalitions under one institutional umbrella can provide leaders with the resources and coalitional flexibility required for enacting major policy shifts. The dual dependence on policy and electoral coalitions by Peronism and the PRI placed limits on their original transformative potential, but it also created an internal balance of power that aided political leaders greatly during the reform periods of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Mexico and Argentina the electoral leverage provided by the peripheral coalitions gave leaders a critical degree of autonomy from their old policy coalitions when they decided to pursue free-market reforms. The disruption caused by the recasting of the metropolitan policy coalition was countered by the stabilizing effect of the peripheral coalition's electoral weight. This situation in essence made the transitional costs of policy change sustainable in electoral terms. Similarly, in the case of Sri Lanka today, the once leftist governing coalition has relied on its peripheral coalition's electoral support while pursuing major free-market reforms against the resistance of its metropolitan constituencies.[57] Disaggregating the functional and territorial components of coalition building is thus important not only for an accurate historical understanding of the origins and evolution of populist parties, but also for a more nuanced understanding of the coalitional dynamics at play when such parties undertake market-oriented economic reforms.

Regarding the specific evolution of Peronism and the PRI, certain trends in their historic subcoalitions might be highlighted. In the metropolitan coalition one visible development has been a new political incorporation of business. Business politics has become a new coalitional "fulcrum" in this period of political and economic realignment, and this development has reshaped both the policy and electoral dimensions of its political action.[58]

At the policy level, business, which for decades had been a favored interlocutor in the state's relations with social groups, now finds itself in a prominent and more autonomous role. It is less fettered, in its deal-

[57] For an analysis of the Sri Lankan case, which adopts the analytical framework presented in this essay, see Mick Moore, "Leading the Left to the Right: Populist Coalitions and Economic Reform," *World Development* 25 (July1997).

[58] In its institutional and political consequences, this might be seen as a historical sequel to Collier and Collier's portrayal of labor politics as a coalitional "fulcrum" in twentieth-century Latin American politics. Collier and Collier (fn. 2), 40.

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ings with populist-controlled governments, by a corporatist balance of power that once forced it to negotiate with a centralized and politically integrated labor movement. At the electoral level, business now finds itself openly drawn into party politics, an arena that until recently it had avoided. In both Mexico and Argentina the relationship between business and political parties has become open, and populist parties are vigorous contenders for the electoral support of the propertied and socially privileged. This may portend, as a political sequel to the economic reform process, a "popular conservative" future for Peronism and the PRI as they organize for political competition in the neoliberal era. If so, it would still be a struggle to be won. Opposition parties, such as Mexico's PAN, may well thwart the PRI's overtures to the business community,[59] and resistance within Peronism and the PRI to the social conservatization of their metropolitan constituencies threaten its development at every turn.

Another issue relates to the changing relationship between the metropolitan and peripheral coalitions. Tensions between the parties along regional lines are likely to increase as the reform process shifts resources and power between regional leaders and constituencies. The declining electoral weight of the peripheral coalitions and the modernization and urbanization of Mexican and Argentine societies suggest that the division of functional tasks between regional constituencies will decline in the future.[60] The restructuring of the metropolitan coalition and the shifting of electoral tasks to the parties' metropolitan constituencies and political organization will undoubtedly spark important internal power struggles as peripheral coalition members strive to hold on to their declining shares of power.

In addition, tensions between the peripheral coalition and the populist parties' free-market policy orientations are likely to wrack both parties in the years to come. Although this essay has focused on conflicts between the parties and their metropolitan constituencies, it should be stressed that tensions between party leaders and the peripheral coalition over market reform also exist. In Argentina the interior provinces have historically been the most dependent on central government subsidies

[59] The economic crisis unleashed by the December 1994 devaluation in Mexico certainly increases the possibilities that the PAN will erode privileged strata support for the PRI.

[60] In Argentina this trend can be expected to accelerate as a result of the 1994 reform of the national constitution. Under the old constitution the provinces of the interior of the country were overrepresented in national elections because of the regional apportionment of votes in the national electoral college. With the abolition of the electoral college, the peripheral coalition's electoral weight in presidential elections will more closely reflect its actual population size.

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and were spared the more ravaging effects of fiscal adjustment during President Menem's first term.[61] During his second term they will face a harsh period of adjustment imposed by the central government.[62] In Mexico the peripheral coalition forms a powerful bastion of opposition to further economic reform and political democratization. PRI "dinosaurs" are strongly entrenched in the peripheral coalition, and conflicts between them and PRI elites in the presidency have been a powerful source of disharmony in the party. The temporary alliance between technocrats and peripheral-coalition políticos, which access to state power helped to maintain, cannot be expected to last indefinitely. In both Mexico and Argentina, continued conflicts between them will shape the evolution of populism well into the postdevelopmentalist era.

[61] Edward L. Gibson and Ernesto Calvo, "Electoral Coalitions and Market Reforms: Evidence from Argentina" (Manuscript, Northwestern University, December 1996).

[62] The Menem economic team's "Second Reform of the State," announced in late 1995, envisages a major fiscal reform for the country's provincial governments.

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GAME THEORY AND THE SPIRAL MODEL

By ANDREW KYDD*

IN 1908, in the midst of the Anglo-German naval race, the German ambassador to London, Count Metternich, wrote to his superiors:

> The cardinal point of our relations with England lies in the growth of our fleet. . . . Two different views are taken in England about the German Fleet. One section of opinion holds that the fleet is being built for the purpose of attacking England; the supporters of this view point to the assertions of the (German) Navy League, and other Anglophobe statements. The other view is that our fleet is not a deliberate threat of aggression, but a possible danger to England. . . . The consciousness of this danger naturally increases with the expansion of our fleet.[1]

As the count attempted to convey, one state's military preparations can generate fear on the part of other states. Other states become concerned, not just that the balance of forces has shifted against them, but that the military preparations indicate a desire for aggression or expansion on the part of the first state. The spiral model formulated by Robert Jervis captures this process well.[2] The model focuses on uncertainty about state motivations: states are uncertain whether other states are simply security seekers or whether they have more aggressive motivations and are "greedy," to use Charles Glaser's terminology.[3] When a state engages in an arms buildup, a neighboring state may take this as a sign that it is more aggressive than had previously been thought. The neighbor then responds with its own arms buildup, as indeed the British did in response to German naval increases; and in turn the first state becomes yet more fearful and more intent on increasing its power. Thus, an action-reaction cycle is complete. The cycle can even lead to

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[1] E. L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), 168–69, 198.

[2] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3.

[3] Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," *World Politics* 44 (July 1992).

World Politics 49 (April 1997), 371–400

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war if mutual fears grow to such an extent that preemptive or preventive incentives to attack become dominant. This unfortunate outcome is possible even though the states merely want to be secure and are acting solely to protect themselves. Defensive considerations and self-preservation, that is, lead to arms racing and war.

This story generates two puzzles. First, if one state escalates out of a combination of a desire for security and fear of the other state, why does it assume the other side's escalation is a sign of aggression? The British, that is, believed their own building to be motivated by a desire for security; yet they impugned the motivations behind the German buildup. In fact, since both security seekers and aggressive states escalate in arms races, the mere occurrence of an escalation should tell us nothing about which type a state is likely to be; nevertheless states routinely make such inferences about each other, based on escalations. Second, if states understand that these escalations are driving them toward an unwanted war, why do they not find a way to break the cycle, by exercising unilateral restraint or negotiating some mutual limit, and thereby halt the cycle of increased fear? In our case, why did Germany not act on its ambassador's warning and seek some form of accommodation with England?

Psychological bias is often invoked to explain these puzzles. Jervis, for example, believes that a specific psychological bias drives the spiral. He holds that people mistakenly assume that their own benign motivations are transparent to everyone, so that when others react negatively to their efforts at self-defense, they take it as a sure sign of hostile intent.[4] Furthermore, because people strive for cognitive consistency, it becomes almost impossible to change negative images of the other side once they are established.[5] This means that states will be both overly reluctant to try conciliatory policies with established adversaries and prone to ignore or misinterpret conciliatory policies these adversaries might employ toward them. The result is many unnecessary conflicts and many opportunities lost for détente.

This paper proposes an alternative set of solutions to these puzzles. I examine the spiral model from a rational choice perspective and present an incomplete information game that represents the structure inherent in spiral arguments. This provides a rational baseline with which psychological accounts can be compared. Some insights of the psychological school are supported, while others are challenged; and the model also generates new predictions unforeseen by psychological or previous nonformal approaches.

[4] Jervis (fn. 2), 71.
[5] Ibid., chap. 4.

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With respect to the first puzzle, the model demonstrates that psychological bias is not needed to explain why escalations are provocative. Escalations are provocative because, ex ante, greedy states are more likely to escalate than are security seekers. This is because greedy states escalate whether or not they believe their opponent is greedy, whereas security seekers are likely to escalate only if they fear that their opponent is greedy. Jervis's argument—that states will find escalations provocative when they are sure that others trust them—therefore turns out to be a special case of a much more general argument that is not dependent on such extreme or biased beliefs. States will find escalations provocative to some degree if they believe that there is *any chance at all* that their adversary is relatively trusting of them.

Concerning the second puzzle—the possibility of states breaking out of such spirals—the model sheds light on several issues. First, there are equilibria in which security seekers *can* avoid war by mutually refraining from arming and thereby signaling their lack of aggressive intentions. By signaling, states can eliminate the uncertainty at the heart of the spiral model and avoid war. Second, the model offers some suggestions about when this will not happen. States that are genuinely greedy will not be willing to signal and will end up in war, both with each other and with security seekers. While this is obvious, it reminds us, in Kenneth Oye's phrase, to "think horse before we think zebra" when we hear hoofbeats.[6] Many spiral-like phenomena in international politics may in fact be the acts of genuinely greedy states, rather than of security seekers who mistakenly become more fearful of each other.[7] In addition, the model indicates what variables will make it more difficult for security seekers to signal their intentions and avoid a spiral. When the costs of war and of arms racing are low, states will be less willing to signal by reducing their arms. When the military value of those arms is high, states will also be less willing to surrender them as a signal. States that have high fears of each other's motivations for exogenous reasons will also be reluctant to signal. Finally, stronger states will be less willing than weaker states to signal through arms reductions, because the latter have a greater incentive to avoid war.

These and other insights generated by the model provide a richer understanding of the spiral process than did previous psychological and nonformal investigations. Game theory is an especially helpful tool in a

[6] Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985).

[7] Many historians note the aggressive motivations of the continental states before 1914, for instance. In the case of Germany, see Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), esp. 11–20.

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context where beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, and behavior combine in a complex strategic interaction, as in the spiral model of international conflict.

The article has three parts. First, I present the structure of the model. Second, I describe two important equilibria related to the spiral model. Finally, I discuss implications of the model.

The Structure of the Model

The model depicts two states labeled 1 and 2 in a situation of mutual vulnerability. They have the option of attacking each other, and they can also build up their armaments in order to prepare for war. They are uncertain about the value the other side places on winning a war, or how innately aggressive it is. They are also uncertain about how the other side views them. I begin by describing the information structure, I then outline the structure of moves, and finally I discuss how war is modeled and payoffs are determined.

The Information Structure

Uncertainty is typically represented in game theory by establishing different types of players and giving other players probability estimates over these types. There are four possible types for each player in this model, distinguished by two variables. The first variable is the level of aggression, or greed, of the player. Greedy states are expansionist, not out of concern for security, but because of some positive value they place on the territory, wealth, or power they can acquire by expanding. The level of greed is represented by the utility for winning a war, V. The security seeker (S) has a value V_s, which is equal to 1, and which is also the value of peace for both players, regardless of type. The security seeker is thus content with the status quo and only wishes to be left in peace. The greedy type (G) has a value for war $V_g > 1$, and thus has something to gain from going to war, if the costs and risks are low enough. The second variable distinguishing the types is their level of fear, or each state's belief about how likely the *other* side is to be greedy. More fearful types (F) have a higher estimate that the other side is greedy than do the more trusting (T) types. Combining the two variables yields four possible types for each player, greedy and fearful (GF), greedy and trusting (GT), security seeking and fearful (SF), and security seeking and trusting (ST).[8] The type designation refers to their be-

[8] The information structure thus contains two levels of uncertainty. There is uncertainty over the utility of the other side, as well as uncertainty over their beliefs about your own utility. This somewhat complex information structure is necessitated by the logic of the spiral model, as will become clear below. The types in this model are comparable to those in Glaser (fn. 3).

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liefs at the start of the game. Note that the beliefs of each type may change as the game progresses; indeed, the focus of analysis will be on how they change.

The information structure can be thought of as having been generated by two choices made by Nature. First Nature picks the level of greed of each player, making it either greedy or security seeking. The probability that Nature chooses each option is determined by the common priors, γ_1 and γ_2, where γ_1 is the probability that 1 is greedy and γ_2 is the probability that 2 is greedy (the notation is summarized in Table 1). Next, Nature sends "messages" to each player about the greed of the other player. These messages can read either "g" or "s." If a player receives the message g, it is a sign that the other side is likely to be greedy; if it receives the

TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF NOTATION

Prior Beliefs over Moves by Nature	
Likelihood that player 1 is greedy	γ_1
Likelihood that player 2 is greedy	γ_2
Likelihood that message is wrong	ε
Beliefs after Moves by Nature	
Player i's estimate that j is greedy, conditional on receiving "g"	$p_{ig} = \frac{(1-\varepsilon)\gamma_j}{(1-\varepsilon)\gamma_j + \varepsilon(1-\gamma_j)}$
Player i's estimate that j is greedy, conditional on receiving "s"	$p_{is} = \frac{\varepsilon\gamma_j}{\varepsilon\gamma_j + (1-\varepsilon)(1-\gamma_j)}$
Player i's estimate that j is fearful, conditional on being greedy	$q_{ig} = 1-\varepsilon$
Player i's estimate that j is fearful, conditional on being security seeking	$q_{is} = \varepsilon$
Primes denote posterior beliefs in the second round of play	p_{1gf}', q_{2gf}', etc.
Value of War	
Value of winning for greedy players	$V_g > 1$
Value of winning for security seekers	$V_s = 1$
Value of peace	1
Value of losing a war	0
Cost of war	C_w
Cost of building weapons	C_b
Base probability of winning	π_i where $\pi_1 + \pi_2 = 1$
Advantage from attacking first	α
Advantage from building arms	β

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message s, it is a sign that the other side is likely to be a security seeker. The player who receives the g message thus becomes more fearful than the player who receives the s message. Of course, if these messages were perfectly accurate, there would be no uncertainty in the model: each side would know the other's motivations and beliefs perfectly. These messages are not perfectly accurate, however. There is a chance that Nature will send the wrong message and that a state will receive a g when the other side is really security seeking, or vice versa. The probability that these messages are in error is denoted ε.[9]

This way of generating the information structure corresponds to an intuitive story of how states derive their beliefs about each other. Certain information about states is public knowledge, published in newspapers and books or broadcast over the air. Such information is enough to allow the formation of certain opinions about how likely states are to be greedy or security seeking. These beliefs based on public information correspond to the γ priors in the model. However, states do not form their opinions solely on the basis of publicly available information. They also collect information from their many intelligence-gathering agencies and departments, ranging from the ordinary diplomatic service to clandestine intelligence operatives. Other states, for their part, do not know for sure what information is conveyed through these channels. Although the information may or may not be correct, it is nevertheless a reasonable conjecture that more often than not these channels enable states to improve their estimates and hence can be modeled as messages that are more likely to be accurate than not. Each side knows what message it receives, but not exactly what was conveyed to the other side. Thus the information structure here corresponds to a world in which states draw upon commonly available sources and private intelligence and then combine the two to form opinions about the other side's type and beliefs.[10]

A simple formal way of representing the information structure is by

[9] I assume without loss of generality that $1-\varepsilon > \varepsilon$. If $1-\varepsilon$ were less than ε, the signal would simply imply the opposite of its value, so that g would indicate a security seeker and s a greedy type. It is further assumed that the draws that produce these messages, as well as those that produce the player's greed, are uncorrelated. The interpretation of the messages as private intelligence gathering is in accord with a lack of correlation. As for the first draws over greed, it is difficult to see why greedy and security-seeking states should rationally infer different probabilities that an opponent is greedy from the same public information, although this kind of divergence may occur for psychological reasons. A final point to emphasize is that these messages are *not* sent by the other player in any conscious way but simply represent information that the receiving state gathers on its own and that influences its beliefs about the other side's type. Thus they are not "signals" in the sense of consciously manipulated signs. Rather, states signal with their armament choices, as described below.

[10] Of course, these beliefs may arise in other ways as well. The intelligence-gathering story is offered as one intuitively plausible way in which such divergent beliefs could arise.

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Player 1's Type	Player 2's Type: Greedy and Fearful	Greedy and Trusting	Security Seeking and Fearful	Seucirity Seeking and Trusting
Greedy and Fearful	$\gamma_1\gamma_2(1-\varepsilon)(1-\varepsilon)$	$\gamma_1\gamma_2(1-\varepsilon)\varepsilon$	$\gamma_1(1-\gamma_2)\varepsilon(1-\varepsilon)$	$\gamma_1(1-\gamma_2)\varepsilon\varepsilon$
Greedy and Trusting	$\gamma_1\gamma_2\varepsilon(1-\varepsilon)$	$\gamma_1\gamma_2\varepsilon\varepsilon$	$\gamma_1(1-\gamma_2)(1-\varepsilon)(1-\varepsilon)$	$\gamma_1(1-\gamma_2)(1-\varepsilon)\varepsilon$
Security Seeking and Fearful	$(1-\gamma_1)\gamma_2(1-\varepsilon)\varepsilon$	$(1-\gamma_1)\gamma_2(1-\varepsilon)(1-\varepsilon)$	$(1-\gamma_1)(1-\gamma_2)\varepsilon\varepsilon$	$(1-\gamma_1)(1-\gamma_2)\varepsilon(1-\varepsilon)$
Security Seeking and Trusting	$(1-\gamma_1)\gamma_2\varepsilon\varepsilon$	$(1-\gamma_1)\gamma_2\varepsilon(1-\varepsilon)$	$(1-\gamma_1)(1-\gamma_2)(1-\varepsilon)\varepsilon$	$(1-\gamma_1)(1-\gamma_2)(1-\varepsilon)(1-\varepsilon)$

FIGURE 1
POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF PLAYER AND TYPE[a] AND THE PRIOR PROBABILITIES THAT NATURE WILL SELECT EACH COMBINATION TO START THE GAME

[a]Each player can be one of four possible types, so there are 4^2 or 16 possible combinations of player types that can play the game. The terms in the cells of the table are the probability that Nature starts the game with that combination of types. The sixteen entries sum to 1, as is necessary for any probability distribution.

way of the state space in Figure 1. There are sixteen possible initial states of the world, corresponding to the four possible types for each of two players. Player 1's partitions (information sets) are the rows of the table, player 2's partitions are the columns, reflecting the fact that both players know their own type but not that of the opposite player. The priors over the initial states of the world are given in the cells of the table. Nature starts the game by selecting a cell in accordance with these priors.

What beliefs does each player hold after Nature starts the game?[11] As an example, assume that Nature picks the first row, second column.

[11] I will sometimes refer to beliefs after Nature's move but before the first round of play as "priors" because they precede any move by the players, but it should be remembered that they are posterior to Nature's move.

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Since this is the first row, player 1's type is greedy and fearful (because it received the g message about player 2), or GF. Consider player 1's belief that player 2 is also greedy. This is found by examining the probabilities in the first row, dividing the probability that 2 is greedy (the first two cells) by the total probability of the row, which reduces to

$$\frac{(1-\varepsilon)\gamma_2}{(1-\varepsilon)\gamma_2 + \varepsilon(1-\gamma_2)}.$$

This belief is higher than the prior γ_2, which makes sense since player 1 received the g message from Nature and has therefore become more suspicious about player 2. By contrast, consider the case when Nature picks the second row, second column, in which player 1 is the GT type (receives the s message). Player 1 now has an estimate of

$$\frac{\varepsilon\gamma_2}{\varepsilon\gamma_2 + (1-\varepsilon)(1-\gamma_2)}$$

that player 2 is greedy.

This belief is lower than γ_2, indicating that player 1 has become less suspicious as a result of the message from Nature. To simplify notation, I label the more fearful type's level of fear p_{if} and the more trusting type's fear p_{it}, where

$$p_{if} = \frac{(1-\varepsilon)\gamma_j}{(1-\varepsilon)\gamma_j + \varepsilon(1-\gamma_j)}$$

$$p_{it} = \frac{\varepsilon\gamma_j}{\varepsilon\gamma_2 + (1-\varepsilon)(1-\gamma_j)}.$$[12]

While it is true that $p_{if} > \gamma_j > p_{it}$, it is important to recognize that the differences need not be great. If ε is near .5, the differences will be quite small. Thus it is best to think of the terms "fearful" and "trusting" as meaning "relatively fearful" and "relatively trusting," that is, fearful relative to what the actor believed before it received its message and relative to what it would have been had it received the opposite message.

What is each type's belief about whether the other side is fearful or not? The more fearful side is the side that received the g message. If player 1 is greedy, it knows that the likelihood of player 2 receiving the g message is 1-ε, which is the likelihood of player 2's message being correct. If player 1 is security seeking, however, his belief is ε, or the likelihood of player 2's message being incorrect. Notice that the belief about the fear of the other side is related to a player's own level of

[12] Note that the subscript on the p's is the opposite of that on the γs. I subscript the p's to reflect the player holding the belief, whereas the γs are subscripted to reflect the object of the prior probability.

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greed. Greedy players have higher estimates that the other side is fearful than do security-seeking players, which is natural because the message is more likely to be accurate than not and both sides know the other is updating based on the message it receives. I again define two levels of belief about fear, q_{ig} for the greedy type and q_{is} for the security seeker, such that

$$q_{ig} = 1-\varepsilon$$
$$q_{is} = \varepsilon.^{13}$$

This completes the description of the initial moves by Nature that set up the beliefs with which players enter the game. Let us now consider the choices that face each player.

The Structure of Moves

The game is designed to analyze the problem of how states learn from observing arms buildups by other states and whether this learning process can drive them to war, as the spiral model literature suggests. The model therefore has two rounds, one in which states have the option to build weapons or not (after an initial attack choice) and a second in which they decide whether or not to attack each other.[14] The structure of moves is illustrated in the game tree in Figure 2. The initial node of this tree corresponds to a cell of the state space in Figure 1.

In the first round, the states have two separate decisions: an attack choice and then a weapons-building choice. First, states can attack (A) the other player, or they can choose to defend (D). If either or both sides attack, a battle is fought in which one side wins and the other loses. If both sides defend, no war occurs. In this case, states can build (B) or add to their stock of weapons, or they can refrain from building or wait until the next round (W). Giving the states the opportunity to attack *before* as well as after their build decision may seem an unnecessary complication, but it is mandated by an important consideration. In reality, states can attack at any time (aside from seasonal considerations in some eras), so they do not engage in arms buildups unless *both sides* think this will make them better off than attacking right away. For

[13] This may seem like redundant notation, but it will become convenient later on when these beliefs about the other side's fear are updated and the formulas become much less simple.

[14] Further rounds of play would complicate the model without adding greatly to its capacity to address spiral arguments. Note in particular that unlike many models of international relations, such as the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and related models of arms races, cooperation here is not a function of the shadow of the future; hence the restriction to a finite number of rounds does not fundamentally change the nature of the game, as it does in the repeated PD. See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); and George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, *Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).

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

FIGURE 2
THE STRUCTURE OF MOVES

instance, a greedy state might hope to get a power advantage over an unwary opponent, and a security seeker might hope that a buildup may deter attack. However, in some cases these hopes vanish for one or both states: greedy states discover that their adversaries are on their guard and will match their buildup, or security seekers realize that buildups will fail to deter. In such cases, war will break out immediately without any preliminary arms race. For the model to deny states the option of attacking immediately would therefore constrain their behavior artificially and skew any interpretations one might make about the conditions under which arms races arise. Thus, at the price of added complexity in the model, an initial attack decision is included so that arms races take place only when *both* sides prefer to defer a possible war into the future.

In the second round there are two possibilities. If a war has been fought in the first round, the victor continues to enjoy the spoils of victory in the second round and the loser continues to suffer the conse-

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quences of the lost war. The loser is not restored and is not in a position to fight again. If no war was fought in the first round, the players have another opportunity to attack each other in the second round. The chances of victory will of course be influenced by the decisions to build or not to build weapons in the first round. The game then ends.[15] Thus there are six choices or information sets facing each player. In the first round there is an initial attack decision, then a build decision for when no one attacks. In the second round there are four attack decisions for each possible combination of build choices from the first round.

When a state is deciding whether or not to attack its opponent, it does not know whether the opponent has decided to attack. Similarly, when considering a buildup, it does not know whether its opponent has decided to build or not.

The Payoff Structure

The players derive payoffs from both rounds of the game; added together, these give the total payoff. The highest payoff for security seekers is to be left in peace without engaging in an arms race. This payoff is normalized to 1 per period. A security seeker that remained at peace without arms racing for both rounds would therefore receive a payoff of 1 in each round for a total payoff of 2. The lowest payoff is that associated with losing a war, which is normalized to 0. The value of winning a war, before costs are subtracted, is V per period. As mentioned earlier, for security seekers, $V = V_s = 1$, meaning that they are no happier winning wars than being left in peace. This reflects the fact that security seekers are happy with the status quo and have nothing to gain from changing it. For greedy types, $V=V_g > 1$; they prefer to take over the other state if no costs or risks are involved. The cost of war is C_w for both parties, payable in the round in which a war occurs. Thus if a greedy player wins a war initiated in the first round, he gets a payoff of $V_g - C_w$ from the first round and a further V_g from the second round, for a total of $2V_g - C_w$. It is assumed that there is no discounting between periods.[16]

The payoffs associated with war are equal to its expected utility. War is considered a simple lottery with a chance of winning π_i for player i where $\pi_1 + \pi_2 = 1$. The model allows for the possibility of a first-strike advantage, that is, an increase in the chance of winning provided that you

[15] No building choice is included in the second round because building is only worthwhile if there is a subsequent war, but in this final round of the game there are no subsequent possibilities for attack. Hence no player would build, regardless of type; including the choice would therefore complicate the description of the game to no purpose.

[16] Discounting would not affect the results in any significant way and would further complicate an already complex model.

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strike first.[17] If player 1 attacks and player 2 does not, player 1's chance of victory goes up to $\pi_1+\alpha$ whereas player 2's is now $\pi_2-\alpha$. Similarly, if player 1 builds in the first round and player 2 does not and they then attack simultaneously in the second round, player 1's chance of winning is $\pi_1+\beta$ and 2's is $\pi_2-\beta$. Thus β represents the advantage in war of the arms buildup. It is assumed that $\pi_i+\alpha+\beta \leq 1$ for all i. The cost of a buildup is assumed to be the same for both players and is written C_b.

An example of the payoffs in a specific situation may help to clarify the principles behind them. If greedy types attack in the first round and security seekers neither attack nor build, the expected payoff for a security-seeking fearful player 1 is

$$p_{1f}(2(\pi_1-\alpha)V_s-C_w) + (1-p_{1f})(2).$$

The first term corresponds to the p_{1f} chance that player 1 will be attacked by a greedy player 2. If this occurs, player 1 will have a first-strike disadvantage, hence the $-\alpha$ in the term for its chance of winning the war. If player 1 is not attacked, it means that player 2 is a security seeker (a $1-p_{1f}$ chance), player 1 will therefore get its maximum payoff of 1 per round for a total of 2. A greedy player 2 in this scenario would attack and receive and expected payoff of

$$p_{2f}(2\pi_2V_g-C_w) + (1-p_{2f})(2(\pi_2+\alpha)V_g-C_w).$$

The first term corresponds to the situation in which both players attack, which will occur if player 1 is greedy, a p_{2f} probability. In this case there is no first-strike advantage. The second term, corresponding to when player 1 is security seeking, reflects that player 2 in this case attacks with a first-strike advantage. Other utilities are derived in a similar fashion. The notation for the game is summarized in Table 1.

Analysis of the Model

In analyzing the model, I will focus on two questions. First, why and when should states grow more suspicious of each other's motivations after observing an arms buildup? Second, when can security seekers take steps to signal their intentions and break out of spirals? Related questions will arise as the model is examined, and implications will be discussed more fully in the following section. The analysis will proceed through the examination of the model's Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.[18]

[17] A first-strike advantage is necessary for there to be a danger of war between security seekers, a key subject of concern in the spiral model.

[18] Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, *Game Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), chap. 8.

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In a model as complex as this it should not be surprising that there are many equilibria, which are determined by the values of the various parameters and ex ante expectations. A full analysis of all of them is beyond the scope of this article. For the purposes of answering the two questions set out above, however, a full catalog of equilibria is of less interest than an understanding of those equilibria that are pertinent to the questions.

Some equilibria in the model are, by contrast, irrelevant for our purposes, because the conditions that underlie them are either too mild or too extreme to generate a possibility for spirals. First consider mild conditions. If the greedy type is actually not very greedy (V_g is close to 1), then equilibria exist in which no type builds or attacks, and hence beliefs do not change. Thus if greedy states are not very greedy, they may be content to behave like security seekers—avoiding conflict. If the greedy type *is* greedy enough to attack, but security seekers are nearly sure that the other state is *not* greedy, then there are equilibria in which security seekers will avoid arms racing or attacking without any concern for the possibility that the other state may attack, simply because such an event is viewed as only a remote chance. Thus high levels of ex ante trust will also eliminate spirals, even if a really greedy state would attack. If the first-strike advantage is very low, spirals may be possible but will not lead to war between security seekers. Security seekers will arm and become more suspicious of each other but choose not to attack first. Finally, if private intelligence gathering enables states to refine their priors exceptionally well, spirals between security seekers will become rare, because the set of mistaken beliefs on which they depend become unlikely. Thus in these mild conditions, spirals are either unlikely to happen or not dangerous if they do happen.

Similarly, under particularly harsh conditions, spirals are also unlikely. Consider the case where greedy types are quite greedy ($V_g >> 1$), each side comes into the game already nearly convinced that the other side is greedy (γ_i close to 1), and there is a significant first-strike advantage. In this case, all types will attack in the first round to avoid being the victim of a first strike. Clearly no learning takes place under such conditions, for no state dares to postpone attack to engage in an arms buildup. Spirals are therefore impossible. Consider also a case in which the weapons system in question is so cheap and so effective that even relatively trusting states will feel compelled to buy it. In this case, all types will buy the system, and again no learning will take place, hence no spiral. For instance, no one would draw inferences based on the fact that a state equipped its troops with combat rifles. The weapon is cheap

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and necessary, so all states buy it and "escalate" even if they are not particularly greedy. Thus under certain conditions, all types will either escalate or preempt, once more eliminating the possibility of spirals. While these harsh conditions, as well as the mild ones discussed above, are not conducive to spirals and are hence less interesting for the purposes of this article, it is important to be aware of their existence. In particular, when attempting to identify spirals between security seekers in the real world, we should be careful that these conditions do not apply.

For conditions between these extremes, there are various families of equilibria that are of more interest. Given our focus on learning and change in beliefs, two families are of special interest: those equilibria in which states grow more suspicious of each other's motivations as a result of behavior in the first round, and those equilibria in which states grow less suspicious, or become reassured. These can be called upward and downward spiral equilibria, where these terms are defined as follows:

> —A *spiral* or (or *upward spiral*) takes place when a security-seeking state i takes an action that causes another state j to raise its belief, p_j, that state i is greedy.
>
> —In a *downward spiral*, a security seeker (i) takes an action that causes another state (j) to decrease its fear (p_j) (in this case correctly).

Examining equilibria in which upward and downward spirals take place will enable us to say something about how states should learn about each other's motivations through observing their armaments.

Within each of the two families, I have selected a representative equilibrium, one for upward spirals, one for downward spirals. The members of each family resemble each other in most important respects, and implications drawn from each example will be valid across the family, unless otherwise noted.[19]

The Spiral Equilibrium

An equilibrium containing a spiral is presented in Table 2. The information sets, or choices, for the players are represented by the columns of the table, each player/type by the rows, and the choice of the player/type at each information set by the entry in the table. In the first round the player/types first have the opportunity to attack (A) or defend (D) and all player/types choose to defend. Then they have the opportunity to build weapons (B) or wait (W), and both greedy types

[19] Differences between family members are primarily off the equilibrium path and in the second round, after learning has taken place. A more complete description of the equilibria in the model is available from the author upon request.

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TABLE 2
A SPIRAL EQUILIBRIUM: STRATEGY CHOICE[a] AT EACH INFORMATION SET[b]

		Round 1		*Round 2*			
Player	*Type*	*A*	*B*	*WW*	*WB*	*BW*	*BB*
Player 1	GF	D	B	A	A	A	A
	GT	D	B	A	A	A	A
	SF	D	B	D	A	D	A
	ST	D	W	D	D	D	A
Player 2	GF	D	B	A	A	A	A
	GT	D	B	A	A	A	A
	SF	D	B	D	D	A	A
	ST	D	W	D	D	D	A

[a]Key to strategy choices:
A = attack
D = defend
B = build weapons
W = wait (not build)

[b]Key to information sets:
Round 1 A = attack choice in the first round
B = build choice in the first round
Round 2 WW=attack choice in second round, after both sides waited
WB = attack choice in second round, after 1 waited and 2 built
BW = attack choice in second round, after 1 built and 2 waited
BB = attack choice in second round, after both sides built

(GF and GT) and the fearful security seeker (SF) build weapons. Only the security-seeking trusting type (ST) refrains from building weapons in the first round. In the second round greedy types attack. Security-seeking fearful types attack if the other side built in the first round, and defend otherwise. Security-seeking trusting types defend unless both sides built in the first round. Equilibrium payoffs and boundary conditions are given in the appendix.

This spiral equilibrium captures the essential arguments of the spiral model. Mutual fear and vulnerability lead security-seeking fearful types to increase their power; that is, SF types build in the first round. This arms race reinforces mutual fear and leads to war between SF types in the second round; SF types end up at information set BB, where they attack each other.

The essence of the spiral can be examined by looking at how beliefs change after observing the behavior in the first round. First, imagine that the other side does not build but instead waits (W). By doing so, it identifies itself as a security-seeking and trusting type (ST), since no

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other type pursues this strategy. In this case a security seeker (either SF or ST) can relax. It is free to defend and receive its maximum payoff from peace because it knows that the ST type will not attack in the next round.[20]

If the other side builds, however, a state will remain uncertain about which type it faces. GF, GT, and SF types all build weapons in the first round; hence uncertainty remains about the other side's type. Each player/type's beliefs must be updated in accordance with Bayes rule. The new beliefs will differ for each type. Type GF's new estimate that the other side is greedy is

$$p_{igf}' = \frac{p_{if}}{p_{if}+q_{ig}(1-p_{if})}$$

and its estimate that the other side is fearful is

$$q_{igf}' = \frac{q_{ig}}{q_{ig}+p_{if}(1-q_{ig})}.$$

Beliefs for the other types are similar and are shown in Table 3. These formulas imply that $p_{igf}' > p_{if}$ and $q_{igf}' > q_{ig}$ and so forth for the other types. The posterior probabilities that player j is greedy, given an arms buildup, are greater than the priors. Escalation provokes suspicion, the hallmark of a spiral. Note that the beliefs are specific to each type because they depend on the initial beliefs about both greed and fear. The implications of these formulas for the generation of fear will be discussed below.

TABLE 3
POSTERIOR BELIEFS IN SPIRAL EQUILIBRIUM EXAMPLE

GF	$p_{igf}' = \frac{p_{if}}{p_{if}+q_{ig}(1-p_{if})}$	$q_{igf}' = \frac{q_{ig}}{q_{ig}+p_{if}(1-q_{ig})}$
GT	$p_{igt}' = \frac{p_{it}}{p_{it}+q_{ig}(1-p_{it})}$	$q_{igt}' = \frac{q_{ig}}{q_{ig}+p_{it}(1-q_{ig})}$
SF	$p_{isf}' = \frac{p_{if}}{p_{if}+q_{is}(1-p_{if})}$	$q_{isf}' = \frac{q_{is}}{q_{is}+p_{if}(1-q_{is})}$
ST	$p_{ist}' = \frac{p_{it}}{p_{it}+q_{is}(1-p_{it})}$	$q_{ist}' = \frac{q_{is}}{q_{is}+p_{it}(1-q_{is})}$

[20] Thus, within this upward spiral equilibrium, a downward spiral is also possible, because the ST type signals its type by not building. The next equilibrium will focus on when the SF type can also refrain from building.

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THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL EQUILIBRIUM

While buildups provoke fear, refraining from a buildup can reassure. If the military advantage associated with building weapons is small enough such that not building can be used as a signal that the actor is a security seeker, then the security seekers may wish not to build weapons and not to attack if the other side reciprocates—even though this strategy leaves them worse off if the other side really is greedy and decides to attack. An example of an equilibrium in which this happens is given in Table 4.

The key feature of the strategies in this equilibrium is that all security seekers choose to wait in the first round. This implies that anyone who builds must be greedy. Thus, if player 2 builds in the first round, p_{1gf}' must equal 1, as must p_{1gt}', p_{1sf}', and p_{1st}'. In this equilibrium also, then, escalations are provocative, in this case completely so. Conversely, if player 2 waits in the first round, then player 1's beliefs go to 0: $p_{1gf}' = p_{1gt}' = p_{1sf}' = p_{1st}' = 0$. Since both greedy types attack in the second

TABLE 4
A DOWNWARD SPIRAL EQUILIBRIUM: STRATEGY CHOICE[a] AT EACH INFORMATION SET[b]

		Round 1		*Round 2*			
	Type	*A*	*B*	*WW*	*WB*	*BW*	*BB*
Player 1	GF	D	B	A	A	A	A
	GT	D	B	A	A	A	A
	SF	D	W	D	A	A	A
	ST	D	W	D	A	A	A
Player 2	GF	D	B	A	A	A	A
	GT	D	B	A	A	A	A
	SF	D	W	D	A	A	A
	ST	D	W	D	A	A	A

[a]Key to strategy choices:
A = attack
D = defend
B = build weapons
W = wait (not build)

[b]Key to information sets:
Round 1 A = attack choice in the first round
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Round 2 WW=attack choice in second round, after both sides waited
WB = attack choice in second round, after 1 waited and 2 built
BW = attack choice in second round, after 1 built and 2 waited
BB = attack choice in second round, after both sides built

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round, it makes sense for the security-seeking types to attack in the second round when they are sure they are facing a greedy type (in information sets WB, BW, and BB) and to wait when they become sure they are facing another security seeker (at WW). Notice that this has the consequence that if a security-seeking player 1, say, makes a "mistake" and builds when he should have waited in the first round, he should then attack. This is because player 2, convinced by this mistake that player 1 is greedy and intends to attack, will therefore feel compelled to attack; player 1 therefore must attack as well. Greedy types all build in the first round and then attack. They are willing to postpone their attack until the second round because if their adversary is a security seeker, they will gain a military advantage in the subsequent war.

Despite a first-strike advantage and the existence of mutual fears, war between security-seeking states is avoided in this equilibrium. The importance of the first-strike advantage makes it imperative for the security seekers to identify others and reveal their own identities, and to this end they employ the signal of forgoing an arms buildup. Greedy states are unwilling to mimic this signal because they wish to attack later on and want to be well prepared for the war. Security seekers, by contrast, prefer to be ill prepared for wars that are forced upon them by greedy types if this enables them to avoid unnecessary wars with other security seekers.

When is this equilibrium possible? There are two conditions placed on the greedy player: he cannot be so greedy that he wants to attack in the first round, and he must be greedy enough to avoid mimicking the security-seeking types that do not build in the first round. The most interesting condition, however, is the comparison between the security-seeking strategy and the greedy one, that is, between waiting and building in the first round. For the security seekers, it must be the case that

$$1-C_b+p_{if}(\pi_i V_s-C_w)+(1-p_{if})[(\pi_i+\beta)V_g-C_w] <$$
$$1+p_{if}[(\pi_i-\beta)V_s-C_w]+(1-p_{if})$$

which reduces to

$$p_{if} < 1-\frac{\beta-C_b}{1-(\pi_i-C_w)}.$$

The numerator of the fraction is the net value of arming, given a war, and the denominator is 1 minus the base value of war, given no arming or first-strike advantage.

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Implications of the Model for Fear, Reassurance, and War

In discussing the implications of the model, I focus first on the generation of fear in the spiral equilibrium and then on the possibility of reassurance as represented by the downward spiral equilibrium.

The Generation of Fear

My first question was why and under what conditions escalations are provocative. The reason escalations are provocative is easily seen by considering first-round behavior in the spiral equilibrium. Whereas both fearful and trusting aggressive types build weapons, only the fearful security seeker does. Therefore, provided there is some probability that the other side is trusting, aggressive types are more likely to build than are security seekers. Note that this is precisely the logic that Jervis identifies as driving the spiral. He argues that escalations are provocative because states believe that others are not fearful of them; that is, states believe that other states are trusting. As the model indicates, if a state were completely convinced that the other side was the trusting type, then an escalation in this equilibrium would be sure proof that the other side is aggressive.

With respect to *when* escalations are provocative, however, the model departs from Jervis. Escalation in the spiral equilibrium is provocative even if the state is not certain that the other side is trusting. In fact, as long as the state thinks there is *any chance at all* that the other is trusting, it will still find the escalation provocative in a spiral equilibrium. Biased or extreme beliefs, such as an unreasoned belief that the other side does not fear you, are *not* necessary for escalations to be provocative. For instance, assume that a greedy and fearful (GF) state starts out with a prior belief that the other side is 30 percent likely to be greedy ($p_{if} = .3$) and 60 percent likely to be fearful ($q_{ig} = .6$).[21] This state is quite aware that the other side may be fearful of it and does not seem to be laboring under any delusion about its own image. From the formula above it can be verified that such a state will have a posterior belief of 42 percent ($p_{igf}' = .42$) that the other side is greedy and has therefore become more fearful from observing the buildup. Thus, escalations can be provocative given seemingly unbiased beliefs that reflect the uncertainty endemic to international relations. While Jervis correctly identi-

[21] Note again, the subscript refers to the holder of the belief, not the object of the belief, so a GF type's level of fear is pif and its belief that the other side is fearful is qig.

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fies the logic that makes escalations provocative, he understates the conditions under which the logic applies. Extreme or biased beliefs are not necessary to make escalations provocative; they will be provocative if there is any chance at all that the other side is trusting.[22]

Further implications go beyond issues raised by the psychological approach. One such implication is that greedy states will increase their fear of other states to a lesser degree than will security seekers in response to an escalation. That is, security seekers will be more easily provoked than greedy states by the escalations of others. Since $q_{is} \leq .5 \leq q_{ig}$, aggressive states have a higher estimate that the other state is fearful of them than security seekers do. Hence the aggressive state thinks it more likely that the escalation was motivated by fear than does the security seeker. Greedy states, therefore, should not grow fearful of other's motivations as quickly as security seekers should. (From Table 3 it can be seen that $p_{igf}' < p_{isf}'$ and $p_{igt}' < p_{ist}'$.) Note that this implication lessens the severity of the dilemma, identified by Glaser, of how to deal with the greedy fearful type of state (greedy and potentially insecure in his terminology).[23] Glaser notes that confrontational policies are traditionally recommended against greedy states while policies of reassurance are recommended against insecure states, posing a dilemma in the treatment of states that are both greedy and insecure. Confrontation runs the risk of provoking fears and bringing on preemptive attack, while reassurance invites aggression. The model shows, however, that greedy states are less easily provoked than are security seekers, so that confrontational policies against them generate less risk of war than they would against security seekers. While not wholly without risk, then, confrontational policies against the greedy and fearful state are not as risky as had previously been believed.

A related implication pertains to beliefs about fear. Observing a buildup also increases the belief that the builder is fearful. Thus, as an arms race progresses, states become more convinced that they face a fearful type. The formulas in Table 3 indicate that this effect will be especially pronounced the less fearful a state is. That is, the more trusting a state is, the less likely it thinks the adversary is to be aggressive, and hence the more likely it is to think that the escalation was motivated by fear. (Once again, this can be seen by noting that $q_{igf}' < q_{igt}'$ and $q_{isf}' < q_{ist}'$.) Thus states that view their adversaries as more likely to be security

[22] This dependence of spiraling on the distinction between trusting and fearful states is what necessitates the incorporation of the second level of uncertainty in the model (fn. 8).

[23] Glaser (fn. 3).

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seekers will grow especially convinced by escalations that their adversary is fearful.

The Anglo-German naval race offers a historical illustration of these implications. The weight of historical opinion holds that German leaders, at least in comparison with their British counterparts, had substantial aggressive motivations, which expressed themselves through the building of the fleet.[24] Furthermore, as Germany continually received information from its ambassadors about the pacific inclinations of the London government and business elites, it is safe to say that Germany was more trusting than fearful of Great Britain. Britain, by contrast, continually received information suggesting a deep-seated Anglophobia on the part of Germany. The general wave of anti-British feeling in the wake of the Boer War was particularly vehement in Germany, and incautious remarks on the part of the kaiser about "seizing the trident," coupled with clumsy efforts at reassurance such as the *Daily Telegraph* interview, only fed British fears.[25] We can then code Germany as a GT type and Britain as an SF type. If we then place them in the spiral equilibrium, we should observe the following pattern: Germany, being the GT type, should react to British buildups by becoming somewhat more convinced that Britain is aggressive but much more convinced that Britain is fearful of them. Britain, being the SF type, should display the opposite pattern: the fear that Germany is aggressive should rise precipitately, while the belief that Germany is fearful should rise less markedly.

In fact, this is precisely what we do see. The recurrent German fear throughout the race is that their escalations will make Britain so fearful of them that they attack preventively in the "Copenhagen" scenario, so named for a preventive attack by the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars.[26] The German leadership suffered continual and increasing anxiety in its quest to get through the "danger zone" of relative weakness without provoking a preventive strike.[27] Being expansionist,

[24] Woodward (fn. 1), 11; Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany* (Miami, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1970), 145; Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945* (London: Fontanna Press, 1983), chap. 5; Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), chap. 7.

[25] In 1907 the kaiser granted an interview with a reporter from the *Daily Telegraph*, in which he claimed to have given the British the winning strategy in the Boer War and also that the German navy was being built against the Japanese. These preposterous claims only worsened Anglo-German relations and led to a serious political crisis in Germany. See Peter Padfield, *The Great Naval Race* (London: Hart-Davis, 1974), 223–24; and Robert K. Massie, *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War* (New York: Random House, 1991), chap. 37.

[26] Jonathan Steinberg, "The Copenhagen Complex," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 3 (1966).

[27] Fischer (fn. 24), 114.

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German leaders may have become somewhat more fearful of Britain because of its escalations, but primarily they became more convinced that Britain was growing fearful and might lash out before it was too late. Britain, by contrast, became primarily convinced that Germany was aggressive. While some credence was given to the possibility that Germany was fearful of them, and attempts were made to diffuse this fear, the dominant tendency was to interpret German naval expansion as a sign of an aggressive desire on the part of Germany to displace Britain as the dominant naval power and perhaps even threaten the British Isles themselves. Hence, even the Liberal government elected in 1906, which came into office with a desire to shift expenditure from the armed forces to social spending, found itself forced to continue a vigorous arms race, especially after 1908.[28]

Two final implications from the spiral equilibrium concern the comparison between posterior beliefs about greed and beliefs about fear. Note that the symmetrical quality of the formulas implies that the ratio between the priors is equal to the ratio between the posteriors. For the GF type:

$$\frac{p_{igf}'}{q_{igf}'} = \frac{p_{if}}{q_{ig}}$$

and similar relations hold for the other types. This implies that the relative likelihood or odds of facing a greedy versus a fearful player is not changed by observing an escalation, which makes sense since both greedy and fearful types escalate.[29] Note, however, that while the ratio between the beliefs is constant, the magnitude of the difference between them will increase. This follows from the fact that the posteriors are bigger than the priors ($p_{igf}' > p_{if}$ and $q_{igf}' > q_{ig}$) while the ratio remains the same. As an extreme example, consider the case where the priors are $p_{if} = .1$ and $q_{is} = .01$, so that the state thinks its opponent is ten times more likely to be greedy than fearful but quite unlikely to be either. The posteriors after an escalation are then $p_{isf}' = .92$ and $q_{isf}' = .09$. The ratio between p and q is preserved (10 to 1) but the state has gone from assessing a 10 percent chance that the other side is greedy to thinking it 90 percent likely, while the posterior likelihood that the

[28] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914* (London: Ashfield Press, 1980), 443–44. For the showdown within the Liberal Party over naval expenditures during the naval scare of 1909, see also Massie (fn. 25), chap. 33.

[29] In a variant of the spiral equilibrium in which GF types attack in the first round, the ratio between the posteriors is not preserved. However, this equilibrium does still witness the polarization of beliefs identified below.

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other side is fearful is still less that 10 percent. If the priors are reversed so that the state starts out thinking its opponent is more likely to be fearful than greedy, (p_{if} = .01 and q_{is} = .1), the state will become 90 percent convinced that it faces a fearful state and only 10 percent convinced that the opponent is greedy (p_{isf}' = .09 and q_{isf}' = .92).

This may account, in part, for the polarization that often takes place in debates on the intentions of other states. Throughout the cold war the debate between hawks and doves often seemed to generate more heat than light. Each side typically interpreted the same event or evidence in markedly different fashion, to support its own favored interpretation of Soviet behavior.[30] Both analysts who thought the Soviets were more likely to be aggressive than fearful and analysts who thought the Soviets were more likely to be fearful found their views confirmed by escalations. This has often been taken as evidence that rational learning is rare, or perhaps even impossible, and that psychological bias, nonrational predisposition to confirm existing beliefs, or various systems of bounded rationality govern the interpretation of events in the foreign policy process.[31] The model shows, however, that this pattern of belief change can be perfectly rational and is not necessarily a product of a biased attachment to current beliefs in the presence of new information. In the spiral equilibrium, observers with different priors will come to different conclusions about the same event. Observers who think the escalating state is more likely to be aggressive than to be fearful will find this belief confirmed; conversely those who think it is more likely to be fearful will find this belief reinforced, even though both observers are *perfectly rational Bayesian updaters*. This is not to deny that many observers are in fact biased and cling to theories long after they are disproved by events. Rather, it is to say that we need to be more careful in identifying bias: divergent responses to identical events are not in themselves adequate evidence.

The effects of escalation on beliefs in a spiral equilibrium can be summed up in four points. Assume that state 1 builds weapons. This will (1) cause state 2's fear of state 1 to rise, especially if state 2 is a security seeker; (2) cause state 2's belief that state 1 is fearful to rise, especially if state 2 is trusting; (3) preserve the ratio between state 2's fear and state 2's belief that state 1 is fearful; and (4) increase the absolute

[30] For a summary of the debate, see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 7 (Summer 1983).

[31] See the chapters in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), for arguments along these lines, especially Philip E. Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept," and Ernst B. Haas, "Collective Learning: Some Theoretical Speculations."

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difference between these beliefs, polarizing the beliefs of observers with different priors.

Reassurance

Our second question concerns when states can send signals to reassure each other about their motivations. To address this question we can examine the downward spiral equilibrium, focusing in particular on when the security-seeking fearful type will be willing to play its part and not build weapons in the first round. It can be shown that the SF type will not build if its level of fear, p_{if}, is below a critical value as follows:

$$p_{if} < p^*_{if} = 1 - \frac{\beta - C_b}{1-(\pi_i - C_w)}.$$

One may wonder whether not building in this case really constitutes "signaling" or whether it is just a function of the fact that the other state is not thought to be likely to be greedy, so the financial cost of the buildup outweighs the benefits. For a certain range of fear, it can be shown that this is not the case; that is, the state would find it worth the money to build the weapons but nonetheless decides not to because of the provocative effects on the other state. If building were not provocative but instead left beliefs and behavior unchanged, the fearful type would not build if

$$p_{if} < \frac{C_b}{\beta}.$$

It can be shown that this critical value is lower than that for the downward spiral equilibrium; that is, the fearful type would begin to build weapons at lower levels of fear, if the information revealed by building weapons did not alter the behavior of other states. Thus, over a certain range of fear, refraining from building is motivated by its provocativeness, not simply by the cost of weapons. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3. Starting at a low level of fear, states will forgo weapons simply because they cost money and they see no reason to acquire them. As a state gets more fearful, it would be willing to spend the money on the weapons, but it still refrains because of the provocative effect of escalation upon the other state. As it becomes even more fearful, it will decide to buy the weapons in spite of the provocative effect; since it believes war is almost inevitable anyway, it prepares to fight.

Examining the formula for p^*_{if} enables us to say more about when signaling is more or less likely. The greater the value of arming β, the

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

FIGURE 3
THE CRITICAL VALUE FOR THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL EQUILIBRIUM

lower this critical value will be, and thus the less fearful a state must be to be willing to signal. Thus the more valuable in military terms are the weapons concerned, the less fearful a state must be to give them up as a signal of good intentions.[32] The greater the costs of arming, C_b, or of war itself, C_w, the higher the critical value will be. That is, increasing the costs associated with war and with the arms race makes states more willing to signal. This makes sense, since as wars and arms races become more costly, it becomes more imperative to avoid them. Finally, and somewhat counterintuitively, increasing the chance of victory, π_i, decreases the critical value. The greater a state's chance of winning, the less willing it will be to signal by reducing its weapons, or, more precisely, the less fearful it must be to be willing to signal. More powerful states will therefore be less willing to reduce their power to signal benign intentions than weaker states will be. This may seem odd, in that more powerful states have greater security to begin with and would seem to be in a better position to sacrifice some military resources in order to avoid a war. The logic revealed in the model is that for powerful states war is less dangerous than it is for weaker states, and hence they have less of an incentive to avoid it through signaling. Thus while stronger states may seem to have greater leeway for sending such signals, they also lack as strong an incentive to do so.

This equilibrium illustrates the argument that rational security-seeking states will sometimes choose to forgo military preparations in order to signal their underlying motivations even if this puts them at risk with respect to genuinely greedy states. Here, security seekers choose not to build in the first round because a buildup would be provocative,

[32] Of course, the less military importance the concession has, the greater the danger that the aggressive state may try to mimic it, depriving it of its signaling value. If the concession had no military value, then it would simply be cheap talk and the aggressive state would not hesitate to make it too. Thus the signal has to have some middling value of risk in order to be persuasive but not too costly.

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in that it would persuade other states that the builder is aggressive and planning to attack. Not building can be thought of as a "costly signal" that proves that the state is a security seeker. While costly signals are typically encountered in deterrence theory as demonstrations of resolve, here they act to reassure the opponent, or build trust.[33] Security-seeking states are making a trade-off between being well prepared for war and avoiding unnecessary wars. In this equilibrium they reduce their level of preparedness in order to avoid wars with other security seekers. Note that the state's ability to convey its nonaggressive nature is not a product of the offense/defense distinction; the model depicts a world with no such distinction and an advantage to striking first. Note also, this is one equilibrium among many. No claim is made that states will definitely signal under such and such conditions, only that equilibria exist in which they do refrain from increasing their arms and this does act as a signal of benign intentions. Whether such equilibria are enacted in the real world depends upon many factors, some of which are not addressed here, such as how equilibrium expectations are formed.

It is also important to realize that signaling will not be observed from a state that is in fact greedy, as I argued that Germany was before the First World War. In spite of Metternich's warnings of the dire effects of German buildups on British perceptions, German leaders proceeded to increase their navy. Evidence that Britain was feeling the strain of naval competition was used, not to justify corresponding slowdowns, but as a rationale to work even harder to catch up, as in the naval scare of 1909.

Conclusion

Applying game theory to the spiral model gives us a much fuller understanding of the problem than the psychological and nonformal literature have so far provided. The model I have presented examines the problem of escalation, fear, and war from a rational choice perspective. Some insights from the psychological school are supported, while others are challenged. Psychological studies correctly identify the logic behind the provocative character of escalations, but it turns out that

[33] For a discussion of costly signals in deterrence theory, see James Fearon, "Threats to Use Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Crises" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1993), chap. 3. For a discussion of the role of signals in building trust, see Charles Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self Help," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1995); Andrew Kydd, "Signaling and Structural Realism" (Manuscript, University of California, Riverside, 1996), and Deborah Larson, "Distrust, Missed Opportunities and Unilateral Initiative in Foreign Policy" (Manuscript, University of California, Los Angles, 1996). Note that these three authors discuss costly signals in a reassurance context but do not formally demonstrate their possibility, as is done here.

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extreme or biased beliefs are not necessary to the explanation. Escalation will be provocative for a broad range of seemingly unbiased beliefs. Aggressive states will tend to be less provoked by arms escalations than security-seeking states because they rightly believe that the other side has good reason to be fearful of them. Also, divergent cognitive responses to the same escalation need not be a sign of an irrational disposition to confirm existing beliefs. In the spiral equilibrium, those who believe the other side to be motivated more by fear than by aggression will find this belief confirmed by escalation, just as those who believe the other side to be motivated more by aggression will find their belief confirmed.

In part because of the provocative nature of escalation, however, equilibria exist in the model in which security seekers avoid escalation and thereby signal their benign motivations to each other, short circuiting the spiral at its inception. Greedy states will be unwilling to signal. States that have much to lose in arms racing and war—that is, states that have high costs for building weapons, high costs for warfare itself, and a low initial probability of winning—are particularly willing to signal their intentions by refraining from an increase in weapons. The less fearful a state is, the more willing it will be to signal as well.

Appendix

The Spiral Equilibrium

Equilibrium payoffs

Player Type	*Round 1*	*Round 2*
GF	$1-Cb+$	$(p_{if}+(1-p_{if})q_{ig})(\pi_i V_g-Cw)+(1-p_{if})(1-q_{ig})((\pi_i+\beta+\alpha)V_g-Cw)$
GT	$1-Cb+$	$(p_{it}+(1-p_{it})q_{ig})(\pi_i V_g-Cw)+(1-p_{it})(1-q_{ig})((\pi_i+\beta+\alpha)V_g-Cw)$
SF	$1-Cb+$	$(p_{if}+(1-p_{if})q_{is})(\pi_i V_s-Cw)+(1-p_{if})(1-q_{is})$
ST	$1+$	$p_{it}((\pi_i-\beta-\alpha)V_s-Cw)+(1-p_{it})$

Boundary conditions

When does this equilibrium hold? There are nine boundary conditions. Starting with the second round, greedy types must wish to attack at BB and WW, even if they were sure of not being attacked, so that mutual attack at those points is not simply a function of reciprocal fear of surprise attack. This implies that

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(1) $(\pi+\alpha)V_g-C_w > 1.$

When greedy types are at a military disadvantage, for instance player 1GT at the information set WB where 1 has waited and 2 has built, the equilibrium strategy has them attacking rather than defending. So it must be the case that

Attack > Defend

(2) $p_{igt}'((\pi-\beta)V_g-C_w)+(1-p_{igt}')((\pi+\alpha-\beta)V_g-C_w) > p_{igt}'((\pi-\alpha-\beta)V_g-C_w)+(1-p_{igt}')$

Note that SF types will not attack if the greedy types deviate to wait in the first round and find themselves in this position, because only ST types are expected to wait.

The condition for GT types is more binding than the condition for GF types, so only the former is shown.

SF types must also be willing to attack rather than defend in this situation, so it must be that

Attack > Defend

(3) $p_{isf}'((\pi-\beta)V_s-C_w)+(1-p_{isf}')((\pi+\alpha-\beta)V_s-C_w) > p_{isf}'((\pi-\alpha-\beta)V_s-C_w)+(1-p_{i\cdot sf}')$

ST types, however, must wish to defend rather than attack at this point, so that for them the inequality is reversed:

(4) $p_{ist}'((\pi-\beta)V_s-C_w)+(1-p_{ist}')((\pi+\alpha-\beta)V_s-C_w) < p_{ist}'((\pi-\alpha-\beta)V_s-C_w)+(1-p_{ist}')$

These conditions are the binding ones for the second round. SF types will attack at BB given condition 3; and given GF, GT, and SF types attacking, ST must also attack there, given that the other side has armed and thus must be one of the three other types. S types with an advantage will not attack because they are sure that the other side is an ST type that will not attack. Greedy types with an advantage will attack given condition 1. At WW, greedy types will attack given condition 1, while S types will believe that they face an ST type and will not attack.

In the first round, the GF type must not find it worthwhile to attack right away, thus

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Build > Attack

(5) $1-C_b + (p_{if} + (1-p_{if})q_{ig})(\pi_i V_g - C_w)$
$+ (1-p_{if})(1-q_{ig})((\pi_i+\beta+\alpha)\, V_g - Cw) > 2(\pi+\alpha)V_g - C_w$

This condition is more binding than that for the GT type. Greedy types would prefer to attack rather than wait (not build), so a deviation to wait need not be considered.

The SF type must also not wish to attack right away

Build > Attack

(6) $1-C_b + (p_{if} + (1-p_{if})q_{is})(\pi_i V_s - C_w) + (1-p_{if})(1-q_{is}) > 2(\pi+\alpha)V_s - C_w$

SF types must also be unwilling to wait in the first round:

Build > Wait

(7) $1-C_b + (p_{if} + (1-p_{if})q_{is})(\pi_i V_s - C_w) + (1-p_{if})(1-q_{is}) >$
$1 + p_{if}((\pi_i-\beta)V_s - C_w) + (1-p_{if})(q_s((\pi+\alpha-\beta)V_s - C_w)+1-q_s)$

Note that if the SF type waits, it attacks in the second round if the other side builds, unlike the ST type, who defends. Thus the right-hand side above is not the same as the equilibrium payoff for the ST type.

The ST type must be unwilling to build in the first round:

Wait > Build

(8) $1 + p_{it}((\pi_i-\beta-\alpha)V_s - C_w) + (1-p_{it}) >$
$1-C_b + (p_{it} + (1-p_{it})q_{is})(\pi_i V_s - C_w) + (1-p_{it})(1-q_{is})$

ST must also not wish to attack:

Wait > Attack

(9) $1 + p_{it}((\pi_i-\beta-\alpha)V_s - C_w) + (1-p_{it}) > 2(\pi+\alpha)V_s - C_w$

The Downward Spiral Equilibrium

Equilibrium payoffs

Player Type	*Round 1*	*Round 2*
GF	$1-Cb$	$+p_{if}(\pi_i V_g - Cw) + (1-p_{if})((\pi_i+\beta)V_g - Cw)$
GT	$1-Cb$	$+p_{it}(\pi_i V_g - Cw) + (1-p_{it})((\pi_i+\beta)V_g - Cw)$

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SF 1 $+ p_{if}((\pi_i-\beta)V_s - Cw) + (1-p_{if})$

ST 1 $+ p_{it}((\pi_i-\beta)V_s - Cw) + (1-p_{it})$

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS

There are three boundary conditions for the downward spiral equilibrium. They are derived in a similar fashion as those for the hot spiral equilibrium and are listed below.

$V_A > \frac{1+C_w}{\pi+\alpha}$ (A types must attack in second round at parity.)

$V_A < \frac{1-C_b}{\pi+2\alpha-(1-p_{iF})\beta}$ (AF must not attack in first round.)

$p_{iF} < \text{min.}\left[1 - \frac{\beta V_s - C_b}{1-(\pi_j V_s - C_w)}, \frac{2(1-(\pi_i+\alpha)V_s)-C_w}{1-((\pi_j-\beta)V_s-C_w)}\right]$ (SF must not build or attack.)

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CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

By SHERI BERMAN*

PRACTICALLY everywhere one looks, from social science monographs to political speeches to *People* magazine, the concept of "civil society" is in vogue. A flourishing civil society is considered to have helped bring down the Evil Empire and is held to be a prerequisite for the success of post-Soviet democratic experiments; a civil society in decline is said to threaten democracy in America. Tocqueville is the theorist of the decade, having noted a century and a half ago that "Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations." Further, he linked such behavior to the robustness of the nation's representative institutions. "Nothing," he claimed, "more deserves attention than the intellectual and moral associations in America. . . . In democratic countries the knowledge of how to combine is the mother of all other forms of knowledge; on its progress depends that of all the others."[1]

Today neo-Tocquevilleans such as Robert Putnam argue that civil society is crucial to "making democracy work,"[2] while authors like Francis Fukuyama and Benjamin Barber (who differ on everything else) agree that it plays a key role in driving political, social, and even economic outcomes.[3] This new conventional wisdom, however, is flawed. It is simply not always true that, as Putnam (for example) puts it, "Tocqueville was right: Democratic government is strengthened, not

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[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 513, 517.

[2] Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); see also idem, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (January 1995); idem, "The Prosperous Community," *American Prospect*, no. 13 (Spring 1993); and idem, "The Strange Disappearance of Civic America," *American Prospect*, no. 24 (Winter 1996).

[3] Fukuyama, *Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1995); and Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: How the Planet Is Both Falling Apart and Coming Together—and What This Means for Democracy* (New York: NY Times Books, 1995).

World Politics 49 (April 1997), 401–29

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weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society."[4] This essay will show how a robust civil society actually helped scuttle the twentieth century's most critical democratic experiment, Weimar Germany.

Associational life flourished in Germany throughout the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century. Yet in contrast to what neo-Tocquevillean theories would predict, high levels of associationism, absent strong and responsive national government and political parties, served to fragment rather than unite German society. It was weak political institutionalization rather than a weak civil society that was Germany's main problem during the Wilhelmine and Weimar eras. As Samuel Huntington noted almost three decades ago, societies with highly active and mobilized publics and low levels of political institutionalization often degenerate into instability, disorder, and even violence;[5] German political development provides a classic example of this dynamic in action. During the interwar period in particular, Germans threw themselves into their clubs, voluntary associations, and professional organizations out of frustration with the failures of the national government and political parties, thereby helping to undermine the Weimar Republic and facilitate Hitler's rise to power. In addition, Weimar's rich associational life provided a critical training ground for eventual Nazi cadres and a base from which the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) could launch its *Machtergreifung* (siezure of power). Had German civil society been weaker, the Nazis would never have been able to capture so many citizens for their cause or eviscerate their opponents so swiftly.

A striking implication of this analysis is that a flourishing civil society does not necessarily bode well for the prospects of liberal democracy. For civil society to have the beneficial effects neo-Tocquevilleans posit, the political context has to be right: absent strong and responsive political institutions, an increasingly active civil society may serve to undermine, rather than strengthen, a political regime. Political institutionalization, in other words, may be less chic a topic these days than civil society, but it is logically prior and historically more important. As Huntington put it, a well-ordered civic polity requires "a recognizable and stable pattern of institutional authority . . . political institutions [must be] sufficiently strong to provide the basis of a legitimate political order and working political community." Without such political institutions, societies will lack trust and the ability to define and realize

[4] Putnam (fn. 2, *Making Democracy Work*), 182.

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

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their common interests.[6] Political scientists need to remember that Tocqueville himself considered Americans' political associations to be as important as their nonpolitical ones, and they need to examine more closely how the two interact in different situations.[7]

Neo-Tocquevillean Theories

The logic of neo-Tocquevillean theories bears closer examination. Contemporary scholars, it turns out, are not the first to "rediscover" the great Frenchman, nor even the first to link group bowling and political development.[8] After World War II several social scientists also claimed to have found in associational life a key to understanding democracy's success or failure.

During the 1950s and 1960s social scientists such as William Kornhauser and Hannah Arendt helped turn the concept of "mass society" into a powerful theory for explaining the disintegration of democracy and the rise of totalitarianism in Europe.[9] This school believed that Europe's slide into barbarism was greased by, among other factors, the collapse of intermediate associations across much of the Continent during the interwar years; the epigraph to Kornhauser's *Politics of Mass Society* was Tocqueville's warning that "if men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased."[10]

[6] Ibid., 82–83, 5–25.

[7] Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (July 1996); Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (July 1994); Theda Skocpol, "The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement in American Democracy" (Presidential address for the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association, New Orleans, October 12, 1996); and idem, "Unravelling from Above," *American Prospect*, no. 25 (March–April 1996).

[8] A distinction apparently belonging to Max Weber; see fn. 23 below.

[9] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); and Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973). See also Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution* (New York: Harper, 1942); Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Rinehart, 1941); Edward Shils, "The Theory of Mass Society," in Philip Olson, ed., *America as a Mass Society* (New York: Free Press, 1963); and E. V. Walter, "'Mass Society': The Late Stages of an Idea," *Social Research* 31 (Winter 1964). It should be pointed out that the concept of mass society has a variety of different interpretations. Apart from the one discussed here, the most well known usage of the term is associated with José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), and other theories of cultural decay. For a recent discussion of this latter usage, see Neil McInnes, "Ortega and the Myth of the Mass," *National Interest* (Summer 1996). For general overviews of the mass society literature, see Patrick Brantlinger, *Bread and Circuses: Theories of Mass Culture as Social Decay* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Salvador Giner, *Mass Society* (New York: Academic Press, 1976).

[10] On the intellectual history of mass society theories, see Walters (fn. 9), 405; and Sandor Halebsky, *Mass Society and Political Conflict: Toward a Reconstruction of Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

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Drawing on Durkheim, and to a lesser degree on Marx, the mass society theorists argued that industrialization and modernity estranged citizens from one another, leaving them rootless and searching for ways of belonging. Ripped from their traditional moorings, masses were available for mobilization by extremist movements—unless, that is, individuals could develop communal bonds through organizational affiliations and involvement. Without "a multiplicity of independent and often conflicting forms of association," Kornhauser wrote, "people lack the resources to restrain their own behavior as well as that of others. Social atomization engenders strong feelings of alienation and anxiety, and therefore the disposition to engage in extreme behavior to escape from these tensions."[11]

Civil society, according to these theorists, was an antidote to the political viruses that afflicted mass society. Participation in organizations not only helped bring citizens together, bridging cleavages and fostering skills necessary for democratic governance, but it also satisfied their need to belong to some larger grouping. According to this view, a key reason for the collapse of the Weimar Republic was its status as a classic mass society, which made it susceptible to the blandishments of totalitarian demagoguery. Hitler's supporters were drawn primarily from alienated individuals who lacked a wide range of associational memberships and saw in the NSDAP a way of integrating themselves into a larger community; had German civil society been stronger, the republic might not have fallen.[12]

The empirical evidence did not support such a causal sequence. For this and other reasons (such as the advent of newer and trendier theories), by the late 1960s social scientists had moved on and the concept of mass society had fallen out of vogue. Beginning in the 1970s, however, a third wave of democratization swept across the globe,[13] and scholars sought to identify its causes, as well as those factors that determined democratic success more generally. Several were drawn to the same Tocquevillean insights that had attracted Kornhauser, Arendt and others a few decades earlier. Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* was par-

[11] Kornhauser (fn. 9), 32; see also Arendt (fn. 9), 315–23. For a general review of the literature on this point, see Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," *American Sociological Review* 17 (1982).

[12] On mass society theories and the Weimar Republic, see the excellent essay by Bernt Hagtvet, "The Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic: A Re-examination," in Stein Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust, eds., *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism* (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1980).

[13] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

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ticularly important for the revival of interest in the role played by private, voluntary associations in sustaining vibrant democracy.[14]

Like the mass society theorists, recent neo-Tocquevillean analyses stress the way individuals relate to each other and their society when explaining why democratic regimes function well. To measure and explain the success of democracy, Putnam, for example, uses the concepts of civic community and social capital; for both of these the key indicator is what might be termed associationism, the propensity of individuals to form and join a wide range of organizations spontaneously. According to Putnam:

> Civil associations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government . . . both because of their "internal" effects on individual members and because of their "external" effects on the wider polity. Internally, associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness. . . . Externally . . . a dense network of secondary associations . . . [enhances the articulation and aggregation of interests and] contributes to effective social collaboration.[15]

Associations "broaden the participants' sense of self, developing the 'I' into the 'We.'" "Networks of civic engagement," meanwhile, "foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust," which help resolve dilemmas of collective action and smooth economic and political negotiations.[16] For Putnam almost any type of secondary association will serve these functions, as long as it is not organized around vertical bonds of authority and dependency. As he puts it: "The manifest purpose of the association [need not] be political."[17] "Taking part in a choral society or a bird-watching club can teach self-discipline and an appreciation for the joys of successful collaboration," he writes, thus contributing to the efficiency of regional government in Italy; the decline of league bowling, similarly, signals the decay of democracy in the United States.[18] In sum, for Putnam and oth-

[14] Recent neo-Tocquevillean analyses are somewhat different in emphasis, however, from their earlier mass society counterparts. In particular, they focus—as Putnam's title states—on what "makes democracy work," that is, what makes some democracies healthier than others; there is no explicit discussion of the possibility of a new descent into totalitarianism. For Putnam and his counterparts, in other words, the dependent variable is the strength or effectiveness (it is unclear which) of democratic institutions, while for mass society theorists the dependent variable was the slide into totalitarianism.

[15] Putnam (fn. 2, *Making Democracy Work)*, 89–90. On social capital, see also James Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1990).

[16] Putnam (fn. 2, 1995), 67. See also idem, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," *PS* (December 1995); and idem (fn. 2, "The Prosperous Community").

[17] Putnam (fn. 2, *Making Democracy Work)*, 90. For a separate argument on the consequences of organizations' internal structures, see Harry Eckstein, "A Theory of Stable Democracy," in Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[18] Putnam (fn. 2, *Making Democracy Work)*, 90; idem (fn. 2, 1995), 70.

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ers in the new generation of neo-Tocquevillean analysts, associationism is both an indicator of healthy democracy and a prerequisite for it.

Testing the Theory

This neo-Tocquevillean thesis has attracted much attention, especially in its application to the contemporary American scene. Nevertheless, there has actually been little in-depth analysis by political scientists of the "internal" and "external" effects associations actually have on individual members and the wider polity.[19] This essay therefore sets out to test the claims of the theory—specifically, by probing the effects of associationism on the political life of one country (Germany) over the course of almost a century (from the mid-1800s to the Nazi takeover in 1933). The investigation is facilitated by the work of historians of Germany, who, largely unnoticed by political scientists, have fought their own battles over some related issues: those debates provide extensive evidence of the vigor of German civil society, along with documentation of its causes and effects.

One might counter, of course, that a theory based on only a single case is inherently problematic and that, moreover,[20] German political development during this period was certainly influenced by a range of factors extending beyond civil society, many of them highly particular. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why an inability of neo-Tocquevillean analysis to account for the central features of this case should be significant and troubling. First, scholars have long viewed the Weimar Republic and its collapse as a crucial theoretical testing ground. The disintegration of democracy in interwar Germany is so central to our understanding of comparative politics and so critical for the history of modern Europe that we should at the least be wary of any theory of political development that cannot explain it. Second, the

[19] Putnam, for example, cites some development and economic studies to buttress his points, but much less empirical research has been carried out on associationism's *political* effects, whether on citizens or societies. The old mass society literature did, however, spur sociologists to investigate some of these questions. See, for example, Nicholas Babchuk and John N. Edwards, "Voluntary Associations and the Integration Hypothesis," *Sociological Inquiry* 35 (Spring 1965); David E. W. Holden, "Associations as Reference Groups: An Approach to the Problem," *Rural Sociology* 30 (1965); Maurice Pinard, "Mass Society and Political Movements: A New Formulation," *American Journal of Sociology* (July 1968); and also Sidney Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus," *Journal of Politics* 27 (August 1965). Some political scientists are beginning to investigate these questions. See Dietland Stolle and Thomas Rochon, "Associations and the Creation of Social Capital," in Kenneth Newton et al., eds., "Social Capital in Western Europe" (Manuscript, 1996); and idem, "Social Capital, Associations and American Exceptionalism," in *American Behavioral Scientist* (forthcoming).

[20] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 209–12.

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postwar neo-Tocquevilleans highlighted precisely this case as an example of the impact of associationism (or lack thereof) on political outcomes. And third, while the United States has been considered the homeland of associationism ever since Tocqueville, comparable honors could also be bestowed on Germany, making it resemble a most likely case for determining the reliability of the neo-Tocquevillean theory.

The extraordinarily vigorous associational life of Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany was frequently commented on, so much so in fact that contemporaries spoke of the *Vereinsmeierei* (roughly, associational fetishism or mania) that beset German society and joked that whenever three or more Germans gathered, they were likely to draw up by-laws and found an association.[21] The German passion for forming organizations was so characteristic that it became the butt of several well-known satires, including Kurt Tucholsky's classic poem "Das Mitglied" (The Member).[22] Max Weber, Germany's most perceptive analyst during this period, took note of his countrymen's predilection for voluntarily joining together in groups; recognizing the significance of this phenomenon for political development, he urged his colleagues to study German organizational life in all of its manifestations, "starting with the bowling club [!] . . . and continuing to the political party or the religious, artistic or literary sect." Yet Weber also observed that German associationism, unlike its American or British counterparts, did not lead directly to responsible citizenship, much less to liberal or democratic values. "The quantitative spread of organizational life," he argued, "does not always go hand in hand with its qualitative significance." He explicitly noted that participation in, say, a choral society did not necessarily promote true civic virtue: "A man who is accustomed to use his larynx in voicing powerful sentiments on a daily basis without, however, finding any connection to his actions," he said of singing group members, "that is a man who . . . easily becomes a 'good citizen' in the *passive* sense of the word."[23]

[21] James J. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995), and Thomas Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur in Deutschland im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert: Eine Fallstudie zur Modernisierung," in Nipperdey, *Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur neueren Geschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1976).

[22] Kurt Tucholsky, "Das Mitglied," in Mary Gerold-Tucholsky, ed., *Zwischen Gestern und Morgen: Eine Auswahl aus seinen Schriften und Gedichten* (Hamburg: Taschenbuch, 1952), 76.

[23] Max Weber, "Geschäftsbericht und Diskussionsreden auf den deutschen soziologischen Tagungen," in Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924), 442, quoted in Rudy Koshar, *Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg, 1880–1935* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 4, emphasis added. See also Margaret Levi, "Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*," *Politics and Society* 24 (March 1996).

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This essay now proceeds to explore the internal and external effects of German associationism, focusing on the Protestant middle classes in particular because of the critical role they played in the disintegration of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Nazis.[24] The results show that the postwar neo-Tocquevilleans were wrong in their assertion that an absence of civil society paved the way for the collapse of democracy and the rise of totalitarianism in Germany. I find, to the contrary, that participation in organizations of civil society *did* link individuals together and help mobilize them for political participation (just as current neo-Tocquevillean scholars claim), but in the German case this served not to strengthen democracy but to weaken it. And finally, I show that the NSDAP rose to power, not by attracting alienated, apolitical Germans, but rather by recruiting highly activist individuals and then exploiting their skills and associational affiliations to expand the party's appeal and consolidate its position as the largest political force in Germany. The essay concludes by probing the broader implications of the German case for theories of political development.

Civil Society in Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany

German associational life grew rapidly during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Spurred by changes in the legal code, the breakdown of preindustrial corporate traditions, and growing social wealth and diversification, an increasingly dense network of private voluntary associations spread throughout the country. This trend was pronounced enough for many to comment that Germany was in the grips of an "associational passion" on the eve of the 1848 revolutions. Voluntary associations were active in public life, in areas ranging from education to land preservation policy; in particular, they helped a growing and self-assertive bourgeoisie pursue its social and economic interests. Many historians, therefore, have interpreted German associational life from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century as a "symptom of

[24] For a review of the literature on the middle classes and fascism, see Bernt Hagtvet and Reinhard Kühl, "Contemporary Approaches to Fascism: A Survey of Paradigms," and Reinhard Kuhl, "Preconditions for the Rise and Victory of Fascism in Germany," both in Larsen, Hagtvet, and Myklebust (fn. 12). See also Hans Lebovics, *Social Conservatism and the Middle Classes in Germany, 1914–1933* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Hans Speier, *German White Collar Workers and the Rise of Hitler* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); and Jürgen Kocka, *Die Angestellten in der deutschen Geschichte, 1850–1980* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1981). For reasons detailed in the text and notes below, observations about bourgeois Protestant associationism do not necessarily apply to its labor or Catholic counterparts, among others.

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the rise of bourgeois society and . . . a factor serving to accelerate" its development.[25]

The next spurt of German associational growth began in the 1870s. One contributing factor was the constitution adopted by the new German Reich in 1871: the granting of universal suffrage encouraged a wide variety of groups to form organizations in order to give themselves a voice in the political sphere. More importantly, just as the institutional structure of the Reich was prompting certain kinds of organizational activity, the prolonged economic downturn that began in the late 1870s highlighted the vulnerability of different groups and increased demands for state aid. During the following two decades almost all sectors of German society engaged in a frenzy of associational activity, with heavy industry, small business, the *Mittelstand,* and white-collar groups all forming their own organizations.[26] The fight over protectionism was certainly a key reason for the emergence of new associations, but the Great Depression, as contemporaries referred to it, did more than merely highlight the divergent interests of different socioeconomic groups. It led many to recognize that Germany was at a historical turning point, poised between a traditional agricultural existence and industrialized modernity. The tension between these two visions stimulated the formation of a wide variety of organizations, many of which (such as patriotic societies, sports and reading clubs, and neighborhood associations) were designed to foster certain values and lifestyles, rather than directly engage the political process.

In practice, the political system set up in 1871 only widened the existing cleavages within German society, since political parties were

[25] Nipperdey (fn. 21), 182; see also David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Politics and Society in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 194ff.; David Blackbourn, "The German Bourgeoisie: An Introduction," in David Blackbourn and Richard J. Evans, eds., *The German Bourgeoisie* (London: Routledge, 1993); Jürgen Kocka, "The European Pattern and the German Case," in Jürgen Kocka and Allan Mitchell, eds., *Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 1993); Karl-Erich Born, "Der soziale und wirtschaftliche Strukturwandels Deutschlands am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1966); and *Vereinswesen und bürgerliche Gesellscaft in Deutschland*, special issue of *Historische Zeitschrift*, ed. Otto Dann (Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1984).

[26] Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Der Aufstieg des Organisierten Kapitalismus und Interventionsstaates in Deutschland," in Heinrich August Winkler, ed., *Organisierter Kapitalismus: Voraussetzungen und Anfänge* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1974); Heinrich August Winkler, *Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus: Die politische Entwicklung von Handwerk und Kleinhandel in der Weimarer Republik* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1972), 47ff.; Dirk Stegmann, *Die Erben Bismarcks: Parteien und Verbände in der Spätphase des Wilhelminischen Deutschlands* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1970); David Blackbourn, "Between Resignation and Volatility: The German Petite Bourgeoisie in the Nineteenth Century," in Geoffrey Crossick and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, eds., *Shopkeepers and Artisans in Nineteenth Century Europe* (London: Methuen, 1984); and Jürgen Kocka, *Facing Total War: German Society, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

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organized around discrete, particularistic social groups and since national political structures were not strong or responsive enough to overcome social divisions. Under these conditions, associational activity occurred largely within each sector of society and helped lock in the fragmentation of the Reich.

These developments continued apace as the power bloc that had dominated the Reich since 1871 fell apart and German politics entered a new phase. Bismarck had been able to hold together a majority coalition based on antisocialism and a protectionist logroll serving the interests of "iron and rye." By the early 1890s, however, the Iron Chancellor had been dismissed and mounting contradictions within the dominant classes (industry versus agriculture, protectionists versus free traders, exporters versus producers for the domestic market) threatened to rip apart the ruling coalition. The lower and middle classes, moreover, were becoming increasingly mobilized: electoral participation increased from 50.7 percent of those eligible in 1871 to 77.2 percent in 1887, and participation in Reichstag elections averaged more than 75 percent from then until the outbreak of war in 1914.[27] This posed a challenge to traditional political structures in general and to existing political parties such as the National Liberals in particular.[28]

Liberals had been the dominant force in Germany in the years after unification, but their political organizations, like those of other established groups, found it difficult to adapt to the changing environment in which they had to operate. Until the 1890s most parties (with the exception of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [the SPD] and to a lesser extent the Catholic Zentrum) were informal collections of notables (*Honoratioren*). These parties had little in the way of formal organization, especially at the grassroots level, and were really active only at election time; their institutional structures were simply not up to the task of performing well in the hurly-burly that was now German politics.[29] The failure of the National Liberals in particular to adjust to the new conditions left many of their potential constituents, particularly in rural areas and among sections of the middle class, searching for other ways of expressing their social and political aspirations. This

[27] Stanley Suval, *Electoral Politics in Wilhelmine Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), esp. chap. 2.

[28] The following section draws heavily on Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). See also Blackbourn and Eley (fn. 25), 144–55; and Koshar (fn. 23), esp. 46ff.

[29] Liberals did make some attempts to respond to the challenges of popular mobilization and the political organization of workers by the SPD, but these proved unsuccessful. See Eley (fn. 28), 2; and Sheehan (fn. 21), pt. 6.

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helped spur yet another burst of associational growth in Germany, as organizations designed to appeal to a wide variety of disaffected groups sprang up across the country.

By the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, a distinct and troubling pattern had already begun to appear in Germany—the growth of civic associations during periods of strain. When national political institutions and structures proved either unwilling or unable to address their citizens' needs, many Germans turned away from them and found succor and support in the institutions of civil society instead. Because weak national political institutions reinforced social cleavages instead of helping to narrow them, moreover, associational activity generally occurred within rather than across group lines. Under these circumstances, associational life served not to integrate citizens into the political system, as neo-Tocquevilleans would predict, but rather to divide them further or mobilize them outside—and often against—the existing political regime.

As the liberal parties stumbled, their natural constituencies were left unorganized, and many of their natural activists found themselves adrift and in search of alternative ways of becoming involved in public affairs. As one observer has noted, "Members of the middle strata may have looked with disdain on parties and elections, but they participated with extraordinary vigor in a dense network of other institutions through which they sought political influence, social identity and economic advantage."[30] Many of these activists played critical roles in forming and staffing the nationalist associations that became so popular in Germany in the decades before World War I.

The nationalist associations, as Geoff Eley argues, are best viewed as "symptoms and agencies of change. They were formed as distinctive organizations within a space which the difficulties and obsolescence of an older mode of dominant-class politics had opened up."[31] They targeted a broad swath of German society and attempted to provide new channels for participation in public life. Many of these groups were not directly "political" organizations, however. Their primary goal was not to participate in the Wilhelmine political system, and indeed, they often defined themselves in direct repudiation of existing political institutions and structures, arguing that they were *Volksvereine* (people's associations) devoted to cross-class solidarity and national unity. Another distinctive characteristic of these groups was that, in contrast to old-style

[30] Sheehan (fn. 21), 236.
[31] Eley (fn. 28), xix.

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Honoratioren organizations and parties, they placed the idea of popular legitimacy front and center. The Navy League and Pan-German League, for example, broke new ground in terms of mass participation and activism. Both emphasized membership involvement in discussion and decision making, and both were more willing than the *Honoratioren* organizations to offer "particularly deserving" individuals the opportunity to rise to leadership positions. In many ways, the nationalist organizations conform to the type of civil society institutions neo-Tocquevillean scholars hold up as exemplary: "horizontally" organized, stressing equality and community, devoted to overcoming narrow particularistic interests.

Even though increasing numbers of Germans turned away from national politics during the Wilhelmine era, this hardly meant that they were becoming apolitical. Quite the contrary, in fact: the population was increasingly mobilized and politically active. Some observers failed to note the change, however, because the popular energies of the Protestant middle classes in particular were channeled into arenas outside of national political structures and organizations.[32] Some took refuge in local government, for example, an arena in which liberals and the middle classes more generally felt they could play an important role. A National Liberal parliamentarian and former mayor of Berlin named Arthur Hobrecht captured this feeling in his observation that "the citizenship which is derived from common endeavors in the organs of local government becomes increasingly valuable for us the more the conflict of material interests fragments contemporary society as a whole."[33] In general, though, the discontented middle and rural strata of the German population turned to the organizations of civil society. Some of these were drawn into political life and developed ties with existing political parties; most however viewed themselves as a sanctuary from traditional politics. The "various organizations to which members of the Protestant middle strata belonged, therefore, helped to deepen

[32] Workers and Catholics, by contrast, were efficiently organized through and by the SPD and the Zentrum, respectively. In contrast to the liberal parties, both the SPD and the Zentrum were able to create their own affiliated associations in most areas of social life. One consequence of this, however, was the further fragmentation of German society, as the associations affiliated with these parties were so encompassing as to create "subcultures" that hived off their members from other groups. Referring to the SPD in particular, Dieter Groh has termed such behavior "negative integration"; see Groh, *Negative Integration und revolutionärer Attentismus* (Frankfurt: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 1973). The literature on the socialist and Catholic subcultures in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany is immense; good places to begin are the bibliographies in Eberhard Kolb, *The Weimar Republic* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); and Hans Mommsen, *The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

[33] Sheehan (fn. 21), 237.

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the divisions within their ranks and furthered the debilitating fragmentation of liberalism's social base."[34]

On the eve of World War I, practically all Germans were discontented with national political life. The then chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg would later write of this period:

> While the storm-clouds gathered ever more heavily on the world horizon, an almost inexplicable pressure weighed on the political life of Germany. . . . [M]alaise and dejection imparted a depressing tone to political party activity, which lacked any progressive impulse. The word *Reichsverdrossenheit* [dissatisfaction with the imperial state] rose up out of the darkness.[35]

With the national government unresponsive to calls for economic and political change and traditional political parties unable to adjust to the era of mass politics, civil society offered an outlet for the demands and aspirations of an increasingly restive German populace. This growth of associations during these years did not signal a growth in liberal values or democratic political structures; instead, it reflected and furthered the fragmentation of German political life and the delegitimization of national political institutions. State-society relations thus took an ominous turn during the Wilhelmine era, with consequences that would plague the Weimar Republic in later decades.

Civil Society in the Weimar Republic

The democratization of Germany at the end of World War I opened up a new phase in the country's associational life. Hitherto unrepresented and unorganized groups began to form their own organizations, and the Weimar years witnessed feverish associational activity at practically every level. The number of local voluntary associations grew throughout the 1920s, reaching extremely high levels as measured by both historical and comparative standards.[36] National associations also

[34] Ibid., 237–38. See also Thomas Nipperdey, "Interessenverbände und Parteien in Deutschland vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg," in Wehler (fn. 25).

[35] Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, *Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg*, vol. 1 (Berlin: R. Hubbing, 1919–21).

[36] William Sheridan Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922–1945* (New York: 1984); Peter Fritzsche, *Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Koshar (fn. 23). For cross-national comparisions of the impact of civil society activity on democracy, see Nancy Bermeo, "Getting Mad or Going Mad? Citizens, Scarcity, and the Breakdown of Democracy in Interwar Europe" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, San Francisco, 1996); Nancy Bermeo and Phil Nord, eds., "Civil Society before Democracy" (Manuscript, Princeton University, 1996); and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. 113–14.

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grew rapidly, and participation in professional organizations reached very high levels among the middle classes in particular.[37] Yet, as in Wilhelmine Germany, the rise in associationism signaled, not the spread of liberal values or the development of healthy democratic political institutions, but rather the reverse. The parties of the bourgeois middle had reconstituted themselves after the war and proclaimed their commitment to becoming true "people's parties" and reintegrating German society. But these parties found it increasingly difficult to hold on to their constituencies in the face of growing economic, political, and social conflicts during the 1920s. Once again this created a vicious circle. The weakness of the bourgeois parties and national political structures drove many citizens looking for succor and support into civil society organizations, which were organized primarily along group lines rather than across them. The vigor of associational life, in turn, served to further undermine and delegitimize the republic's political structures. The result was a highly organized but vertically fragmented and discontented society that proved to be fertile ground for the Nazi's rise and eventual *Machtergreifung*.

The German revolution raised hope among the middle classes that the "divisive" and "unrepresentative" parties of the Wilhelmine era would be replaced by a single *Volkspartei* capable of unifying the nation's patriotic bourgeoisie and confronting the menace of social democracy. Popular support for such a course was strong, but institutional jealousies and elite divisions prevented its adoption. Instead, Weimar's early years saw, along with a strengthened conservative movement, the formation of two main liberal parties (the German Democratic Party [DDP] and the German People's Party [DVP]) and of several smaller regional parties, as well as reconsolidation of the Catholic Zentrum. The nonsocialist portion of Germany's political spectrum was thus permanently divided among a large (and eventually increasing) number of parties, which soon began to squabble among themselves.[38]

The failure of the bourgeois parties to form a single movement or even to agree on important issues of the day did not dull the desire of the German middle classes for some form of antisocialist unity and a

[37] Kocka (fn. 26); idem, "The First World War and the 'Mittelstand': German Artisans and White Collar Workers," *Journal of Contemporary History* 8 (January 1973); Gerald Feldman, "German Interest Group Alliances in War and Inflation, 1914–1923," in Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Rudy Koshar, "Cult of Associations? The Lower Middle Classes in Weimar Germany," in Rudy Koshar, ed., *Splintered Classes* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990); and Hagtvet (fn. 12).

[38] Larry Eugene Jones, *German Liberalism and the Dissolution of the Weimar Party System, 1918–1933* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

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greater role in the political, social, and economic life of the republic. Throughout the 1920s "burghers from all social stations [continued] to demand more effective representation and a more direct political voice" and refused to abandon the ideals of bourgeois unity and community.[39] In this context, bourgeois social life took on a renewed vigor and sense of urgency. "More voluntary associations attracted more members and did so in a more active fashion than ever before. Just as retailers, bakers, and commercial employees had organized into economic interest groups, so also did gymnasts, folklorists, singers and churchgoers gather into clubs, rally new members, schedule meetings, and plan a full assortment of conferences and tournaments."[40]

At first, this activity occurred in conjunction with, or at least parallel to, traditional party politics, since the newly reconstituted liberal parties tried to improve their grassroots organization, cultivate broader ties, and even achieve the status of a "people's party." By the middle of the decade, however, the attempt to reshape the relationship between national political life and civil society had failed, with the Great Inflation of 1922–23 being the turning point. Economic historians may disagree over which socioeconomic groups suffered the most, but there is little doubt that the middle classes suffered greatly, even if the pain was more psychological than material.[41] This was followed by the crushing stabilization of 1923–24, which hit white-collar workers and the middle classes particularly hard. "By the end of the 1920s the economic position of the independent middle class had deteriorated to such an extent that it was no longer possible to distinguish it from the proletariat on the basis of income as a criterion."[42]

The economic dislocations made all groups more jealous of their socioeconomic interests and more strident and narrow in their political demands, while making the middle classes increasingly resentful of both workers and big business, who were seen as having a disproportionate influence over the national government and political parties. By fighting for measures such as the eight-hour day and better wages, the

[39] Fritzsche (fn. 36), chap. 2, quote at 21. On the middle classes and the revolution, see also Arthur Rosenberg, *A History of the German Republic* (London: Methuen, 1936); Winkler and Kocka (fn. 26).

[40] Fritzsche (fn. 36), 76.

[41] The most comprehensive treatment of almost all aspects of the Great Inflation and its aftermath is Gerald Feldman, *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation, 1919–1924* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). On the psychological aspects in particular, see Jürgen von Krüdener, "Die Entstehung des Inflationstraumas: Zur Sozialpsychologie der deutschen Hyperinflation 1922–23," in Gerald Feldman et al., eds. *Consequences of Inflation* (Berlin: Colloquium, 1989).

[42] Larry Eugene Jones, "'The Dying Middle': Weimar Germany and the Fragmentation of Bourgeois Politics," *Central European History* 5 (1972), 25; see also Kocka (fn. 37).

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SPD was considered to be serving the class interests of its core constituency above all else; the contrast between real (if limited) SPD success and the political impotence of the middle classes generated further paroxysms of antisocialist fervor.[43]

Middle-class groups also became increasingly frustrated with the unwillingness or inability of liberal and conservative parties such as the DDP, DVP and DNVP (German National People's Party) to recognize their needs and act as their representatives on the national political stage. These parties came to be seen as the tools of big capitalists and financial interests, and the ideal of the people's party faded as the traditional parties of the middle and right seemed to be run by and for an unrepresentative elite.[44] Local-level organizations and associational affiliations, furthermore, were allowed to languish or break away. Not surprisingly, the vote share of the traditional bourgeois parties dropped precipitously throughout the 1920s. In 1924 the DVP and DDP together managed to attract only about 15 percent, and splinter parties were forming to capture their increasingly alienated and fragmented constituency. By 1928—the high point of economic stabilization and supposedly the "golden age" of the Weimar Republic—the splinter parties were outpolling the traditional parties of the middle.[45]

As before, middle-class tension and frustration sparked a growth in associational activity. During the 1920s middle-class Germans threw themselves into their clubs, community groups, and patriotic organizations while increasingly abandoning the seemingly ineffectual liberal parties. By the middle of the decade both the style and the substance of bourgeois social life in Germany had begun to change:

[43] The SPD itself did much to preserve its image as a worker's rather than a people's party. See Richard Hunt, *German Social Democracy, 1918–1933* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964); Donna Harsch, *German Social Democracy and the Rise of Fascism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Heinrich August Winkler, "Klassenbewegung oder Volkspartei?" *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, vol. 8, 1972; Hans Kremdahl, "Könnte die SPD der Weimarer Republik eine Volkspartei werden?" in Horst Heimann and Thomas Meyer, eds., *Reformsozialismus und Sozialdemokratie* (Berlin: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, 1982); and Sheri Berman, *Ideas and Politics: Social Democracy in Interwar Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

[44] The 1920s even saw something of a resuscitation of the old Bismarckian coalition of iron and rye, which like its predecessor was able to secure a wide range of subsidies and tariffs, the most infamous of which was the *Osthilfe*. See Dietmar Petzina, "Elemente der Wirtschaftspolitik in der Spätphase der Weimarer Republik, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 21 (1973); and Gerald Feldman, *Vom Weltkrieg zur Weltwirtschaftskrise* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1984).

[45] Jones (fnn. 38, 42); idem, "In the Shadow of Stabilization: German Liberalism and the Legitimacy of the Weimar Party System," and Thomas Childers, "Interest and Ideology: Anti-System Parties in the Era of Stabilization," both in Gerald Feldman, ed., *Die Nachwirkungen der Inflation auf die deutsche Geschichte* (Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1985). See also Hans Mommsen, "The Decline of the Bürgertum in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Germany," in Mommsen, *From Weimar to Auschwitz* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

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> Spurred by growing political tensions, social organizations helped to lead an unprecedented surge of apoliticism that escaped the control of bourgeois elites. . . . [M]any spokesman for Weimar apoliticism argued that social organizations would do more than cushion political strife—they would bind together a moralistic, antisocialist, "folk community" of disparate classes and strata. . . . [T]he middle and late 1920s . . . thus saw not only an acceleration of tensions that had originated in the Empire but also an unprecedented rupture between the social and the political authority of the local bourgeoisie.[46]

What occurred in Germany was no less than an inversion of neo-Tocquevillean theory; not only did participation in civil society organizations fail to contribute to republican virtue, but it in fact subverted it. "[A]s the middle class became more and more disenchanted with and hostile towards the republic, their energies ceased to be channeled into proto political organizations and party political organizations of the center and right which the old elites had traditionally headed. Instead the radicalized troops of the middle class deserted these organizations and their leaders."[47]

Private associations were correctly seen to offer benefits that the traditional bourgeois parties were failing to provide, such as a sense of community and unity. While the DDP, DVP and DNVP had trouble shaking their image as *Honoratioren* parties dominated by business and agricultural elites, many private bourgeois associations brought together a relatively wide range of individuals and created a sense of purpose that transcended socioeconomic divisions.

> For many provincial burghers, associational life facilitated social contacts and friendships and muffled party differences. Repeatedly, the club was lauded for reconciling burghers. As an officer of a bourgeois choir in Hesse's Marburg commented, in "a time of both internal and external antagonisms, it is the German song that binds together members of the folk . . ." In a similar fashion, the summer festival of Celle's riflery club offered the mayor a happy example of unity between "burgher and civil servant."[48]

A fine example of these trends can be found in the World War I veterans organization known as the Stahlhelm. One of the largest and most politically powerful organizations during the 1920s, the Stahlhelm reached a peak membership of between five and six hundred thousand and played an important role in Hindenburg's election to the presidency. It had a relatively diverse membership, attracting support

[46] Koshar (fn. 23), 166. See also Gerald Feldman, "German Interest Group Alliances in War and Inflation, 1914–1923," in Berger (fn. 37); and Charles Maier, "Strukturen kapitalistischer Stabilität in den zwanziger Jahren," in Winkler (fn. 26).

[47] Detlev J. K. Peukert, *The Weimar Republic* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 230.

[48] Fritzsche (fn. 36), 76.

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from different socioeconomic groups, regions, and both the liberal and conservative camps. In addition, the organization encouraged a high level of membership participation, had a relatively democratic internal structure, and maintained contacts with other clubs and associations. In the early years of the republic the Stahlhelm developed ties with parties of the center-right and right, viewing such links as the best way to ensure the success of its nationalist, antisocialist agenda. By the mid-1920s, however, the organization was becoming disillusioned with traditional party politics and began to emphasize a nationalist and populist communitarianism. Many burghers began to transfer their primary political loyalties to it from center-right and right political parties, helping to eradicate these parties' authority at the grassroots level. The nature of the organization is captured well by a 1927 manifesto, which declared:

> Stahlhelm does not want to form or become a new party. But it does want . . . for its members to acquire the possibility and the right of decisive participation in all positions of public service and popular representation, from the local community to the national government. . . . Stahlhelm opposes all efforts and conceptions that seek to divide the German people. It esteems highly the experience of old comradeship at the front and unity and wants to develop out of it a national sense of unity. . . . [I]n full recognition of the value and the vital unity among enterprise, entrepreneur, and fellow workers, Stahlhelm will not hinder an honest and decisive settlement of conflicts of interest. It demands, however, the maintenance and preservation of the transcending interest of the German community.[49]

After 1928 the Stahlhelm began to lose membership and influence, in part because it allied itself more closely with the DNVP, but mostly because it was unable to adjust to the increasing mobilization and radicalism that was sweeping Germany during the late 1920s and early 1930s. The organization remained tied to the memory of the wartime generation and was not very successful in attracting those who came of age later. It had trouble operating amid the accelerating disintegration of traditional political structures and did not manage to cultivate ties to

[49] Among the other goals of this neo-Tocquevillean paragon, it is interesting to note, were rearmament, the extirpation of degeneration and foreign influence, and the acquisition of Lebensraum. "Berlin Stahlhelm Manifesto," first published in *Stahlhelm und Staat* (May 8, 1927), reprinted in Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, eds., *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 339–40. On the development of the Stahlhelm, see Fritzsche (fn. 36), chap. 9; Volker Berghahn, *Der Stahlhelm: Bund der Frontsoldaten, 1918–1935* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1966); and J. M. Diehl, *Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1977).

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either the new bourgeois splinter parties or their constituencies. Ironically, therefore, while the Stahlhelm had played a crucial role in infusing nationalist populism into the German political system and further weakening the traditional bourgeois parties, it was the Nazis and not the Stahlhelm who would be the ultimate beneficiaries of these trends. As the Great Depression spread throughout Europe, Germany found itself with weak political institutions and a fragmented but highly organized civil society; this, not the atomized anomie of a pure "mass society," would prove to be the ideal setting for the rapid rise to power of a skilled totalitarian movement.

The Rise of the NSDAP

During the 1920s the Nazi Party (the NSDAP) was stagnant—low on funds and unable to fill meeting halls or amass a significant share of the vote. By 1926 the situation had become so dire that the party began to move toward a major shift in strategy. Where previously the NSDAP had focused primarily on urban areas and working-class voters, it now reoriented its appeal toward the middle classes, nonvoters, and farmers, while proclaiming itself above the group divisions that plagued the country. Thus, as late as the 1928 elections the Nazis polled only 2.6 percent, whereas four years later they were the largest party in the Weimar Republic.[50] What enabled the Nazis to make such spectacular inroads into the German electorate? The depression, the weak response to it from mainstream parties, Hitler's charisma and political savvy—all these clearly played a role. A significant part of the answer, however, lies with contemporary German civil society.

As voters abandoned traditional bourgeois parties during the 1920s and then grappled with the ravages of the depression, a political vacuum opened up in German politics, a vacuum that offered the Nazis a golden opportunity to assemble an unprecedented coalition. To this end, the NSDAP exploited its increasingly strong position in Weimar's

[50] A good summary of the history of the Nazi party during this time is provided by Dietrich Orlow, *The History of the Nazi Party, 1919–1933* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969). Good English-language treatments of the formation of the Nazi constituency include Thomas Childers, ed., *The Formation of the Nazi Constituency* (London: Croom Helm, 1986); idem, "The Middle Classes and National Socialism," in Blackbourn and Evans (fn. 25); Peter Stachura, ed., *The Nazi Machtergreifung* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); and Thomas Childers, *The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983). Perhaps the most up-to-date analysis in German is Jürgen W. Falter, *Hitlers Wähler* (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck,1991).

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rich associational life. The dense networks of civic engagement provided the Nazis with cadres of activists who had the skills necessary to spread the party's message and increase recruitment. Those networks also served as a fifth column, allowing the NSDAP to infiltrate and master a significant sector of bourgeois society before emerging to seize control of Germany's national political structures. As one scholar notes:

> Path-breaking work in recent years on the rise of National Socialism has stressed the importance of local newspapers, municipal notables, and voluntary associations, and points to the buoyancy and vigor of civic traditions. Had bourgeois community life been overly disoriented and fragmented, the body of new evidence indicates, the Nazis would never have been able to marshal the resources or plug into the social networks necessary to their political success.[51]

During the second half of the 1920s the Nazis concentrated on attracting bourgeois "joiners" who had become disillusioned with traditional party politics. Like the neo-Tocquevilleans, Hitler recognized that participation in associational life provided individuals with the kinds of leadership skills and social ties that could be very useful in the political arena.[52] Civil society activists formed the backbone of the Nazis' grassroots propaganda machine. The party also skillfully exploited their organizational contacts and social expertise to gain insight into the fears and needs of particular groups and to tailor new appeals to them—using them, in other words, as "focus groups." The activists, finally, provided the movement with unparalleled local organizations. In contrast to the other bourgeois parties, the Nazis were able to develop flexible and committed local party chapters that enabled full and accurate two-way communication between the national party and its frontline troops.

Recent research into local life in interwar Germany details the crucial role played by bourgeois "joiners" in paving the way for the Nazi rise to power. Rudy Koshar's excellent study of Marburg, for example, shows that party members were an unusually activist bunch. "Before September 1930 there existed at least 46 Nazi party members with 73 cross-affiliations. For the period before 30 January 1933 overall, there were at least 84 Nazi students and 116 nonstudent party adherents with 375 cross-affiliations to occupational associations, sports clubs, nonparty municipal electoral slates, civic associations, student fraternities

[51] Fritzsche (fn. 36), 13.

[52] Rudy Koshar, "From Stammtisch to Party: Nazi Joiners and the Contradictions of Grass Roots Fascism in Weimar Germany," *Journal of Modern History* 59 (March 1987), 2; idem (fn. 23), 185ff.; Hans Mommsen, "National Socialism: Continuity and Change," in Walter Lacquer, ed., *Fascism: A Reader's Guide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); and Hagtvet (fn. 12).

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and other local voluntary groups." By January 1933 there was at least one Nazi Party member in one out of every four voluntary groups in the city.[53] The Nazi elite was even more well connected.[54]

Koshar describes the key role of civil society activists in creating a powerful and dynamic Nazi organization in Marburg. By the time of the Nazi breakthrough in the 1930 elections, the NSDAP had representatives in a wide range of civic associations working to spread the movement's message, get out the vote, and discredit political opponents. "The 1930–31 electoral victories were more lasting than expected, because the NSDAP was gaining control over a field of social organizations wider than that supporting bourgeois parties."[55] The activists not only created a powerful electoral machine but also helped the NSDAP to anchor itself in local communities in a way no other bourgeois party could match. The Nazis used their local organization to design propaganda and political events that would mesh with and appeal to Marburg's particular social rhythms, making the NSDAP seem sympathetic and responsive by contrast with elitist and out-of-touch liberals and conservatives.

> [T]he party was attractive in part because of its positive image in conversations in the marketplace, local stores, university classrooms, fraternity houses, meeting halls, soccer fields, and homes. Hitler's seemingly mysterious mass appeal could hardly have been so extensive without the unplanned propaganda of daily social life. . . . Through infiltration, the NSDAP gained moral authority over organizations in which it also established a material base. It was becoming the political hub, the focus of legitimacy and material power, that bourgeois constituencies had lacked.[56]

The Nazis did not merely exploit their cadres' preexisting associational bonds; they even deliberately infiltrated activists into a wide range of bourgeois organizations in order to eliminate potential opponents from positions of power within them.[57] Without the opportunity to exploit

[53] Koshar, "Contentious Citadel: Bourgeois Crisis and Nazism in Marburg/Lahn, 1880–1933," in Childers (fn. 50), 24, 28–29. See also Koshar (fn. 23); Hagtvet (fn. 12); Allen (fn. 36); and idem, "The Nazification of a Town," in John L. Snell, ed., *The Nazi Revolution: Hitler's Dictatorship and the German Nation* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973).

[54] In a study of right-wing extremists in the U.S., Raymond Wolfinger and several colleagues came to a similar conclusion. See Wolfinger et al., "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[55] Koshar (fn. 23), 202.

[56] Ibid., 204, 202.

[57] On the party's infiltration of a variety of bourgeois associations, see Mommsen (fn. 52); Winkler (fn. 26), 168ff.; Larry Eugene Jones, "Between the Fronts: The German National Union of Commercial Employees from 1928 to 1933," *Journal of Modern History* 48 (September 1976); Koshar (fn. 37); and Peter D. Stachura, "German Youth, the Youth Movement and National Socialism in the Weimar Republic," in Stachura, ed., *The Nazi Machtergreifung* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983).

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Weimar's rich associational network, in short, the Nazis would not have been able to capture important sectors of the German electorate so quickly and efficiently.

A brief profile of the Nazi methods can be found in the case of the German peasantry. During the interwar years peasants joined and participated in a wide range of professional, special interest, and regional associations, a trend carried over from the Wilhelmine era. Early in the republic the peasantry tended to vote liberal or conservative, but they like other bourgeois groups soon began to desert traditional political parties. During the second half of the 1920s most peasants either withdrew from the national political arena or gave their support to one of the new splinter parties; they did not disproportionately support the extreme right.[58] As the depression bore down, however, the crisis in German agriculture became more acute and the political situation in rural areas more volatile. Large landowners used their influence on the DNVP and other political organizations to secure a large amount of help (including the notorious *Osthilfe*), but the peasantry found itself without a powerful political champion.

Until late in the day the Nazis essentially ignored rural Germany, and the vaguely socialist aspects of the Nazi program (such as land reform and expropriation) tended to drive farmers away. But by the end of the 1920s the NSDAP, clever and opportunistic in ways its competitors were not, noticed the political potential of the frustration and unrest spreading across the countryside. In 1928, therefore, the party refashioned its agricultural program, eliminating many offensive planks and focusing instead on the particular needs and demands of rural inhabitants.[59]

R. Walther Darre was the key figure in Nazi agricultural policy, and by the end of 1930 he decided that the way to win the peasantry's support and box out potential opponents in rural areas was to capture existing agricultural organizations. In November 1930 an instruction

[58] In the 1928 elections, for example, the NSDAP share of the vote in the predominently rural districts of East Prussia, Pomerania, East Hannover, and Hesse-Darmstadt was below its national average. Horst Gies, "The NSDAP and Agrarian Organizations in the Final Phase of the Weimar Republic," in Henry A. Turner, ed., *Nazism and the Third Reich* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1972), 75 fn. 2. See also Richard J. Evans and W. R. Lee, eds., *The German Peasantry* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); Robert G. Moeller, *German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, 1914–1924* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); Shelley Baranowski, *The Sanctity of Rural Life: Nobility, Protestantism, and Nazism in West Prussia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Werner Angress, "The Political Role of the Peasantry," *Review of Politics* 21, no. 3 (1959).

[59] On Nazi agricultural policy during this period, see J. E. Farquharson, *The Plough and the Swastika: The NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany, 1928–1945* (London: Sage, 1976). For a discussion of why other parties such as the SPD passed up this opportunity, see Berman (fn. 43).

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sheet ordered the NSDAP's agricultural apparatus (*agrarpolitische Apparat*, or aA) to

> penetrate into all rural affairs like a finely intertwined root system. . . . [The aA] should embed itself deeply in [all rural organizations] and seek to embrace every element of agrarian life so thoroughly that eventually nothing will be able to occur in the realm of agriculture everywhere in the Reich which we do not observe and whose basis we do not understand. Let there be no farm, no estate, no village, no cooperative, no agricultural industry, no local organization of the RLB [an agricultural organization], no rural equestrian association, etc., etc., where we have not—at the least—placed our [representatives].[60]

Darre became particularly interested in capturing the Reichslandbund (RLB), a major player in German agrarian life that by the end of the 1920s had 5.6 million members. During the 1920s the RLB had cooperated with a number of bourgeois parties including the DVP and DNVP. But eventually many RLB members grew disgusted with the organization's political vacillation and inept leadership and began to consider the NSDAP as a potential champion for agricultural interests. During the latter part of 1930 Darre decided that the best way to gain control over the RLB was by "conquering one position after another from within."[61] The aA focused first on placing supporters in lower ranks of the RLB, then on capturing leadership positions. Like his führer, Darre recognized the value of gradualism and legalism, reasoning that if the Nazis nibbled "away at [the RLB's] official apparatus, then, along with this mortar, the big stones will fall out on their own."[62]

After the NSDAP's successes in local elections in 1931, Darre began to push harder for Nazi appointments to the RLB leadership. He recognized that an official RLB endorsement could play an important role in the 1932 elections. Soon he succeeded in getting a Nazi named one of the four presidents of the RLB, and in 1932 the RLB duly endorsed the Nazis. Darre continued his attack on the RLB from within, eliminating remaining non-Nazis from all influential positions. This pushed the RLB increasingly into the Nazi fold, brandishing the NSDAP's image as the champion of Germany's "neglected" groups while opening up new avenues for manipulation. "Instead of proving an obstacle to Nazism in the countryside, the RLB and other agricultural organizations became convenient conveyor belts for Nazi propaganda reaching deep into the

[60] Quoted in Gies (fn. 58), 51.

[61] Ibid., 62. See also Zdenek Zofka, "Between Bauernbund and National Socialism: The Political Orientation of the Peasantry in the Final Phase of the Weimar Republic," in Childers (fn. 50).

[62] Ibid., 65.

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rural population. In this way the intermediate groups facilitated the rise of Nazism."[63]

The Nazis had infiltrated and captured a wide range of national and local associations by the early 1930s, finally bridging the gap between bourgeois civil society and party politics that had plagued Germany for half a century. From this base Hitler was able to achieve two goals that had long eluded German politicians—the creation of an effective political machine and a true cross-class coalition. With these in Nazi hands and bourgeois competitors eliminated, Hindenburg found it increasingly difficult to ignore Hitler's demands for a change of course. By the end of 1932 Schleicher had lost Hindenburg's confidence;[64] two days after Schleicher was forced to resign, Hitler was named chancellor.[65]

Conclusions: Germany, Associationism, and Political Development

The German case reveals a distinct pattern of associationism that does not conform to the predictions of neo-Tocquevillean theories. German civil society was rich and extensive during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and this nation of joiners should accordingly have provided fertile soil for a successful democratic experiment. Instead, it succumbed to totalitarianism. This does not mean that civil society was disconnected from German political development; it was, rather, connected in ways that the reigning neo-Tocquevillean theories ignore.

The vigor of German civil society actually developed in inverse relation to the vigor and responsiveness of national political institutions and structures. Instead of helping to reduce social cleavages, Germany's weak and poorly designed political institutions exacerbated them; instead of responding to the demands of an increasingly mobilized population, the country's political structures obstructed meaningful participation in public life. As a result, citizens' energies and interests were deflected into private associational activities, which were generally

[63] Hagtvet (fn. 12), 91.

[64] At least partially because of the RLB's efforts, which were directed by the Nazis; Hagtvet (fn. 12), 75.

[65] In a tragic irony, Hindenburg's decision may well have allowed the Nazis to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. After the July 1932 elections the NSDAP began to run into trouble, as Hitler's inability to deliver on his promises caused dissent among different groups within the Nazi coalition and the party's previously formidable organization had trouble maintaining necessary levels of enthusiasm and funding. A few months more out of power and the party might have begun to self-destruct. See the new study by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., *Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933* (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996); and also Orlow (fn. 50), 233ff.; and Childers, "The Limits of National Socialist Mobilization," in Childers (fn. 50).

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organized within rather than across group boundaries. The vigor of civil society activities then continued to draw public interest and involvement away from parties and politics, further sapping their strength and significance. Eventually the Nazis seized the opportunities afforded by such a situation, offering a unifying appeal and bold solutions to a nation in crisis. The NSDAP drew its critical cadres precisely from among bourgeois civil society activists with few ties to mainstream politics, and it was from the base of bourgeois civil society that the party launched its swift *Machtergreifung*. In short, one cannot understand the rise of the Nazis without an appreciation of the role played by German civil society, and one cannot understand the contours of that civil society without reference to the country's weak political institutionalization.

From Bismarck's tenure onward German political parties exhibited two major weaknesses.[66] First, they tended to focus on particular and relatively narrow socioeconomic groups. Workers, large landowners, large industrialists, Catholics—all had political parties catering specifically to them. Instead of reconciling the interests of different groups or creating a sense of national unity, therefore, parties reflected and deepened the divisions within German society. Only Hitler was able to overcome this pattern, finally creating a cross-class political coalition and uniting a majority (or at least a plurality) of Germans under a single political umbrella. Second, Germany's bourgeois parties in particular never adjusted fully to the era of mass politics. Instead, they retained an elite organizational style and failed to develop strong grassroots organizations and to cultivate strong ties to the associational lives of their constituencies.[67] The result was that large sectors of the German middle classes withdrew even further from national political activity. In general, therefore, the party system served to aggravate the lack of political and social cohesion that had plagued Germany since unification.

The weakness of such national political structures was a key reason that Germans threw themselves into clubs, organizations, and interest groups during periods of strain like the 1870s and 1920s. Because the

[66] Many, indeed, have blamed Bismarck for the nature of the German party system. By allowing universal suffrage but failing to provide responsible government, Bismarck ensured that political parties would be necessary but also somewhat impotent. Furthermore, by continually manufacturing crises and identifying certain parties (i.e., the SPD and Zentrum) as enemies of the Reich, Bismarck increased the difficulty that parties and their constituencies had in working with each other.

[67] Both the SPD and the Catholic Zentrum managed to avoid such problems with their core consituencies. Each maintained close ties with an extremely wide range of ancilliary organizations, and the SPD in particular was a very effective mass party. Largely as a result of these parties' ability to integrate political and civil society life, their constituencies (i.e., workers and Catholics) proved less likely to vote for the Nazis later on than were other groups. Because they contributed to the segmentation of German society during the 1920s, however, these parties can still be held at least indirectly responsible for the collapse of the Weimar Republic.

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political system deepened social cleavages, however, civil society institutions often catered to members of a particular group: socialists, Catholics, and bourgeois Protestants each joined their own choral societies and bird-watching clubs. However horizontally organized and civic minded these associations may have been, they tended to hive their memberships off from the rest of society and contribute to the formation of what one observer has called "ferociously jealous 'small republics.'"[68] Germany was cleaved increasingly into distinct subcultures or communities, each of which had its own, separate associational life. Civil society activity alone, in short, could not overcome the country's social divisions or provide the political cohesion that would have been necessary to weather the crises which beset Germany beginning in 1914. For this, strong and flexible political institutions, particularly political parties, would have been necessary.

On the eve of the Great Depression, Germany found itself in a precarious political situation—its civil society was highly developed but segmented, and its mainstream bourgeois parties were disintegrating. Many citizens active in secondary associations were politically frustrated and dissatisfied; when the depression added economic and political chaos to the mix, the result was a golden opportunity for a new political force. The Nazis stepped into the breach, reaching out to the disaffected bourgeois civil society activists and using the country's organizational infrastructure to make inroads into various constituencies. The dense network of German associations enabled the NSDAP to create in a remarkably short time a dynamic political machine and cross-class coalition unlike anything Germany had ever before seen—one to which it soon succumbed.

The German case should make us skeptical of many aspects of neo-Tocquevillean theory. In particular, German political development raises questions about what has by now become practically conventional wisdom, namely, that there is a direct and positive relationship between a rich associational life and stable democracy. Under certain circumstances, clearly the very opposite is the case: associationism and the prospects for democratic stability can actually be inversely related. Furthermore, many of the consequences of associationism stressed by neo-Tocquevillean scholars—providing individuals with political and social skills, creating bonds between citizens, facilitating mobilization, decreasing barriers to collective action—can be turned to antidemocratic

[68] Fritzsche (fn. 36), 232. On this point, see also M. Rainer Lepsius, "Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur: zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft," in Gerhard A. Ritter, ed., *Deutsche Parteien vor 1918* (Cologne: Droste, 1983).

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ends as well as to democratic ones. Perhaps, therefore, associationism should be considered a politically neutral multiplier—neither inherently good nor inherently bad, but rather dependent for its effects on the wider political context.[69]

The neo-Tocquevilleans have in fact already been criticized for their inability to predict whether civil society activity will have negative or positive consequences for political development. Some, for example, have taken Putnam to task for praising the long-term salutory effect of civil society activity in Northern Italy while ignoring the fact that this selfsame activity proved to be consistent with Fascism.[70] What the analysis presented here seems to indicate is that if we want to know *when* civil society activity will take on oppositional or even antidemocratic tendencies, we need to ground our analyses in concrete examinations of political reality. If a country's political institutions and structures are capable of channeling and redressing grievances and the existing political regime enjoys public support and legitimacy, then associationism will probably buttress political stability by placing its resources and beneficial effects in the service of the status quo. This is the pattern Tocqueville described.

If, on the contrary, political institutions and structures are weak and/or the existing political regime is perceived to be ineffectual and illegitimate, then civil society activity may become an alternative to politics, increasingly absorbing citizens' energies and satisfying their basic needs. In such situations, associationism will probably undermine political stability, by deepening cleavages, furthering dissatisfaction, and providing rich soil for oppositional movements. Flourishing civil society activity in these circumstances signals governmental and party failure and may bode ill for the regime's future.

This latter pattern fits Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as we have seen, but it may be applicable to many other cases as well, with provocative implications. The weakening of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, for example, was hastened by a rise in civil society activity there in the 1980s; parts of the contemporary Arab world are witnessing a remarkable growth in Islamist civil

[69] Foley and Edwards (fn. 7); Skocpol (fn. 7, "The Tocqueville Problem"); Diamond (fn. 7); Pinard (fn. 19); Hagtvet (fn. 12), esp. 94; Koshar (fnn. 37, 23); Winkler (fn. 26), esp. 196; and Fritzsche (fn. 36).

[70] See Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work," *American Political Science Review* 90 (June 1996). Interestingly, Tarrow also criticizes Putnam for failing to recognize that much of the civil society activity he finds was directly or indirectly created by Italian political parties. According to Tarrow, in other words, civil society may not be an *independent* variable (as Putnam claims) but rather an *intermediary* variable, along the lines suggested by the analysis presented here.

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society activity that feeds on the citizenry's frustration with the region's unrepresentative and unresponsive authoritarian governments. In such situations civil society may not necessarily promote liberal democracy, as the neo-Tocquevilleans would have it, but rather may simply corrode the foundations of the current political order while providing an organizational base from which it can be challenged. From this perspective, the fact that a militant Islamist movement, for example, provides its supporters with religious classes, professional associations, and medical services tells us little about what might happen should the movement ever gain power; it tells us much more about the political failure and gloomy prospects of the nation's existing regime.

Unfortunately, one need not look so far abroad to find examples of this pattern. The *New York Times* noted in a recent report on the District of Columbia, for example, that for many of Washington's residents home rule "has come to mean a patronage-bloated, ineffective city payroll offering phantom services." The weakness and failure of Washington's local government and political system, in turn, has spurred both a rise in associational activity and a fragmentation of social consciousness and communal identity. "Volunteerism [is] growing stronger in the face of the dwindling services, mismanagement and budget shortfalls that bedevil the city," according to one neighborhood activist. "Gradually," says another, "people come to feel they have to take care of themselves and not worry about the other guy."[71] Another observer proclaims: "Amid widespread disillusionment with government and its ability to solve the nation's most pervasive problems, a loosely formed social movement promoting a return to 'civil society' has emerged . . . drawing a powerful and ideologically diverse group of political leaders."[72] When associationism and communitarian activities flourish in such a context, it would seem that there is cause, not for celebration, but rather for deep concern about the failure of the community's political institutions.

Finally, if neo-Tocquevilleans have misunderstood the true connections between civic and political institutions, the policy advice they offer should be called into question. Responding to current public dissatisfaction with the state of democracy in America, many have argued that the remedy lies in fostering local associational life. This prescription may prove to be both misguided and counterproductive, however. If a population increasingly perceives its government, politicians, and

[71] Ward 3 block-watch organizer Kathy Smith and Cleveland Park Citizens Association president Stephen A. Koczak, respectively, quoted in Francis X Clines, "Washington's Troubles Hit Island of Affluence," *New York Times*, July 26, 1996, p. A19.

[72] "Promoting a Return to 'Civil Society,' Diverse Group of Crusaders Looks to New Solutions to Social Problems," *Washington Post*, December 15, 1996.

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parties to be inefficient and unresponsive, diverting public energies and interest into secondary associations may only exacerbate the problem, fragment society, and weaken political cohesion further. American democracy would be better served if its problems were addressed directly rather than indirectly. Increased bird watching and league bowling, in other words, are unlikely to have positive effects unless the nation's political institutions are also revitalized.[73]

[73] On this point, see also Skocpol (fn. 7, 1996, 1996).

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Research Note

DEMOCRACY WITH ADJECTIVES
Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research

By DAVID COLLIER and STEVEN LEVITSKY*

THE recent global wave of democratization has presented scholars with the challenge of dealing conceptually with a great diversity of postauthoritarian regimes. Although the new national political regimes in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the former communist world share important attributes of democracy, many of them differ profoundly both from each other and from the democracies in advanced industrial countries. Indeed, many are not considered fully democratic.

This article argues that scholars respond to this challenge by pursuing two potentially contradictory goals. On the one hand, researchers attempt to increase *analytic differentiation* in order to capture the diverse forms of democracy that have emerged. On the other hand, scholars are concerned with *conceptual validity*. Specifically, they seek to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied to cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not appropriate.[1] The result has been a proliferation of alternative conceptual forms, including a surprising number of subtypes

* We acknowledge the valuable suggestions of Ruth Berins Collier, Larry Diamond, Andrew Gould, Peter Houtzager, Marcus Kurtz, Terry Karl, David Laitin, George Lakoff, Arend Lijphart, James Mahoney, Scott Mainwaring, Carol Medlin, Gerardo Munck, Guillermo O'Donnell, Michael Pretes, Philippe Schmitter, Laura Stoker, Mark Turner, Samuel Valenzuela, and participants in the Berkeley Working Group on Comparative Method. Steve Levitsky's participation in this research was supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and David Collier's work on this project at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences was supported by National Science Foundation Grant no. SBR-9022192.

[1] Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review* 64 (December 1970); and David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 87 (December 1993).

World Politics 49 (April 1997), 430–51

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involving democracy "with adjectives."[2] Examples from among the hundreds of subtypes that have appeared include "authoritarian democracy," "neopatrimonial democracy," "military-dominated democracy," and "protodemocracy."

This proliferation has occurred despite the efforts by leading analysts to standardize usage of the term democracy on the basis of procedural definitions in the tradition of Joseph Schumpeter and Robert A. Dahl.[3] In important respects this standardization has been successful. Yet as democratization has continued and attention has focused on an increasingly diverse set of cases, the proliferation of subtypes and other conceptual innovations has continued. Hence, given the risk of growing conceptual confusion, the earlier effort to standardize usage must now be supplemented by assessing the structure of meaning that underlies these diverse forms of the concept.

This article initiates this assessment, focusing on qualitative categories[4] employed in the study of recent cases of democratization at the level of national political regimes, with particular attention to work on Latin America.[5] Our goal is twofold: to make more comprehensible the complex structure of the alternative strategies of conceptual innovation that have emerged and to examine the trade-offs among these strategies. We begin with Sartori's well-known strategies of moving up and down a ladder of generality—strategies aimed at avoiding conceptual stretching and increasing differentiation, respectively. Because this approach cannot be used to pursue both goals at once, we find that scholars have often turned to other strategies: creating "diminished" subtypes of democracy, "precising" the definition of democracy by adding defining attributes, and shifting the overarching concept with which democracy is associated (for example, from democratic *regime* to democratic *state*).

[2] A parallel expression, "democracy without adjectives," appeared in debates in Latin America among observers concerned with the persistence of incomplete and qualified forms of democracy. See, for instance, Enrique Krauze, *Por una democracia sin adjetivos* (Mexico City: Joaquín Mortiz/Planeta, 1986).

[3] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1947); and Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

[4] Along with the qualitative categories that are the focus of this discussion, valuable quantitative indicators have been developed for comparing recent cases of democratization. Ultimately, it will be productive to bring together insights about the strategies of conceptual innovation employed in these alternative approaches. However, an essential prior step, which is our present concern, is to learn more about the conceptual innovations introduced by scholars who employ qualitative categories.

[5] We are thus not primarily concerned with the literature on advanced industrial democracies, although this literature is an important point of reference in the studies we are examining. In a few places, we have included recent studies of countries that are not actually part of the current episode of democratization, but whose relatively new democracies are a point of comparison in the studies under review, for example, Colombia. We also include a few references to other historical cases that have been used in recent scholarship as important points of analytic contrast.

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More broadly, the analysis seeks to encourage scholars to be more careful in their definition and use of concepts. The subtypes and other conceptual forms examined here are, after all, generally critical components of the main substantive arguments presented by these researchers, often advancing the author's overall characterization of the case or cases in question. These are the "data containers" that convey the most salient facts about the regimes under discussion.[6] If one is to describe the new regimes adequately, these data containers must be employed in a clear and appropriate manner.

Improved description, in turn, is essential for assessing the *causes* and *consequences* of democracy, which is a central goal of this literature. Many studies have treated democracy as an outcome to be explained, including major works of comparative-historical analysis and old and new studies of "social requisites."[7] Other analyses have looked at the impact of democracy and of specific types of democracy on economic growth, income distribution, economic liberalization and adjustment, and international conflict.[8] In these studies, the results of causal assessment can be strongly influenced by the meaning of democracy employed by the author.[9] We hope that the present discussion can serve as a step toward a greater consistency and clarity of meaning that will provide a more adequate basis for assessing causal relationships.

[6] Sartori (fn. 1), 1039.

[7] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Gregory M. Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959); and idem, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," *American Sociological Review* 59 (February 1994); John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Does High Income Promote Democracy?" *World Politics* 49 (October 1996); and Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49 (January 1997).

[8] Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (Summer 1993); Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, "Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income," *American Sociological Review* 50 (August 1985); Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles, "The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Review," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25 (Spring 1990); Karen L. Remmer, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954–1984," *Comparative Politics* 19 (October 1986); Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman, eds., *Debt and Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace: An International Security Reader* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," *World Politics* 46 (October 1993); Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (January 1994).

[9] See, for example, Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, "Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies," *American Sociological Review* 54 (August 1989), 613–16; and Russett (fn. 8), 15–16.

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It merits emphasis that these strategies of conceptual innovation are by no means unique to qualitative research on recent democratization. They are found in many conceptual domains, both in the social sciences and beyond.[10] A further goal of this article is therefore to advance the broader understanding of how qualitative researchers deal with these basic issues of analytic differentiation and conceptual validity.

I. Definitions of Democracy in Research on Recent Democratization

In his famous analysis of "essentially contested concepts," the philosopher W. B. Gallie argues that democracy is "*the* appraisive political concept *par excellence*."[11] Correspondingly, one finds endless disputes over appropriate meaning and definition. However, the goal of Gallie's analysis is not simply to underscore the importance of such disputes, but to show that a recognition of the contested status of a given concept opens the possibility of understanding each meaning within its own framework. With reference to democracy, he argues that "politics being the art of the possible, democratic targets will be raised or lowered as circumstances alter," and he insists that these alternative standards should be taken seriously on their own terms.[12]

In this spirit, we focus on the procedural definitions that have been most widely employed in research on recent democratization at the level of national political regimes. These definitions refer to democratic *procedures*, rather than to substantive policies or other outcomes that might be viewed as democratic. These definitions are also "minimal," in that they deliberately focus on the smallest possible number of attributes that are still seen as producing a viable standard for democracy; not surprisingly, there is disagreement about which attributes are needed for the definition to be viable. For example, most of these scholars differentiate what they view as the more specifically political features of the regime from characteristics of the society and economy, on the

[10] For an analysis that focuses on some of these same strategies with reference to another social science concept, see David Collier, "Trajectory of a Concept: 'Corporatism' in the Study of Latin American Politics," in Peter H. Smith, ed., *Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Method and Analysis* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995). For discussions by linguists and cognitive scientists of the intuitive structure that underlies these strategies, see D. A. Cruse, *Lexical Semantics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), chap. 6; George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), chaps. 2, 6; and John R. Taylor, *Linguistic Categorization: Prototypes in Linguistic Theory*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), chaps. 2–3.

[11] W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1956), 184; emphasis in original.

[12] Ibid., quote at 186; see also pp. 178, 189, 190, 193.

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grounds that the latter are more appropriately analyzed as potential causes or consequences of democracy, rather than as features of democracy itself.[13]

Within this framework, we focus on a "procedural minimum" definition that presumes fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association.[14] However, there is by no means consensus on a single definition. Some scholars, for example, have created an "*expanded* procedural minimum" definition by adding the criterion that elected governments must have effective power to govern—which, as we will see below, is a crucial issue in some countries.

II. Sartori's Strategies

We first consider Sartori's strategies for achieving differentiation and avoiding conceptual stretching. Sartori builds on a basic insight about the organization of concepts: a significant aspect of the relationship between the meaning of concepts and the range of cases to which they apply can be understood in terms of a "ladder of generality."[15] This ladder is based on a pattern of inverse variation between the number of defining attributes and number of cases. Thus, concepts with *fewer* defining attributes commonly apply to *more* cases and are therefore higher on the ladder of generality, whereas concepts with *more* defining attributes apply to *fewer* cases and hence are lower on the ladder.

[13] For discussions of procedural definitions, see Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), chap. 2; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Modest Meaning of Democracy," in Robert A. Pastor, ed., *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989); Schumpeter (fn.3); and Dahl (fn. 3). On minimal definitions, see Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 28; and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 9. On treating characteristics of the society and economy as a cause or consequence of democracy, see Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 182; and Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990), 2.

[14] O'Donnell and Schmitter (fn. 13), 8 (but see note 33 below); Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Preface," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), xvi; Di Palma (fn. 13), 16. See also Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 5.

[15] Sartori (fn. 1), 1040, actually refers to a ladder of "abstraction." However, because the term *abstract* is often understood in contrast to *concrete*, this label can be confusing. We therefore find that "ladder of generality" expresses the intended meaning more clearly.

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DIFFERENTIATION

One of Sartori's goals is to show how conceptual differentiation can be increased by moving *down* the ladder of generality to concepts that have more defining attributes and fit a narrower range of cases. These concepts provide the more fine-grained distinctions that for some purposes are invaluable to the researcher.[16] This move down the ladder is often accomplished through the creation of what we will call "classical" subtypes of democracy.[17] Classical subtypes are understood as *full* instances of the root definition[18] of democracy in relation to which they are formed, at the same time that they are differentiated vis-à-vis other classical subtypes of this concept. Thus, "parliamentary democracy," "multiparty democracy," and "federal democracy" are all considered *definitely* democratic (by whatever standard the author is using), at the same time that each is considered a particular *type* of democracy (see Figure 1). In research on recent cases of democratization, the use of classical subtypes to achieve differentiation is found, for example, in the important debate on the consequences of parliamentary, as opposed to presidential, democracy.[19]

Moving down the ladder of generality provides useful differentiation, and the subtypes just noted play an important role in the recent literature. Yet subtypes formed in this manner may leave the analyst vulnerable to conceptual stretching, because they presume the cases under discussion are definitely democracies. If the particular case being studied is less than fully democratic, then the use of these subtypes as a tool of conceptual differentiation may not be appropriate. Analysts therefore seek concepts that distinguish among different *degrees* of democracy, in addition to distinguishing among different *types* of democracy. Because classical subtypes of democracy only contribute to the second of these two goals, they have not been the most common means of conceptual differentiation in studies of recent democratization.

[16] Sartori (fn. 1), 1041.

[17] We refer to these as classical subtypes because they fit within the "classical" understanding of categorization discussed by such authors as Lakoff (fn. 10), 9 and passim; and Taylor (fn. 10), chap. 2.

[18] In referring to the root definition, we do not imply that it is the "correct" definition of the relevant concept (in this case, of democracy). It is simply the definition that, for a particular author, is the point of departure in forming the subtype. We will occasionally use the expression "root concept" to refer to the concept (again, in the present context, democracy) that is the point of departure for the various conceptual innovations analyzed here.

[19] Linz and Valenzuela (fn. 8); Stepan and Skach (fn. 8); and Giovanni Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes* (New York: New York University Press, 1994).

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

FIGURE 1
THE LADDER OF GENERALITY:
INCREASING DIFFERENTIATION VERSUS AVOIDING
CONCEPTUAL STRETCHING

[a]John A. Booth, "Framework for Analysis," in John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., *Elections and Democracy in Central America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 26.

[b]Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 354.

[c]James Petras and Fernando Ignacio Leiva, *Democracy and Poverty in Chile: The Limits to Electoral Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 89.

[d]Juan J. Linz. "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 3.

[e]Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The Political Regimes Project," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25 (Spring 1990), 113.

[f]Raymond Duncan Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25 (Spring 1990), 35.

AVOIDING CONCEPTUAL STRETCHING

Sartori's proposal for avoiding conceptual stretching is to move *up* the ladder of generality to concepts that have fewer defining attributes and correspondingly fit a broader range of cases.[20] In the present context,

[20] Sartori (fn. 1), 1041.

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this involves concepts located *above* democracy on the ladder of generality. Scholars commonly view democracy as a specific type in relation to the overarching concept of regime. Hence, if they have misgivings as to whether a particular case is really a *democratic* regime, they can move up the ladder and simply call it a regime.

However, because shifting to a concept as general as regime entails a great loss of conceptual differentiation, scholars have typically moved to an intermediate level (Figure 1)—adding adjectives to the term regime and thereby generating classical subtypes to differentiate specific *types* of regime. The resulting subtypes remain more general than the concept of democracy, in that they encompass not only democracies but also some *non*-democracies. Examples include "civilian regime," "competitive regime," and "electoral regime." Although scholars thus achieve some conceptual differentiation in relation to regime, they do not specifically commit themselves to the idea that the case under discussion is a democracy. A similar pattern is followed when scholars use a synonym for regime, as in "civilian rule" and "competitive polity."[21]

Although climbing the ladder of generality helps to avoid conceptual stretching, it has an important drawback. Because these subtypes remain *more general* than the concept of democracy, this approach leads to a loss of conceptual differentiation. Thus, taken together, Sartori's two strategies can advance one or the other of these goals, but not both at once. As a consequence, many scholars have turned to other strategies.

III. Diminished Subtypes

An alternative strategy of conceptual innovation, that of creating "diminished" subtypes,[22] can contribute both to achieving differentiation and to avoiding conceptual stretching. It is a strategy widely used in the literature on recent democratization. Two points are crucial for understanding diminished subtypes. First, in contrast to the classical subtypes discussed above, diminished subtypes are *not* full instances of the root definition of "democracy" employed by the author who presents the subtype. For example, "limited-suffrage democracy" and "tutelary democracy" are understood as less than complete instances of democ-

[21] See, respectively, Richard Wilson, "Continued Counterinsurgency: Civilian Rule in Guatemala," in Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson, eds., *Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order* (London: Pluto Press, 1993); and Terry Lynn Karl, "Democracy by Design: The Christian Democratic Party in El Salvador," in Giuseppe Di Palma and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *The Central American Impasse* (London: Croom Helm, 1986).

[22] The idea of diminished subtypes builds on the discussion of radial concepts in Collier and Mahon (fn. 1), 850–52. See also Lakoff (fn. 10), chap. 6.

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racy because they lack one or more of its defining attributes.[23] Consequently, in using these subtypes the analyst makes a more modest claim about the extent of democratization and is therefore less vulnerable to conceptual stretching.

The second point concerns differentiation. Because diminished subtypes represent an incomplete form of democracy, they might be seen as having *fewer* defining attributes, with the consequence that they would be *higher* on the ladder of generality and would therefore provide less, rather than more, differentiation. However, the distinctive feature of diminished subtypes is that they generally identify specific attributes of democracy that are *missing*, thereby establishing the diminished character of the subtype, at the same time that they identify other attributes of democracy that are *present*. Because they specify missing attributes, they also increase differentiation, and the diminished subtype in fact refers to a *different* set of cases than does the root definition of democracy.

The inclusion and exclusion of cases that occurs with a diminished subtype, as opposed to moving up or down the ladder of generality, can be illustrated with the examples of contemporary Britain, the United States, and Guatemala (Figure 2). Britain and the United States, but probably *not* Guatemala (at least up through the mid-1990s), would be seen as democratic in terms of the procedural minimum definition. If we climb the ladder of generality, we find that the broader concept of "electoral regime"[24] encompasses all three cases. Lower down on the ladder the classical subtype "parliamentary democracy" would include one of the two democracies, that is, Britain. By contrast, the diminished subtype "illiberal democracy" would include only Guatemala, the case that specifically did *not* fit the root definition of democracy.[25]

Figure 3 presents some examples of the many diminished subtypes that have been generated in relation to the procedural minimum and expanded procedural minimum definitions of democracy noted above. In many instances, scholars created diminished subtypes in which more than one component attribute of democracy is missing, but for the pur-

[23] Because they are less than complete instances, it might be objected that they are not really "subtypes" of democracy at all. Drawing on a term from cognitive linguistics, one can refer to them as conceptual "blends" that are derived in part from the concept of democracy. However, to avoid referring repeatedly to "subtypes and blends," it seems simpler in the discussion below to call them subtypes. See Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, "Conceptual Projection and Middle Spaces," Report no. 9401, Department of Cognitive Science (San Diego: University of California, San Diego, 1994).

[24] This subtype is understood to have the meaning explained above in the discussion of Figure 1.

[25] Regarding illiberal democracy, see Figure 3. Two further points about diminished subtypes should be underscored. First, if scholars fail to identify the root definition of democracy in relation to which they form subtypes, it is difficult to determine whether a given subtype is classical or diminished.

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

FIGURE 2
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF CASES:
LADDER OF GENERALITY VERSUS DIMINISHED SUBTYPES

pose of illustration we focus on examples in which the author has been reasonably careful in isolating a single missing attribute. The subtypes in the first group (1a) refer to cases where the missing attribute is full suffrage. Here we find terms such as "male" or "oligarchical" democracy, which are used in pointing to the contrast between contemporary cases and historical cases prior to the advent of universal suffrage. Where the attribute of full contestation is missing (1b), as when important parties

Second, the fact that a subtype refers to what might be understood as a "problematic" feature of democracy does not necessarily mean that it is a diminished subtype. For example, O'Donnell's concept of "delegative democracy," which refers to cases with weak horizontal accountability among the branches of government, in fact meets his minimum definition of democracy, given that he does not include horizontal accountability in the definition. See O'Donnell (fn. 8), 56. Hence, in his usage, delegative democracy is a classical subtype. For a discussion of subtypes that refer to "problematic" democracies, see a longer version of the present analysis in David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy 'with Adjectives': Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," Working Paper no. 230 (Notre Dame, Ind.: The Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, 1996), 20–26. The above characterization of delegative democracy as a classical subtype should be understood as correcting the assessment of this subtype presented in Collier (fn. 10), 147–48.

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<table>
<tr><th colspan="3">1. Diminished from Procedural Minimum Definition</th></tr>
<tr><td>(1a)
Missing Attribute:
Full Suffrage
Limited democracy[a]
Male democracy[b]
Oligarchical democracy[c]</td><td>(1b)
Missing Attribute:
Full Contestation
Controlled democracy[d]
De facto one-party democracy[e]
Restrictive democracy[f]</td><td>(1c)
Missing Attribute:
Civil Liberties
Electoral democracy[g]
Hard democracy[h]
Illiberal democracy[i]</td></tr>
<tr><th colspan="3">2. Diminished from Expanded Procedural Minimum Definition</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Missing Attribute: Elected Government Has Effective Power to Govern
Guarded democracy[j]
Protected democracy[k]
Tutelary democracy[l]</td></tr>
</table>

FIGURE 3
PARTIAL DEMOCRACIES: EXAMPLES OF DIMINISHED SUBTYPES

[a]Ronald P. Archer, "Party Strength and Weakness in Colombia's Besieged Democracy," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 166.

[b]Georg Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Process and Prospects in a Changing World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 20.

[c] Jonathan Hartlyn and Arturo Valenzuela, "Democracy in Latin America since 1930," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America,* vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 99.

[d]Bruce Michael Bagley, "Colombia: National Front and Economic Development," in Robert Wesson, ed., *Politics, Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 125.

[e]Adrian Leftwich, "Governance, Democracy, and Development in the Third World," *Third World Quarterly* 14 (1993), 613.

[f]Carlos H. Waisman, "Argentina: Autarkic Industrialization and Illegitaimacy," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 69.

[g]Axel Hadenius, "The Duration of Democracy: Institutional vs. Socio-economic Factors," in David Beetham, ed. *Defining and Measuring Democracy* (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 69.

[h]Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 9. This is our translation of their *democradura.* In English they refer to this as "limited democracy," the same term used in 1a above, but they make it clear that their meaning corresponds to 1c.

[i]Donald Emmerson, "Region and Recalcitrance: Questioning Democracy in Southeast Asia" (Paper presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, 1994), 14.

[j]Edelberto Torres Rivas, "La gobernabilidad centroamericana en los noventa," *America Latina, Hoy* 2 (June 1994), 27. This is our translation of his *democracia vigilada.*

[k]Brian Loveman, " 'Protected Democracies' and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978–1993," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36 (Summer 1994), 108–11.

[l]Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., *Constitutionalism and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 60–61.

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are banned from electoral competition, we find terms such as "controlled" and "restrictive" democracy. Where civil liberties are incomplete (1c), scholars have used terms such as "electoral" and "illiberal" democracy.

The subtypes in the final group (2), introduced by the scholars who created the expanded procedural minimum definition, provide a useful reminder that the meaning of the subtypes depends on the root definition of democracy in relation to which they are formed. From the point of departure of that definition, these scholars introduced diminished subtypes in which the missing attribute is the effective power of the elected government to govern. These subtypes therefore do not meet the expanded procedural minimum standard for democracy, although they do meet the procedural minimum standard. Examples that refer to cases where the military is seen as having an inordinate degree of political power include "protected" and "tutelary" democracy.

Diminished subtypes, then, are a useful means to avoid conceptual stretching in cases that are less than fully democratic. They also provide differentiation by creating new analytic categories. Various scholars have pointed to the need to move beyond a dichotomous conceptualization of authoritarianism and democracy and recognize the "hybrid" or "mixed" character of many postauthoritarian regimes.[26] Figure 3 suggests that this recognition has indeed occurred, and on a rather large scale.

For countries that are less than fully democratic, however, the question arises as to whether it would be better to avoid identifying them as subtypes of democracy, for example, in cases of gross violations of civil liberties and/or severe restrictions on electoral competition. An example of such questioning is Bruce Bagley's rejection of the numerous diminished subtypes of democracy that have been applied to the National Front period in Colombia (1958–74); these include "restricted," "controlled," "limited," "oligarchical," "elitist," and "elitist-pluralist" democracy. Bagley instead characterizes Colombia as a subtype of au-

[26] James M. Malloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin America," in James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 256–57; Catherine M. Conaghan and Rosario Espinal, "Unlikely Transitions to Uncertain Regimes? Democracy without Compromise in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22 (October 1990), 555; Jonathan Hartlyn, "Crisis-Ridden Elections (Again) in the Dominican Republic: Neopatrimonialism, Presidentialism, and Weak Electoral Oversight," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36 (Winter 1994), 93–96; Terry Lynn Karl, "The Hybrid Regimes of Central America," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (Summer 1995); and Francisco Weffort, *Qual democracia?* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1992), 89–90.

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thoritarianism: as an "inclusionary authoritarian regime."[27] Other scholars have addressed this issue by climbing the ladder of generality to labels such as "civilian," "competitive," or "electoral" regime, which are found in the upper part of Figure 1. A third option is to use dismissive subtypes like those noted above, such as "facade democracy," in which the adjective essentially cancels the democratic character of the subtype. Scholars should be self-conscious about the analytic and normative implications of choosing to form subtypes in relation to democracy, as opposed to some other concept.

IV. Precising the Definition of Democracy

Another strategy of conceptual innovation focuses on the definition of democracy itself and is concerned with "precising" the definition by adding defining attributes.[28] As the concept is extended to new settings, researchers may confront a particular case that is classified as a democracy on the basis of a commonly accepted definition yet is not seen as fully democratic in light of a larger shared understanding of the concept. This mismatch between the case and the formal definition may lead analysts to make explicit one or more criteria that are implicitly understood to be part of the overall meaning, but that are not included in the definition. The result is a new definition intended to change the way a particular case is classified. Although this procedure of precising the definition could be seen as raising the standard for democracy, it can also be understood as adapting the definition to a new context. This innovation increases conceptual differentiation, by adding a further criterion for establishing the cutoff between democracy and nondemocracy. The strategy may thereby also avoid conceptual stretching because it does not apply the label "democracy" to cases that, in light of this new criterion, the analyst sees as incompletely democratic. Although the use of this strategy may arise from a concern with adapting the concept of democracy to fit a particular context, the modified definition should not be understood as being relevant only to that context. Indeed, the modified definition can also provide new insight into other cases for which the significance of the new defining attributes had not previously been fully appreciated.

[27] Bagley, "Colombia: National Front and Economic Development," in Robert Wesson, ed., *Politics, Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 125–27.

[28] See Giovanni Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis," in Sartori, ed., *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1984), 81; and Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, *Introduction to Logic*, 9th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 173–75. In *Social Science Concepts* (p. 42), Sartori also uses this as a verb, as in "to precise" a definition.

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One example of precising the definition is the emergence of the standard of an expanded procedural minimum, noted above. In several Central American countries, as well as in South American cases such as Chile and Paraguay, one legacy of authoritarian rule has been the persistence of "reserved domains" of military power over which elected governments have little or no authority.[29] Hence, despite free or relatively free elections, civilian governments in these countries are seen by some analysts as lacking effective power to govern. In light of these authoritarian legacies, and often in response to claims that because these countries have held free elections they are "democratic," some scholars have modified the procedural minimum definition of democracy by specifying as an explicit criterion that the elected government must to a reasonable degree have effective power to rule. With this revised definition, countries such as Chile, El Salvador, and Paraguay have been excluded by some scholars from the set of cases classified as democracies, even though they held relatively free elections.[30] These scholars have thus adapted the definition to explicitly include an attribute that is often taken for granted in studies of advanced industrial democracies but that is absent in these Latin American cases.

This revised definition has received substantial acceptance, although there certainly has not been full agreement on the treatment of specific cases. For example, in analyzing Chile in the post-1990 period, Rhoda Rabkin takes exception to the usage adopted by scholars who introduced the expanded procedural minimum definition. She argues that the problem of civilian control of the military does not represent a sufficient challenge to the democratically elected government to qualify Chile as a "borderline" democracy.[31]

Two other initiatives to precise the definition have not received similar acceptance, but they usefully serve to illustrate the issues that arise with this strategy. The first is found in discussions of what might be called a Tocquevillean definition of democracy that includes a focus on selected aspects of social relations. In analyzing postauthoritarian Brazil, scholars such as Francisco Weffort and Guillermo O'Donnell

[29] J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 70.

[30] Karl (fn. 13), 2; Valenzuela (fn. 29); and Brian Loveman, "'Protected Democracies' and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1979–1993," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36 (Summer 1994). See also Humberto Rubin, "One Step Away from Democracy" *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Fall 1990).

[31] Rhoda Rabkin, "The Aylwin Government and 'Tutelary' Democracy: A Concept in Search of a Case?" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 34 (Winter 1992–93), 165.

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have been struck by the degree to which rights of citizenship are undermined by the pervasive semifeudal and authoritarian social relations that persist in some regions of the country. In light of this concern, they have precised the definition of democracy so as to exclude Brazil. Thus, Weffort adds the definitional requirement of "some level of social equality" for a country to be considered a democracy, and O'Donnell introduces a similar stipulation.[32] In adopting this usage, these authors view themselves as remaining within the procedural framework. Yet introducing issues of social relations nonetheless represents an important departure from earlier procedural definitions. We will see in the next section that O'Donnell has subsequently arrived at an alternative means of incorporating this set of concerns into his conceptualization of democracy.

Another effort to precise the definition has arisen from a concern that in many new democracies in Latin America and in former communist countries, elected presidents at times make extensive use of decree power, circumvent democratic institutions such as the legislature and political parties, and govern in a plebiscitarian manner that is seen as having strong authoritarian undercurrents. In the Latin American context prominent examples include Carlos Menem in Argentina, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, and, in the most extreme case, Alberto Fujimori in Peru. The concern with these authoritarian tendencies has led some authors to include checks on executive power in their procedural criteria for democracy and thus to exclude cases of unconstrained presidentialism.[33] However, this innovation has likewise not been widely adopted.

Precising the definition can thus usefully serve both to introduce finer differentiation and to avoid conceptual stretching, and the associated debates have raised essential issues about the meaning that scholars wish to attach to the term "democracy." Yet caution is in order. Among the alternative strategies of conceptual innovation examined in this article, precising in a sense introduces the most drastic change: it modifies the definition of democracy itself. If an innovation based on

[32] Francisco Weffort, "New Democracies, Which Democracies?" Working Paper no. 198, Latin American Program (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1992), 18; Weffort (fn. 26), 100–101; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Challenges to Democratization in Brazil," *World Policy Journal* 5 (1988), 297–98; and idem, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," in Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela (fn. 29), 48–49.

[33] Authors who have employed horizontal accountability in their definitions include Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Summer 1991), 76, 87; and Alan R. Ball, *Modern Politics and Government*, 5th ed. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1994), 45–46. O'Donnell and Schmitter (fn. 13), 8, actually include it in their formal definition, but it appears to play no role in their subsequent analysis.

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precising is widely accepted, it has the important effect of changing the definitional point of departure with reference to which all of the other strategies are pursued, in effect unsettling the "semantic field" in which these scholars are working.[34] By contrast, the introduction of a new subtype does not affect the semantic field in the same way. In a literature in which conceptual confusion is a recurring problem, the analytic gains from precising the definition must be weighted against the cost of unsettling the semantic field.

Hence, it is important that scholars avoid "definitional gerrymandering,"[35] in the sense of introducing a new definition every time they encounter a somewhat anomalous case. However, the contrast between the first example (adding the criterion of effective power to govern) and the third example (adding horizontal accountability) shows that scholars may in fact impose constructive limits on precising. In the first example, the inability of elected governments to exercise effective power was seen as invalidating their democratic character. By contrast, in the third example, involving heavy-handed assertions of power by the president, a crucial point is that these presidents *are* elected leaders. Hence, it might be argued that it is appropriate to treat these regimes as meeting a minimal standard for democracy and to avoid precising—as long as (1) they maintain presidential elections and a general respect for civil liberties and the legislature and (2) opposition parties are not banned or dissolved (as occurred in Peru in 1992).

Finally, the initiative of precising can raise the issue of bringing back into the definition of democracy attributes that scholars previously had explicitly decided to exclude. An example is the concern with social relationships in the Tocquevillean approach. These authors could be seen as remaining within a procedural framework, in the sense that they argue that political participation becomes less meaningful in the context of extreme social inequality. However, this conceptual innovation reintroduces features of social relations in a way that nonetheless represents a major shift from earlier recommendations about which attributes should be included in definitions of democracy.

V. Shifting the Overarching Concept

Yet another strategy of conceptual innovation is to shift the overarching concept, in relation to which democracy is seen as a specific instance—that is, as a classical subtype. Thus, although scholars most commonly

[34] On the problem of unsettling the semantic field, see Sartori (fn. 28), 51–54.
[35] Jennifer Whiting, personal communication, suggested this term.

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view democracy as a subtype of the overarching concept "regime" (and the procedural criteria for democracy discussed above would routinely be understood as applying to the regime), some recent literature has understood democracy as a subtype in relation to other overarching concepts, as in "democratic government" and "democratic state." Hence, when a given country is labeled "democratic," the meaning can vary according to the overarching concept to which the term is attached.

A shift in the overarching concept can yield an alternative standard for declaring a particular case to be a democracy, yet without either modifying or stretching the concept of "democratic regime." As can be seen in Figure 4, scholars have used this strategy to create a standard that can be either less or more demanding. For example, a scholar who finds Brazilian democracy in the immediate post-1985 period to be so poorly institutionalized that it appears inappropriate to use the overarching label "regime" may refer to a "democratic situation." This distinction follows the example of Juan Linz's analysis of Brazil during the earlier post-1964 authoritarian period: he introduced the concept of an "authoritarian situation" to take account of the weak institutionalization of national political structures.[36] Other analysts concerned with the immediate post-1985 period in Brazil have referred to "democratic government" in order to suggest that although a particular government (that is, the head of state and the immediate political leadership that surrounds the head of state) has been elected democratically, the ongoing functioning of democratic procedures is not necessarily assured. By shifting the overarching concept from regime to government in this way, scholars lower the standard for applying the label "democratic."

Alternatively, by shifting the overarching concept from "regime" to "state," O'Donnell establishes a more demanding standard for labeling particular countries a democracy. Writing after Brazil's presidential election of 1989, which led scholars to reinterpret Brazil as having a democratic *regime*, O'Donnell raises questions about the democratic character of the *state* in Brazil, as well as in some other South American countries. He suggests that, in the context of the "neofeudalized" and at times "sultanistic" political relationships found in many parts of the country, the national state does not protect basic rights of citizenship,

[36] See Juan J. Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). Malloy uses "democratic moment" to convey a similar meaning. See Malloy (fn. 26), 236.

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Author	Lowering the Standard		Point of Departure	Raising the Standard
	Democratic Situation	Democratic Government	Democratic Regime	Democratic State
Duncan Baretta and Markoff[a]	Yes		No	
Hagopian and Mainwaring[b]		Yes	No	
O'Donnell (1988)[c]		Yes	No	
O'Donnell (1993)[d]			Yes	No

FIGURE 4
SHIFTING THE OVERARCHING CONCEPT:
CHARACTERIZING POST-1985 BRAZIL

[a]Silvio Duncan Baretta and John Markoff, "Brazil's *Abertura:* Transition to What?" in James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 62.

[b]Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring, "Democracy in Brazil: Problems and Prospects," *World Policy Journal* 4 (Summer 1987), 485.

[c]Guillermo O'Donnell, "Challenges to Democratization in Brazil," *World Policy Journal* 5 (Spring 1988), 281.

[d]Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems," *World Development* 21 (August 1993), 1360.

and specifically the rights of citizens to fair and equal protection in their social and economic relationships. This failure may not directly influence the functioning of the regime, in the sense of directly affecting the elections and associated civil liberties that are core features of the procedural understanding of a democratic regime. However, O'Donnell argues, this failure of the legal and bureaucratic institutions of the public sector to protect and promote a broader set of democratic rights of citizens is a crucial feature of the Brazilian state. Hence, although he recognizes that countries like Brazil have a democratic "regime," he *excludes* them from the set of countries he considers to have democratic "states." This shift in the overarching concept constitutes another way of making a more differentiated assessment of what is deemed to be an incomplete case of democracy, specifically by estab-

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lishing a higher and a lower standard for democracy and declaring that these countries meet only the lower standard.[37]

From the standpoint of maintaining a procedural definition of democracy, this innovation can be seen as a better solution to the problem that O'Donnell and others initially tried to address by creating the Tocquevillean definition. Thus, in conjunction with shifting the overarching concept, democratic "regime" continues to have a procedural definition, and this concern with the broader functioning of citizenship in the context of authoritarian patterns of social relations is addressed via the concept of the state.

To summarize, the strategy of shifting among alternative overarching concepts can serve to introduce finer differentiation by creating an additional analytic category. When the strategy is used to lower the standard for declaring a case to be a democracy, it can also help avoid stretching the concept of a democratic regime. When the strategy is used to raise the standard it is not relevant to the problem of conceptual stretching, because it is not concerned with avoiding what might be seen as the mistake of calling a given case a democratic regime. Rather, it provides *additional* information about cases that are accepted as having democratic regimes.

VI. Concluding Observations

We have examined strategies of conceptual innovation used by analysts of recent democratization as they seek to meet a twofold challenge: increasing analytic differentiation in order to adequately characterize the diverse regimes that have emerged in recent years and maintaining conceptual validity by avoiding conceptual stretching. Our goal has been both to make more comprehensible the complex structure of these strategies and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the strategies. Even when these scholars proceed intuitively, rather than self-consciously, they tend to operate within this structure, which, as noted above, is by no means unique to research on recent democratization.[38] Yet, in the interest of conceptual and analytic clarity, it is far more desirable for them to proceed self-consciously, with a full awareness of the trade-offs among the different strategies.

Figure 5 provides an overview of this analytic structure. Conceptual innovation has occurred at the three levels of the root concept of democ-

[37] Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," *World Development* 21, no. 8 (1993), 1359 and passim.

[38] See again references in note 10.

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

FIGURE 5
EVALUATING THE CONCEPTUAL INNOVATIONS:
CONTRIBUTION TO INCREASING DIFFERENTIATION AND AVOIDING CONCEPTUAL STRETCHING

racy itself, the subtypes, and the overarching concept. We observed that Sartori's strategies of (1) moving down the ladder of generality to classical subtypes of democracy and (2) moving up the ladder to classical subtypes of regime can usefully serve either to increase differentiation or to avoid conceptual stretching, but they cannot do both simultaneously. These two goals can be achieved simultaneously, however, by (3) creating diminished subtypes, (4) precising the definition of democracy by adding defining attributes, and (5a) shifting the overarching concept as a means of lowering the standard. By contrast (5b), shifting the overarching concept to raise the standard for democracy does not serve to

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avoid conceptual stretching vis-à-vis the concept of a democratic regime, but it does introduce new differentiation.

We have also underscored issues that are distinctive to particular strategies. Diminished subtypes are useful for characterizing hybrid regimes, but they raise the issue of whether these regimes should in fact be treated as subtypes of democracy, rather than subtypes of authoritarianism or some other concept. The strategy of precising the definition is subject to the perennial problem of scholarly disputes over definitions of democracy, as well as to the problem of imposing limits on definitional gerrymandering. Although the strategy of shifting the overarching concept with the goal of raising the standard is not relevant to the problem of conceptual stretching, it does allow scholars to introduce new analytic issues without abandoning a procedural definition of democracy and of regime.

Finally, these strategies share two common problems. First, given the complex structure of these strategies, the potential for confusion and miscommunication is considerable. It is imperative that scholars clearly define and explicate the conception of democracy they are using so as to situate themselves unambiguously in relation to this structure.

Second, this literature faces a major dilemma in the proliferation of concepts and terms, many of which mean approximately the same thing. The consequence, once again, can be growing scholarly confusion. Although new terms are created in part because scholars are pursuing these goals of differentiation and avoiding conceptual stretching, they may also be introduced with the goal of developing compelling labels that vividly draw attention to novel forms of democracy.[39] In the literature on national political regimes over the past three decades, important analytic innovations have periodically been introduced in conjunction with the creation and/or systematization of concepts and concept labels that vividly capture important constellations of phenomena: for example, "authoritarianism," "polyarchy," "bureaucratic authoritarianism," "corporatism," and "consociational democracy."[40] Correspondingly, the invention of additional concepts that play this same role is an impor-

[39] For a reminder of how important vivid labels can be, one need only look at the impressive evolution of game theory, with its codification of different patterns of political interaction designated by such labels as "prisoners' dilemma," "chicken," "stag hunt," "slippery slope," and "battle of the sexes."

[40] Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology*, Transactions of the Westermarck Society, vol. 10 (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1964); Dahl (fn. 3); Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Institute of International Studies, Politics of Modernization Series no. 9 (Berkeley: University of California, 1973); Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *Review of Politics* 36 (January 1974); and Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

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tant goal in the ongoing study of regimes. However, if research on democratization degenerates into a competition to see who can come up with the next famous concept, the comparative study of regimes will be in serious trouble.

Hence, we propose another major objective of concept usage, one that introduces a further trade-off vis-à-vis the two goals of achieving differentiation and avoiding conceptual stretching. In addition to pursuing these goals, scholars should aim for parsimony and avoid excessive proliferation of new terms and concepts. Otherwise, the advantages that derive from the conceptual refinements discussed in this article will be overridden by the resulting conceptual confusion.

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

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